

THE ROAD TO NON-ACTION:
THE OTTOMANS BETWEEN THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE MAHDIYYA IN
THE SUDAN

by
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ABSTRACT

THE ROAD TO NON-ACTION: THE OTTOMANS BETWEEN THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE MAHDIYYA IN THE SUDAN

Merve Uçar Nurcan

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Y. Hakan Erdem, Thesis Supervisor

Key words: Abdülhamid II, Mahdiyya, the Britain, Ottoman Orientalism and
Colonialism

The aim of the thesis is two-fold. The first one is to draw a comprehensive picture of the Mahdi revolt from an Ottoman point of view and the second one is to analyze the Ottoman perception of its distant periphery in the light of Ottoman colonialism/ orientalism debates. Although there are numerous studies regarding the British and Egyptian policy on the Sudan, the Ottoman perception of the Sudanese Mahdi had been largely ignored and studies remained limited in the literature. For this reason, this study also tries to fill the gap and add a contribution to the Ottoman-African relations from an Ottoman point of view.

There are three decisive features of Abdülhamid's policy of Sudanese Mahdi revolt: prevent spreading of revolution, non- intervention and legalism. The reasons of Abdülhamid's indecisive attitudes could be explained in three certain points. First, military and economic resources of the empire were inadequate to afford a campaign for such a distant place. Second, minor local conflicts could become an excuse for imperialist powers to intervene in the regions. Last, spreading of any clash to the Hejaz area could give irreparable damage to the prestige of the Sultan. For these reasons, Abdülhamid II did not show a hostile attitude towards the local Muslim rulers or mutineers despite serious pressures and threats come from European powers.

ÖZET

EYLEMSİZLİĞE DOĞRU:

SUDANDA İNGİLİZ İMPARATORLUĞU VE MEHDİ ARASINDA OSMANLILAR

Merve Uçar Nurcan

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Tez Danışmanı: Y. Hakan Erdem

Anahtar kelimeler: II. Abdülhamid, Mehdi, İngiltere, Osmanlı kolonyalizmi ve oryantalizmi

Bu tezin iki amacı vardır. Birincisi Sudandaki Mehdi ayaklanmasının Osmanlıların bakış açısından kapsamlı bir resmini çizmek ve ikincisi de Osmanlı kolonyalizmi/oryantalizmi tartışmaları ışığında Osmanlıların kendi uzak taşrasını nasıl gördüğünün bir analizi yapmaktır. Sudandaki İngiliz ve Mısır politikası hakkında çok sayıda çalışma olsa da, Sudanlı Mehdi'nin Osmanlı devleti tarafından nasıl algılandığı literatürde ihmal edilmiş ve bu konudaki çalışmalar sınırlı sayıda kalmıştır. Bu nedenle, bu çalışma alandaki boşluğu doldurmayı ve Osmanlı- Afrika ilişkilerine Osmanlıların bakış açısından bir katkı sunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

II. Abdülhamid'in Sudandaki Mehdi ayaklanmasına karşı üç tane belirgin politikası bulunmaktadır: ihtilalin yayılmasını önlemek, müdahale etmemek ve bölge üzerindeki hukuki haklarını savunmak. Abdülhamid'in bu politikası üç nedenle açıklanabilir. Birincisi, bu uzak bölgeye hareket düzenlemek için imparatorluğun yeterli askeri ve ekonomik kaynağı yoktu. İkincisi, küçük yerel çatışmalar emperyalist güçlerin bölgeye müdahale etmesi için bahaneye dönüşebilirdi. Son olarak, çatışmaların Hicaz bölgesine sıçraması sultanın prestijine onarılmaz zarar verebilirdi. Bu sebeple, II. Abdülhamid yerel Müslüman yöneticilere ya da isyankarlara karşı Avrupalı devletlerden gelen baskı tehditlere rağmen açıktan düşmanca bir tutum göstermemiştir.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BOA	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi
A. MTZ (05)	Sadâret Eyalet-i Mümtaze Mısır Evrakı
İ.HR	İrade Hariciye
İ. MTZ (05)	İrade Eyalet-i Mümtaze Mısır
Y.A.HUS	Yıldız Sadâret Hususî Marûzât Evrâkı
Y.EE	Yıldız Esas Evrâkı
Y. MTV	Yıldız Mütenevvi Maruzat
Y.PRK.ASK	Yıldız Perâkende Askerî Marûzât
Y.PRK.BŞK	Yıldız Perâkende Mâbeyn Başkitâbeti
Y.PRK.UM	Yıldız Perâkende Umum Vilayetler Tahrirâtı

To My Family,

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1.1: Introduction

The Sudanese Mahdi revolt was a watershed in the history of modern Sudan. It is also an important case study to shed light on the Ottoman foreign policy towards the Saharan Africa and offers some insight on a radical Islamist movement in the nineteenth century. It is also a fertile case to develop a perspective on the Ottoman colonialism and orientalism debates in historiography. The first political presence of the Ottoman Empire with the African continent has occurred in sixteenth century. The conquest of Egypt started the Ottoman dominance in North Africa and in the following four hundred years the Ottoman sphere of suzerainty continued to spread into the inside of the continent. Sudan had been conquered by Egypt in the first decades of the nineteenth century and remained under the rule of the Egyptian government for sixty years. Then the Mahdi revolt has broken out in 1881 against the Egyptian administration and British colonialism. Even after the death of Muhammad Ahmed, the mission had continued and spread to neighboring communities until 1898, the date of the reconquest of the Sudan by the British forces.

There are numerous studies regarding the British and Egyptian policy on the Sudan whereas Ottoman perception of the Sudanese Mahdi had been largely ignored and studies remained limited in the literature. For this reason, this study tries to fill the gap and add a contribution to the Ottoman-African relations from an Ottoman point of view. Ottoman response towards the Sudanese Mahdi offers an insight to understand Ottoman approach to the rapid European imperialism in the late nineteenth century.

1.2: Literature Review

It was in 1821 that Sudan had been conquered by the troops of Muhammad Ali Pasha and thereby the boundary of Ottoman Empire has been extended to the interiors of Africa. The truth of the matter is that the Ottoman Empire had never established direct centralized rule on the Sudan but strategic position of the country in terms of being Egyptian hinterland and being intersection point of Indian-Africa trade makes it important in the eyes of the Ottoman Empire. Besides, there has been a considerable Muslim population in the region that Ottoman Empire had to take care of them because of the caliphate. When the Mahdi revolt has broken out in 1881, the Sudan fell into eighteen years instability. It was this multi-dimensional incident affected the future of three countries: Ottoman Empire, Egypt and Britain. As a result of this mutiny, Egypt has gradually lost its sovereignty on Sudan and at the end; Sudan *de facto* became a colony of Britain separated from Egypt. In 1882, British troops “temporarily” occupied Ottoman Egypt in the wake of Urabi revolt but then with the spreading of the Mahdi rebellion British occupation remained permanent in Egypt. Because; they perceived the Mahdi riot as a threat to Egypt’s security. In addition to this, Britain has lost one of its prominent commanders Charles Gordon whose head was cut by the Mahdist dervishes in the war. This incident has caused an immense indignation in the British public and the British government has decided to take revenge for Gordon. On the other hand, it costed too much to the Ottoman Empire. First, even though the Ottoman Empire did not take it seriously, it was a challenge to the legitimacy of the sole caliphate. Secondly, this revolt was utilized by Britain as a pretext of permanency of Egyptian intervention and at the end the Ottoman Empire had to give up all legal rights on Sudan. Egypt remained under the occupation of Britain.

In between the period of outbreak of Mahdi revolt 1881 and the end of Turkey’s judicial rights on Sudan in 1923 is crucial in the history of Sudan and also Ottoman Empire-Egypt- British trio. Therefore, the literature about the Sudanese Mahdi movement developed in these countries and recently the case had been studied from the perspective of Ottoman Empire. This thesis is also aiming to approach the Mahdi revolt from the view of the Ottoman Empire. The sources about the Mahdiyya could be classified into three categories. First, European and Ottoman traveller accounts which composed of the personal narratives of civil and official travellers in Sudan; second, the

memoirs of officials like sir Henry Drummond Wolff and Earl of Cromer who served for British government in Egypt and the memoirs of Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, Ottoman high commissioner of Egypt; and last, the theses and books issued in the period or region would be reviewed in order to make a comprehensive analysis of Mahdi revolt. The Arabic literature which includes the Mahdi's personal letters and speech unfortunately is outside of this study because of the language shortcomings of this author.

In the first group, there are many traveller accounts written by Europeans during the Mahdiyya period. Rudolf von Slatin's *Fire and Sword in the Sudan: A Personal Narrative of Fighting and Serving the Dervishes, 1879-1895*¹, Father Joseph Ohrwalder's *Ten Years Captivity in the Mahdi's Camp: 1882-1892*² and Charles Neufeld's *A Prisoner of the Khaleefa: Twelve Years Captivity at Omdurman*³. These three books are the narrative of personal experiences of European travellers or officials who had come across with Mahdi. As active participators in the historic events, their testimonies are valuable to broadly understand the Mahdist movement. There could be found a wide range of knowledge in these personal notes on the organization of dervishes, perception of Egyptian and British rulers of the characteristics of Mahdi. Although the authors have been prisoners of war and their circumstances have been far away making objective observations, the importance of their pure descriptions and observations have been still useful for the researchers. Charles R. Watson's *The Sorrow and Hope in the Egyptian Sudan: A Survey of Missionary Conditions and Methods of Work in the Egyptian Sudan*⁴ should also be taken into consideration. What makes this book interesting that it describes the Sudan from the standpoint of missions. This book undertakes the story of what has been accomplished in terms of missionary activities and what could be done to ameliorate the current conditions. It was written in order to be a permanent missionary handbook thereby it encapsulates large spectrum of knowledge about the Sudan's history, people and geography. Existing missionary work and its methods and problems has added this account special prominence. This book has

¹R. Slatin Pasha, *Fire and Sword in the Sudan: A Personal Narrative of Fighting and Serving the Dervishes, 1879-1895*, trans. F. R. Wingate, (London: Edward Arnold, 1935).

² Father Joseph Ohrwalder, *Ten Years Captivity in the Mahdi's Camp: 1882-1892*, by Major F. R. Wingate, (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company, 1893).

³ Charles Neufeld, *A Prisoner of the Khaleefa: Twelve Years Captivity at Omdurman*, (London: Chapman & Hall, 1899).

⁴Charles R. Watson, *The Sorrow and Hope in the Egyptian Sudan: A Survey of Missionary Conditions and Methods of Work in the Egyptian Sudan*, (Philadelphia, Pa.: The Board of Foreign Missions of the United Presbyterian Church of North America, 1913).

been used by the students of United Presbyterian Church of North America for special missionary studies. It showed that the country of black have been pursued and worked in depth for a long time. James Dermesteter's *The Mahdi: Past and Present*⁵ is also relatively earl research on Mahdi. This book deserves to be examined in detail because it was written to guide Britain's Egyptian policy. According to author, history repeats itself so closely among Muslims and to recount the past and present story of Mahdi would be important for possible Mahdi movements in Muslim world in future. Indeed, this book gives signs of the long-term policies of Britain in the Muslim lands and this academic study provides a basis for the future attempts of Britain in Muslim countries. Formation of the idea of Mahdi in the early period of Islam, Mahdi in Persia, Africa, Turkey, Egypt and Sudan are the main parts of the book. Sudanese Mahdi, Mohammed Ahmed has been profoundly scrutinized and the mistakes of British government during the fight with dervishes have been put forth not to reiterate same mistakes.

On the other hand, Haim Shaked's *The Life of the Sudanese Mahdi* is based on the translated and annotated version of the *Sira*- biographical chronicle of the life and the campaigns of the Muhammad Ahmad was written by one of the Mahdi's followers *Ismail bin Abd al- Qadir*. The importance of the source was the reflection of the Sudanese view on both Turkiyya and Mahdiyya periods in Sudan. It was an original account in terms of four characteristics: Firstly it is the only one manuscript copy which is available. Secondly, it is the only contemporaneous biography of the Mahdi and chronicle of his uprising. Thirdly, it is the only known study written by a 19th century Sudanese Muslim who was one of the Mahdi's close adherents who collects the historical data and records it for next generations. Fourthly, Ismail's work has a unique position as an intermediate link between the more primary Mahdist documentation and Shuqayr's *Tarikh al-Sudan* published right after the Anglo-Egyptian conquest of the Sudan and first serious study based on primary sources by a non-Mahdist.⁶

Proffesor Mekki Shibeika is the first modern Sudanese historian who worked on the British and Sudanese archival sources and made use of personal letters and memoirs of the Mahdi family in order to illustrate Mahdiyya period of the Sudan. His great work *British Policy in Sudan 1882-1902*⁷ covers the twenty years period of Mahdiyya and

⁵ James Dermesteter, *The Mahdi: Past and Present*, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1885).

⁶ Haim Shaked, *The Life of the Sudanese Mahdi*, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1978).

⁷ Mekki Shibeika, *British Policy in the Sudan: 1882- 1902*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952)

British reconquest of Sudan. The mission of Charles Gordon has been taken seriously. The other most important researcher on the history of Sudan is Peter Holt who wrote *The Mahdist State in the Sudan: 1881-1898*⁸ and *A Modern History of the Sudan*.⁹ Holt seeks for the reasons and historical background of the Mahdi rebellion and the process of state formation with its impact on the future. *The Mahdiya: A History of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*¹⁰ by A.B. Theobald is another significant research about the Mahdi movement. Rather than concentrating on the Mahdi period, Theobald elucidates the period of caliph Abdullah's reign and military incidents. However, this book approaches the Sudan history in terms of politics and military instead of religious background of Mahdi movement. Moreover, *Historical Dictionary of the Sudan*¹¹ written by Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Richard Lobban and John Obert Voll is a comprehensive reference and research book for students and generalist researchers. It includes chronology and analysis of significant events which facilitate the study on Sudan history. Recently, likewise a source book dealing with Turkish literature about the Sudan was prepared by Turkish scholars, as well.¹²

Although the Sudan was by Ottoman, de jure, a province of the Ottoman Empire and there exists bunches of official documents in the Ottoman archives, studies on relations between Sudan and Ottoman Empire are very few. Veysel Akdoğan's master thesis, *Sudan Mehdisi'nin İsyanına Dair Bazı Osmanlı Vesikaları: 1881-1885*¹³, is one of the works that uses some archival documents. It chronologically covers the short period of time from Mehdi's declaration to his death with a special reference to Gordon Pasha's incumbency. Alperen Çelik's *Sünni Dünyada Belli Başlı Mehdilik Hareketleri*¹⁴ study also touches briefly on the Sudanese Mahdi by giving place to his life and ideas. Furthermore, Ömer Koçyiğit's recent study *From Sufi Movement to Statehood: The Mahdi Uprising in the Ottoman Sudan 1881-1885*¹⁵ is an important contribution to the Mahdi literature. He focuses on the four-year rebellion period from 1881 to 1885 and

⁸ Peter M. Holt, *The Mahdist State in the Sudan: 1881-1898*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Second Edition, 1970).

⁹ Peter M. Holt, *A Modern History of the Sudan: From the Funj Sultanate to the Present Day*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961).

¹⁰ A. B. Theobald, *The Mahdiya: A History of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1881-1899*, (London: Longmans, 1952).

¹¹ Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Richard A. Lobban and John Obert Voll, *Historical Dictionary of the Sudan*, (Metuchen: The Scarecrow Press, Fourth Edition, 2013).

¹² Ahmet Kavas, Muhammed Tandoğan and M. Birol Ülker, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Afrika Bibliyografyası*, ed. Zekeriya Kurşun, (İstanbul: Taş Mektep Yayıncılık, 2013), pp. 341-346.

¹³ Veysel Akdoğan, *Sudan Mehdisi'nin İsyanına Dair Bazı Osmanlı Vesikaları (1881-1885)*, (Unpublished master's thesis, Marmara University, 1993).

¹⁴ Alperen Çelik, *Sünni Dünyada Belli Başlı Mehdilik Hareketleri* (Unpublished Master thesis, Marmara University, 2005).

¹⁵ Ömer Koçyiğit, *From Sufi Movement to Statehood: The Mahdi Uprising in the Ottoman Sudan 1881-1885*, (Unpublished master's thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2014).

the echoes of the Mahdi uprising in the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, Tarig M. Nour's *Sevakin'de Türk-İngiliz Rekabeti*¹⁶ stress on how Ottoman Empire lost his judicial rights on Sudan. Also, he claims that the Sudanese Mahdi revolted against the corrupt Egyptian administration rather than Ottoman Empire and he refers to the influence of Britain in the uprising. Ismail H. Göksoy's *The Establishment of Anglo-Egyptian Rule in the Sudan 1897-1914*¹⁷ mentions about the British state formation in Sudan in all its parts. Political, social and economic policies towards changing the structure of the Sudanese state have been elaborately examined throughout the study. He also analyses the importance of Nile valley and conflicts amid Britain, France and Italy for the region. Moreover, Mustafa Minawi's PhD thesis *Lines in the Sand: The Ottoman Empire's Policies of Expansion and Consolidation on its African and Arabian Frontiers (1882-1902)*¹⁸ explores the Ottoman Empire's policies along its southern frontiers, between 1882 and 1902. But he touches upon the Mahdist state very briefly.

The memoirs of Evelyn Baring also known as the Earl of Cromer is a substantial source for people who are interested in Egypt's history. His two volumes book *Modern Egypt*¹⁹ published in 1908 and covers the Baring's experiences during his service 1883-1907 in Egypt as consul-general. Occupation of Egypt, withdrawal from the Sudan, the choice of Gordon to carry out the task and leaving him to death are the some of the crucial issues have been undertaken throughout the books. Additionally, the memoirs of Sir Henry Drummond Wolff²⁰ who was sent on a special mission to Constantinople to negotiate Britain's position in Egypt during the time period of 1885-1887 is a momentous volume. As a result of the negotiations, high commissioners from both sides were dispatched to Egypt in order to reorganize the army and to reform the general administration. In 1887, the Anglo-Ottoman Convention was signed with the promise of Britain to evacuate Egypt at the end of three years. As the chief witnesses of this fervent negotiation process, Wolff's memoir is crucial to grasp the political atmosphere and social conditions of the period. On the other hand, Rıfat Uçarol's *Bir Osmanlı Paşası ve Dönemi*²¹ narrates Ahmed Muhtar Pasha's political and military life. He served as Ottoman high commissioner in Egypt during 1885-1908. He carried out the negotiations

¹⁶ Tarig Mohamed Nour, *Sevakin'de Türk-İngiliz Rekabeti*, (Unpublished PhD thesis, Istanbul University, 2006).

¹⁷ Ismail H. Göksoy, *The Establishment of Anglo-Egyptian Rule in the Sudan 1897-1914*, (Unpublished Master thesis, Universtiy of Manchester, 1986)

¹⁸ Mostafa Minawi, *Lines in the Sand: The Ottoman Empire's Policies of Expansion and Consolidation on its African and Arabian Frontiers (1882-1902)*, (Unpublished PhD thesis, New York University, 2011).

¹⁹ The Earl of Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, 2 Vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1908).

²⁰ Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, *Rambling Recollections*, (London: Macmillan and co., limited, 1908)

²¹ Rıfat Uçarol, *Bir Osmanlı Paşası ve Dönemi*, (İstanbul, Milliyet Yayınları, 1976).

with his counterpart Sir Henry Drummond Wolff. Uçarol's biographical study paved the way for the illustration of this peculiar time period from the standpoint of Ottoman official. There are also personal accounts of Ottoman elites who travelled to the interior of Africa and wrote their memoirs about the inhabitants and political conditions. Both the discourse of the author and their observations about the region are precious for researchers in order to comprehend Ottoman's intention towards the elites.²²

In addition, Ottoman-African studies in Turkish historiography have been newly flourishing. Cengiz Orhonlu's *Habeş Eyaleti*²³ is the primary but constituent study in the field. Eastern politics of the Ottoman Empire has been put forward with a consistent and holistic point of view. There could be found valuable information about the geography, society and trade of the region and the establishment of Habesh province. The variety and numbers of the archival documents enhance the value of the book. Orhonlu also touches upon Ottoman-Egyptian relations and directly to Sudan through Britain's colonial aspirations in the region in one chapter. Similarly, Hatice Uğur's *Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Bir Sultanlık: Zengibar*²⁴ delves into the concept of *Afrika-i Osmani* through the small country located on the shore of Indian Ocean. Even though there is not a specific reference to the Sudan or the Mehdi rebellion in the book, its methodology and approach to Africa is an important contribution to the field of African history. She showed that European scramble for Africa in the nineteenth century has reached up to the coast of East Africa. Süleyman Kızıltoprak has examined diplomatic part of the Ottoman-Britain struggle in Egypt in detail. His document-oriented study *Mısır'da İngiliz İşgali: Osmanlı'nın Diploması Savaşı (1882-1887)* explores the Egyptian occupation and Ottoman diplomatic war against Britain in order to end temporary invasion in a reasonable period of time. The Sudan has been dealt in part in the book, as well. Muhammed Tandoğan's *Afrika'da Sömürgecilik ve Osmanlı Siyaseti*²⁵ also approaches the issue from a political point of view. He gives brief information about each Ottoman African country yet scope of the book has remained insufficient to make in depth analysis for each country's political conditions. However, it could be used as a guidebook for the newcomers of the field. On the other hand, the

²² See, Mehmed Mihri, *Sudan Seyahatnamesi* (İstanbul: Ahmed İhsan ve Seyahatnamesi Şurekası, 1326), Sadık el-Müeyyed, *Afrika Sahra-yı Kebiri'nde Seyahat: Bir Osmanlı Zabitanın Büyük Sahra'da Seyahati*. İstanbul: Çamlıca Basım Yayın, 2008), Sadık el-Müeyyed., *Habeş Seyahatnamesi*, (İstanbul: Kaknüs, 1999) and Cami Baykut, *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2009).

²³ Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Güney Siyaseti: Habeş Eyaleti*, (Ankara: TTK, 1996).

²⁴ Hatice Uğur, *Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Bir Sultanlık Zengibar*, (İstanbul: Klasik, 2005).

²⁵ Muhammed Tandoğan, *Afrika'da Sömürgecilik ve Osmanlı Siyaseti*, (Ankara: TTK, 2013).

study of distinguished Turkish historian Kemal Karpat's *Politicization of Islam*²⁶ attaches special importance to a variety of Muslim revivalist-fundamentalist movements in the late Ottoman Empire. One of them is the Mahdi uprising in the Sudan. He elaborates on those movements from the perspective of Ottoman government's own Islamist ideology.

1.3: Outline of the Chapters

The first political presence of the Ottoman Empire with the African continent has occurred in the sixteenth century. The 1517 Egyptian conquest started the Ottoman dominance in North Africa and in the following four hundred years the Ottoman sphere of suzerainty continued to spread into the inside of the continent. The Abyssinia province established by Özdemiş Pasha in 1555 and *Hatt-ı Istiva* province which is a part of current South Sudan came under the rule of Ottoman Empire via Egyptian Khedivial administration in 1876, proving that Ottoman existence in Africa was not limited to merely northern part of the continent, they also had enhanced noteworthy political and economic relationships with eastern and southern Africa, as well.²⁷ On the other hand, in the course of these four hundred years, *Kuloğlu* descendants of janissaries married with native women emerged as Ottoman ruling elite in Africa. They lived in accordance with the local tradition and customs and deserved to be called *ahali-i sadika* in their regions. They were charged with collecting levies and maintaining security and order on behalf the Ottoman Sultan.²⁸ As it is seen Ottoman influence on the continent was widespread not only in a political but also demographic sense.

In the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was no longer the only actor who claimed rights on North Africa. This challenge in fact relies on two major landmarks in African history which concerns the industrial European powers closely. The year of 1869 is a milestone on the road to partition. First, in South Africa, a huge diamond mine was discovered and second The Suez Canal was completed. Both events increased the economic value of Africa for European great powers that sought raw material and market for their industries.²⁹ In the early 1880s the scramble for Africa had begun to

²⁶ Kemal Karpat, *Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

²⁷ Hatice Uğur, *Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Bir Sultanlık: Zengibar*, p.1

²⁸ Ahmet Kavas, *Osmanlı-Afrika İlişkileri*. (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2011), p.65.

²⁹ Gann, Lewis H. and Peter Duignan. *Burden of Empire: An Appraisal of Western Colonialism in Africa South of the Sahara*. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), p.195.

gain speed. Soon after, partition of Africa caused disagreements among Europeans especially; Britain, France, Germany, Italy. This was the first trial of the fragile balance of power system in Europe. The General Act of Berlin was a watershed agreement which formulated the legal framework for the colonization of Africa among the great powers. Berlin Conference with the invitation of German chancellor Bismarck was convened between 15 November 1884 and 26 February 1885. Attended by fifteen European powers including the Ottoman Empire, this was the first conference that aims setting the rules for the division of the continent of Africa between the major powers. They agreed on the free navigation on Congo and Niger rivers and on free trade with each state. The Ottoman state had also joined the conference owing to having lands in the continent. But soon exploration committees in Africa created uneasiness in the Sublime Porte and in order to protect the Ottoman legal rights, a report that indicates the borders of the Egyptian administration in Africa was demanded from Ahmed Muhtar Pasha.³⁰

In the nineteenth century, although the Ottoman state did not have military power to keep or interfere in its remote territories, it had always carried out a deliberate foreign policy by using all diplomatic and legal means. According to the Ottoman state, the Muslim people in the region could not be relinquished to non-Muslim rules and they had historical and legal rights over Egypt. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire has waged its claims and diplomatic efforts on African lands until the Fashoda Crisis of 1899 when the borders of British and French colonial possessions were demarcated and Ottoman demands were totally put aside. Minawi points out several reasons that are significant

³⁰ “..... Buna dair olan mütâalat arz edebilmek üzere idare-i Mısıriyye’ye geçen arazi neden ibarettir. Evvel emirde anı bilmek için bu babda sahih ve resmi haritanın elde edilmesi lüzumunun cevaben takdim kılınan ariza-i mezkurede dermeyan olunması mütâalat-ı atiyeden neşet etmişti. Zira 21 Zilhicce 1256 tarihli ferman-ı ali ile Nubye, Darfur, Kordofan ve Sennar kıt’alarının Mısır’a ilhaken idaresi Mehmed Ali Paşa’ya verilmiş ve 12 Muharrem 1283 tarihli ferman ile de ma’a mülhakat Massava ve Sevakin kaimmakamlıkları ve 27 Cumadelula 1292 tarihli hatt-ı hümayun ile Zeyla iskelesi İsmail Paşa hazretleri idaresine bırakılmış olduğu malum ise de ahiran Hidivviyet-i Mısıriyye-i Sudan içinde ve Hatt-ı İstiva’ya doğru tevsi ve tesis-i idare ederek oraları fersah fersah ilerü geçüp Devlet-i Aliyye namına daha bir hayli yerleri taht-ı inzibata almış olduğu ve bu defa taaruz edilmek istenen ise o yerler içinde bulunmuş olacağı cihetle hudud-ı Mısıriyye o cihetten nerelere kadar vasıl olabilmışdir. Buralarına dair devletçe bir malumat-ı sahiha ve hakikiyyenin fıkdanı mütâalası ariza-i mezkurenin takdimine esas idi. Bu esas bilinmedikçe temhid ve te’yid-i müddeanın kesb-i kuvvet edemeyeceği ve belki kabil olamayacağı zann-ı acizlerince hala bakidir. Çünkü Mısır’a merbut Sudan mülhakatını yalnız eyalat-ı erbaa-i mezkureden ibarettir der isek pek mühim olan Hatt-ı İstiva Müdüriyeti gayb edilmiş olur. Hasılı Sudan’ın hal ve istikbaline müteallik olan mütâalat hep öyle resmi bir haritanın elde edinilmesiyle tehassün ve kesb-i kuvvet edeceği re’yinde olduğum muhat-ı ilm-i sami-i hazret-i sedaretpenahileri buyruldukda ol babda emr u ferman hazret-i veliyyü’l emrindir. Fi 27 Ramazan 311, fi 23 Mart 310”quoted in: İdris Bostan, *Orta Afrika’da Nüfuz Mücadelesi ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu (1893-1895)*. (Ankara: Belleten 210, 1990) p.688.
BOA, Mümteze-i Mısır 5A 135/ 21

for the participation of the Ottoman Empire in the Conference of Berlin. According to him, first, signing of the General Act of Berlin means that the participants of the conference has confirmed the right of the Ottoman Empire to the Mediterranean coast of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Secondly, Ottoman Empire recognized the rights of France over the Muslim majority areas which were previously Ottoman provinces of Algeria and Tunisia by agreeing on the new rules of the conference. On the other hand, Ottoman Empire, de facto, had to redefine an integral part of the empire by signing the agreement with new European imperial terms and thereby affirmed the claims of European powers gaining possessions in Africa. This by default rebutted the empire's historical claims on the African provinces.³¹

The aim of this thesis is two-fold. The first is to scrutinize the Mahdi revolt with all dimensions by using Ottoman official sources; the second is to understand the Ottoman perception of his periphery through Ottoman colonialism/orientalism debates particularly in the case of Sudanese rebellion. In the context of imperialism, the policies conducted by the Ottoman state against the struggles in her domains and the local resistance towards foreign penetrations will be studied. Sudan is the basic concern of the thesis due to the fact that the Mahdi revolution enables us to discover the regional insurgency opposed to British imperialism in Sudan.

To do this, the thesis is organized into five main parts. At the beginning general information about the Sudanese geography, people and livelihood will be discussed through certain geographical accounts. Important port cities surroundings of the Sudan will be also briefly touch upon to understand vitality of slave trade, rivalries for the region and the volume of the natural resources. Then in the second chapter, Egyptian question which has a great impact on the march of events in the Sudan will be handled. Egypt and Sudan's legal status composed of the main concern of the chapter. Besides, Urabi revolt and British intervention as a subsequent consequence of this rebellion will be examined with the impacts on the Sudanese movement. In the third chapter, Turco-Egyptian period in the Sudanese history will elaborate in detail. The reasons of the Sudanese conquest by Muhammad Ali Pasha, modernization endeavors and suppression of slave trade in the reign of Ismail Pasha are the basic matters of this chapter. In the following chapter, Mahdiyya period will be concerned as the initial step for independent

³¹ Mustafa Minavi, *Lines in the Sand: The Ottoman Empire's Policies of Expansion and Consolidation on its African and Arabian Frontiers (1882–1902)*, p.37.

Sudan. The life of Muhammad Ahmed, proclamation of his mahdship, his victories and overthrow of his movement will be examined from Ottoman point of view. Then, Ottoman response to the Mahdi revolt and British penetration would be scrutinized through Ahmed Muhtar Pasha's reports and politics of Pan-Islamism. In the last chapter, in the light of Ottoman colonialism/orientalism debates, Ottomans' stance to its periphery particularly to the Mahdi movement would be analyzed in depth. Thus, general appraisal of nineteenth century Ottoman policy in Africa would be made upon the example of Sudan. First and foremost the basic concern of the thesis is to approach the historiography of African colonialism from the perspective of Ottoman Empire and put forward the similarities and differences of Ottoman glance to the continent from the European imperialistic/ colonial aspirations.

1.4: General information about Sudan

Sudan takes its name from the medieval Arab geographers' *bilad al-Sudan* which means the land of blacks. The origin of the term Sudan is a derivation from the plural form of Arabic word 'sud' meaning blacks as an indication to the skin colors of the inhabitants living in the region. Some eighteenth and nineteenth century European writers called the region Nigritia, as well.³² The territories in the most general sense contain the area of West and Central Africa and south of the Sahara. It was only in the nineteenth century that the name is applied to the countries of the Nile basin, which were conquered by the troops of Muhammad Ali in 1820-1822 and thereafter this territory known as Egyptian Sudan.³³ Present day Sudan comprises only the eastern part of this defined territory. In the nineteenth century, the scope of the Sudan was much larger than its current borders. Mahdi movement did not remain limited with these territories and spread to wider regions.

There are a variety of Ottoman descriptions about the borders of Sudan. One of the prominent geographical accounts Mehmed Muhsin's *Afrika Delili* demarcates Sudan's border between the Basin of Chad Lake and the Niger River.³⁴ On the other

³² P.M.Holt, *The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881-1898*, (London, Oxford University Press, 1958), p.1.

³³ Brill's First Encyclopedia of Islam, "Sudan", IX, p. 208.

³⁴ Mehmed Muhsin, *Afrika Delili*, (Kahire: el-Fellah Ceridesi Matbaası,1312), pp.89-90.

"Sudan merkezi namı altında sahranın taraf-ı cenubisinde sudan-i garbı ile sudan-i mısırı arasında ve Afrikanın kısm-ı dahilisinde vaki' müttesi' bir kıta olup hududu pek meşkur olduğundan adeta gayri kabil-i mahza umumiyeti itibar ile Sudan merkezi Çad gölü havzasıyla Nijer nehrinin vasatında kain vasi' bir kıtayı ve nehr-i mezkurun yatakları olan başlıca ırmakları ve Benue'yi dahi muhitdir."

hand, Mehmed Mihri in his *Sudan Seyahatnamesi* defined the borders more strictly as being located between the longitudes of 15- degree west and 25- degree east.³⁵ However, both sources point out that political turmoil and conflicts among the kingdoms and sultanates founded in the center of Sudan precludes the determination of exact borders. In this thesis, the Sudan would refer to the area lying from western borders of Ethiopia on the east stretching to Atlantic Ocean on the west. Great Sahara and Libya form the northern border of the country with 10 -degree northern latitude in the south.³⁶

The Sudan was a vast country that displays substantial differences in terms of ethnicity, language and religion in the nineteenth century. It falls naturally into two distinct regions: north and south. As a broad generalization, the northern part of the country was predominantly Arab and Muslim whereas the southern part was mainly “Negroid” and pagan. Among the black tribes of the south there are an immense variety of languages and cultures which make a qualified tribal classification extremely hard. The arabization of the northern Sudan occurred for the sake of tribes who had already migrated from Arabia to Upper Egypt. Northern inhabitants of the Sudan therefore had close racial and linguistic affinities with the people of Upper Egypt who lived between Aswan and Wadi Halfa. They were generally known as Nubians. They claimed to have come from Arab origin but historical and anthropological evidence show that they were a mixture of “Negroes” who were the original inhabitants of northern Sudan, and Caucasians who migrated to Sudan in ancient Egyptian times.³⁷ The Sudanese who claim Arab descend could be divided into two. Arabized Nubians composed of the *Barabra* and *Ja’ali* tribes, which were mainly sedentary and the other group of tribes were *Juhayna* waging nomadic or semi-nomadic life. There were also innumerable sub-tribes like *Shukriyya*, *Kabbabish*, *Baqqara* in the region.³⁸ The common point of these various tribes is that they are Muslim and they speak Arabic.

On the other hand, according to MacMichael’s classification for the southern part of Sudan there were three main groups of “Negro” tribes speaking many different

³⁵ Mehmed Mihri, *Sudan Seyahatnamesi*, (İstanbul: Ahmed İhsan ve Şürekası, 1326), pp.152-153.

“Asıl Sudan 5/15 arz-ı şimali ve 15 tul-i garbi ile 25 derece tul-i şarki aralarında mümtedd olur. Nilin hızası dahilinde bulunarak bu nehre dökülen enharın menba’ı, mecralarını havi olan kısım-i şarkisine (Sudan-ı şarki), Çad gölünün hızasını teşkil eden ve bu büyük göle dökülen enharın müsadif olduğu kısım-ı vasatiye (Sudan-ı vasati), (?) ırmağının hızasına tesadüf eden kısım-ı garbiyesine de (Sudan-ı garbi) namı veriliyor.

³⁶ Ahmet Kavas, “Sudan”, *Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi*, XXXVII, p.459.

³⁷ Mekki Abbas, *The Sudan Question*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1952), p. 3.

³⁸ P.M.Holt & M.W.Daly, *A History of the Sudan*, (Edinburg: Pearson, 2000), pp.3-6.

languages. The first is Nilotic folk composed of *Shilluk*, *Dinka*, *Nuer* and *Anuak* who deal with their cattle. The second was the Nilo-Hamities comprising *Bari*, *Didinga*, *Turkana* tribes who were the cultivators, and herdsmen living the hills. The third one is the *Azande* living in the forest area of Bahr el Ghazal. This last tribe was the branch of the tribes of Belgian Congo who invaded the country in the nineteenth century; thereby they had different characteristics than other southern tribes.³⁹ As seen, the vastness of the country reflects to population as a complexity and heterogeneity in terms of language and ethnicity.

Furthermore, nineteenth century Ottoman traveller Mehmed Mihri presented another classification for the Sudan's tribal society. He divided the society into three. For him, "Negroids" were the essential component of the society. They spoke peculiar languages and belong to many different tribal groups. Another group is *fellahs* who were dark-skinned but racially Caucasian people. They had established some states and disseminated the Islam into the southern and western part of the country. The last one was the Arabs who were the dominated groups engaged in animal selling and commerce particularly in the northern part of the Sudan. They also served the spreading of Islam into the inner part of the country and used Arabic in politics.⁴⁰

In brief, for the nineteenth century although there was wide divergence in habitat and mode of life, the Sudanese people could be summarized in four categories in terms of their livelihood: camel-breeding and cattle breeding nomads, sedentary villagers and town-dwellers. Some of them also kept horses and made a reputation of hunting giraffes and elephants. Sometimes, despite their racial and tribal origins are similar, the way of life could differ from each other. Husbandry and commerce formed the main field of

³⁹ Sir Harold Macmichael, *The Sudan*, (London: Ernest Benn, 1954), p.17.

⁴⁰ Mehmed Mihri, *Sudan Seyahatnamesi*, p.156

"Ahalisinin cinsi, lisan ve mezhepleri: asıl yerli ahalisi zenci ırkına mensup olan Sudanlılar birçok akvama münkasım ve her biri kendine mahsus bir lisanla mütakellimdirler. Bu akvamin birbirlerinden renk ve simaca ahlak ve adetçe az çok farkları varsa da beynlerindeki karabetin ve lisanları arasındaki müşahebetin derecatı henüz anlaşılamamıştır. Ancak yerli zencilerden başka Sudan'da iki kavim daha münteşirdir ki bunların biri (kule) yahud fellah denilen muharib bir kavimdir, renkleri ziyadece esmer ise de simaca tamamen ırk-ı Kafkasiye mensub, mütenasibtavır ve harekete malik adamlardır. Sudanın her tarafına intişar eden ve millet-i hakime gibi geçinen bu kavim birtakım devletler tesis ederek bu son zamanlarda Sudan'ın cenub ve garb cihetlerinde neşr-i İslam etmişler ve gittikçe etmekte bulunmuşlardır. Mezkur iki kavimden diğeri Arablardır ki birbirleriyle mahlut olukları halde Sudan'ın her tarafında ve alelhusus kısm-ı şimalisinde heyvanat ahz ve itasıyla ve ticaret ile meşgul olurlar. Bunların ihtilati ve din-i İslamın kuvvet ve nufuzuyla lisan-ı Arabi hem bütün Sudan'nın lisan-ı edebi ve siyasiyesi sırasına geçmiş ve hükümdarların saraylarında ve hükümet dairelerinde arabi tekellüm edilmekte bulunmuştur. Sudanın şark ve şimal kısmı ahalisi zaten eskiden beri müslim olub, kısm-i cenubi ve garbisinde dahi mezkur fellahların ictihadiyla din-i İslam taammum ederek ahcar ve eşcar ve haşarat ve cemadata ibadet edenler kalmadığı gibi din-i İslam tecavüzle, Afrika-i cenubiye doğru dahi taammum ve günden güne terakki ve tevessu' etmektedir."

occupation. Conversely, Arabic was the predominant language of the country, particularly in the north. It was the only language of letters and administration, but other indigenous languages survive, too. The religion of Islam was likewise mostly dominant in the northern side of the country. Indeed, Medieval Nubia was a Christian country, in the tenth century. Islam came into the northern Sudan in results of Arab immigration and later on Egyptian protectorate while Christianity; paganism and native beliefs still existed in the south.⁴¹

Additionally, there was strong political antagonism between the northern and southern inhabitants; each has its own culture and tradition that results from the slavery. Throughout the nineteenth century, slave raiding and the slave trade were carried on by northern Muslim Sudanese and encouraged by Egyptian governor of the Sudan. This situation created feelings of hatred among the enslaved pagan people against the northerners and foreign power.⁴² Northern slave-dealers sold the slaves gathered from the south to the Egyptian slave bazaars, then some of them has brought into the capital and selected for Palace. For instance, *Beşir Agha* (d. 1159/1746) one of the prominent chief eunuchs of the harem was an Ethiopian slave. He had been emasculated in Upper Egypt, sold in Cairo and brought into *Topkapı* Palace. He raised the position of head chief in harem and succeeds to remain same post during twenty-nine years.⁴³

Through the conquest of Egypt in 1517, Ottoman Empire gained the territories that formerly belonged to the *Mamluk* sultanate and expanded its borders towards the south of Arabian Peninsula. Therefore Ottoman Empire came into contact with Nubia, Ethiopia, and Zanzibar by land and Aden and India by sea. Controlling the trade routes provided the Ottoman Empire a strategic position in the port cities on the shore of Red Sea. These cities were close to Hejaz area and crucial for the spreading of the ideas from Africa to Arabian Peninsula.

The most important port city in the shore of Red Sea was Sewakin (today, a port in the north-eastern Sudan) seized by Ottomans in 1524. The port of Sewakin was on the trade roads; thereby the most important source of income of the city was commerce. The trade of pearl in time became a part of the overseas trade. Moreover, the port of Sewakin has been one of the key gathering places of slaves from the Sudan and

⁴¹ Brill's First Encyclopedia of Islam, "Sudan", IX, p.210.

⁴² Mekki Abbas, *the Sudan Question*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1952), p.19.

⁴³ See, Jane Hathaway, *Beshir Agha: Chief Eunuch of the Ottoman Imperial Harem* (Oneworld Publications, 2006).

Abyssinia and to be dispatched to India, Egypt and Arabia. In the exportation of cereals and animal products to the Hejaz, Sewakin has been in an intermediary position, as well.⁴⁴ In the nineteenth century, Egypt put a claim for the port city and took possession of the city in 1865 as a result of the arrangement with the Sultan. Besides, the importance of Sewakin port has been particularly increased right after the construction of Suez Canal. In the last decade of the nineteenth century Ottoman High Commissioner Ahmed Muhtar Pasha wrote a letter to the palace and highlighted that Sewakin could not be abandoned to any foreign state. He points out the activities of Britain in the region and warned the Sultan about the future of Sewakin.⁴⁵

The other important port in the shores of Red Sea is Massawa. (today, a city on the Red Sea coast of Eritrea) It was the door of African countries opening up to the world. The products generated in Abyssinia disseminated all over the world from this port. Hence, throughout the history, all states strove for Massawa to keep it under their own control. It was in 1536, when the Ottomans took the city under domination. In the eighteenth century, Britain started to show interest in the Red Sea trade and soon after the number of British ships increased. On the other hand, Massawa had also great importance for Muhammad Ali Pasha who dreamed of an independent Egypt from the Ottoman Empire. However, Massawa had been given to Muhammad Ali Pasha as *salyane* during reign of Sultan Abdülmecid. Similar to Sewakin, pearl hunting, husbandry and slave trade formed the substantial source of income of the people.⁴⁶

The third noteworthy port city of the region was Zeila. (today, a port city in the northwestern Awdal region of Somalia) In 1520, Zeila entered into the Ottoman sovereignty and become the center of Habesh Province during under Osman Pasha, the son of *Özdemir* Pasha. Although Zeila was left to Egypt's administration for a while in the nineteenth century, later on it was reconnected to Istanbul.⁴⁷ Furthermore, Zeila was the place where people were known as very pious. Most of the learned books were distributed from there and it could be said that it was the frontier of Islam. Every year people raided against the Habesh for the sake of Allah and by the way of holy war.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Nihal Şahin Utku, *Çöl, Gemi ve Tacir: Kızıldeniz*, (İstanbul: Klasik, 2012), p.42.

⁴⁵ BOA, YEE., 129/43, 28 Rebiyyülahir 1306 (1 January 1889)

⁴⁶ Hatice Uğur, *Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Bir Sultanlık Zengibar*, (İstanbul: Klasik, 2005), p.24.

⁴⁷ Hatice Uğur, *Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Bir Sultanlık Zengibar*, p.26.

⁴⁸ Salih Özbaran, "A Turkish Report on the Red Sea and the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean, The Ottoman Response to European Expansion", *Analecta Isisiana*, XII, p.108.

CHAPTER II: EGYPTIAN QUESTION

The invasion of Egypt by Napoleon in 1798 is a benchmark in the Egyptian history. After this incidence, European powers have realized the economic and strategic importance of this country. Once, it was the gateway of Middle East to Africa and this feature was increasing the importance of Egypt in a time when having colonies in the overseas was deemed to be the same with being a world power. On the other hand, together with the construction of Suez Canal; Egypt becomes the center of maritime trade between Europe and India. Therefore, Egypt has undertaken the key position to grasp both the colonization of Africa and *balance of power* politics which describes peaceful co-existence endeavors of great powers in the long nineteenth century.

2.1: Ottoman Jurisdiction over Egypt

Egypt came under the sovereignty of Ottoman Empire in 1517 and ruled by a governor as other Ottoman provinces until Muhammad Ali Pasha came to the power. In the wake of French evacuation, Egypt entered into long lasting turmoil. The struggle between Ottoman sultan and *Mamluk Beys* has continued for a while. In 1805 Muhammad Ali Pasha has been appointed as Egyptian governor by receiving the support of the leading social stratum. In a short time, he eliminated the *Mamluks* and established his own authority in Egypt. Once he ensured his authority, he started on the long-term military, economic and administrative reforms. The administration has been centralized by establishing assemblies and councils. Increasing revenues comes from the cotton export inclined him to conduct expansionist policies. He attempted to fight against the Ottoman Empire but he failed because of the British opposition. In the wake of long struggle, Muhammad Ali Pasha gained governorship of Egypt and Sudan by

way of hereditary succession.⁴⁹ Thereby the *firman* of 1841 recognized the autonomous status of Egypt and bestowed the administration to people who were descended from Muhammad Ali. In return, Egypt was still the part of Ottoman territory and subordinated to rules and regulations of Istanbul. In 1867 the privileges of this province were enlarged. Egyptian khedive had a right to enact a law and conduct trade relations with foreign governments inside. Finally the *firman* of 1873 enabled the khedives to grant capitulations to Europeans. With the result of these amendments, though Egypt legally adhered to the Ottoman Empire, politically it has gained semi-autonomous position.⁵⁰

Ismail Pasha like his grand father Muhammad Ali attempted to enlarge the autonomous status of Egypt and displayed expansionist policies. He attached particular importance to the relations with Sublime Porte in order to widen his scope of authority. Hence, he achieved to gain several concessions through particular *firman*s by rising the amount of annual taxes yielded to Ottoman Empire and granted gifts and money to the high rank Ottoman bureaucrats. He received the title of khedive means viceroy of Egypt and Sudan and vassal of the Ottoman Empire. Khedive Ismail was educated in Paris and for this reason, was highly influenced by European style of modernization. Moreover he proclaimed “my country is no longer in Africa. I have made it part of Europe.”⁵¹ With departure point of this notion, he made enormous infrastructure investments in the country which causes a great economic depression. During his reign thousands of miles of railroad tracks were built, 8000 miles of canal was excavated and 5000 miles of telegraph cable was laid. Arable land was increased by more than 30 percent through improved irrigation. A modern port was gained to Alexandria, thousands of schools were opened and sugar refineries were built.⁵²

Indeed, Ismail Pasha’s economic confidence was understandable. At the outset of his reign, Egyptian profits were considerable due to the fact that the civil war in the United States suddenly made Egypt the biggest cotton exporter of the world.⁵³ Thorough the privileged status of Ismail Pasha as khedive and economic potential of

⁴⁹ Hilal Görgün, “Mısır” *Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi*, c. XXIX, p. 569

⁵⁰ Süleyman Kızıltoprak, *Mısır’da İngiliz İşgali: Osmanlı’nın Diplomasi Savaşı (1882-1887)*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2010), p.26

⁵¹ Barbara Harlow, and Mia Carter, *Imperialism & Orientalism: A Documentary Source Book*, (Massachusetts: Blacwell Publishers, 1999), p.113.

⁵² H. L. Wesseling, *Divide and Rule: The Partition of Africa 1880-1914*. (London: Praeger, 1996), p. 43.

⁵³ Barbara Harlow, and Mia Carter, *Imperialism & Orientalism: A Documentary Source Book*, p.113.

Egypt, Ismail Pasha was treated like an independent ruler by the European states. One of the great projects of Ismail Pasha was the Suez Canal. Indeed, the modern history of Suez project starts with Napoleon. His engineers concluded that it is an infeasible project because of the difference in level between the two seas. Therefore, the project has been postponed for a long time. In the elapsed time, maritime traffic between Europe and Asia thus continued over the Cape route. But, it came to the agenda again in the period of Khedive Said.

The Suez question was turned into an Anglo-French rivalry in time. Britain considered railroad link more practical while the French was in favor of canal. Both countries had an impact on the Egyptian administration. For instance, at first the British were more influential than French, but in 1854 the new khedive Said Pasha who was pro- French came to power and the balance changed in favor the French side. More importantly, he was friendly with a French diplomat, Ferdinand de Lesseps who comes from a family of consuls. He was born in 1805 in Versailles and came to Alexandria as vice-consular in 1832. Therein, he became acquainted with Said and starts to teach him horse riding. In 1849 De Lesseps left the diplomatic service and allocated all his time to his canal project. He elucidated his plans to Khedive Said who gave his consent. On 30 November 1854 de Lesseps created an international company called *Compagné Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez*. This company would be granted broad concessions to exploit the revenues of canal for ninety-nine years following its completion. Thereafter the canal would be handed over to the Egyptian government which would have received 15 percent of the annual profits during the first ninety-nine years. Said's death and his succession by the dynamic Ismail accelerated the project. Ismail declared: "No one is more canalist than I am" and he had bought almost half of the total shares and thus became the largest shareholder. The other parts of the shares were in the hands of French individuals. In August 1869 the canal was completed, and on 17 September of that year the official inauguration took place.⁵⁴

Many people were advocates of Ismail's progressive system of government. First, Europeans who profited from it were satisfied. As a consequence, the European population of Egypt has grown rapidly. By 1880, the number of resident foreigners in

⁵⁴ H. L. Wesseling, *Divide and Rule: The Partition of Africa 1880-1914*, pp.39-42.

Egypt has reached to 70.000.⁵⁵ For the Turkish ruling class new career paths had been seen on the horizon. Yet, the local Arab population took a different view. Modernization project of Ismail meant more forced labor, higher taxes, more debt and higher interest payments. And still the taxes were not enough to cover the costs of the ambitious modernization program. Ismail therefore chose another solution: foreign loans.⁵⁶ His total external and internal debts reached 400 million pound in a short time. Furthermore, the Ottoman Sultan Abdülaziz had to warn him with a *firman* in order not to raise the taxes and take the foreign loans. In 1875, he failed to pay back the enormous debt and had to sell the shares of the canal belonging to Khedive dynasty and to the British government.⁵⁷ Because, with the establishment of the British Indian Empire, and the opening of the Suez canal in 1869 which linked Europe with the orient and thus increased the amount of trade through Egypt, Egypt became increasingly important to Britain. Indeed, Suez Canal was begun and completed as a project of French engineers. The French made the entire plans and actualized it by undertaking the whole responsibility but now the British has gained the shares without taking any risk. This situation has already triggered the imperialist aspirations between the two great powers. In the forthcoming periods, Suez would be part of bargain process in the partition of Africa.

Slowly but surely, Egyptians began to lose control of their own affairs. By a system of capitulations the most vital privileges were granted to foreigners in Egypt; these privileges included: exemption from taxation, inviolability of domicile, and protection from arbitrary arrest, exemption from the jurisdiction of the native courts and the mixed tribunals established in 1876, that no legislation could be enforced to foreigners without the consent of the Capitulatory Powers.⁵⁸ Furthermore, the sold shares of the Suez Canal had not sufficed to compensate the total amount of the Egyptian debts and Khedive Ismail had continued to take new credits from the European bankers with high interest rates. In 1876, when Ismail declared his failure about discharge of debts, creditor European states established The Public Debt

⁵⁵ Rolend Oliver and G.N. Sanderson, *The Cambridge History of Africa: from 1870 to 1905* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 592.

⁵⁶ H. L. Wesseling, *Divide and Rule: The Partition of Africa 1880-1914*, p.43.

⁵⁷ Süleyman Kızıltoprak, *Mısır'da İngiliz İşgali: Osmanlı'nın Diplomasi Savaşı (1882-1887)*, p. 29.

⁵⁸ L. A. Fabunmi, *The Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations: A Case Study in Power Politics 1800-1956*. (London: Longmans, 1960), p. 29.

Commission in order to take back their money. Under the dual control of Britain and France, Egypt lost her authority in financial issues. There would be a reflection of this maladministration on the social life of the Egyptians.

Economy from now on was under the supervision of the foreign hands and some European ministers have been appointed to the crucial positions in the government of 1878. The penetration of the foreigners in the state created disquiet in society and Khedive Ismail had to dismiss them in order to preserve his position. This act prompted to the reaction of Britain and France. An ultimatum has been given to Khedive Ismail Pasha because of breaking his promises. He was advised to relinquish his place to his son. Subsequent to this incident, Khedive Ismail has dispatched a telegram to the Ottoman sultan and enounced that Egypt is the Ottoman property and he was the servant of Ottoman state. Hence, the proposal brought forward by colonialist states was the infringement of the Ottoman judiciary rights on Egypt. Yet, in May 1879, the British Empire and France began pressuring the Ottoman Sultan to depose Ismail Pasha, and this was done on June 26, 1879. The more pliable Tewfik Pasha, Ismail's son, was made his successor as the new Khedive. Ismail Pasha during his reign acted in accordance with the British interests particularly in the Suez Canal and the Sudan have been governed by a British governor on behalf of the Khedive. Furthermore, many port cities in Somalia and Ethiopian coast have been hired to European states and soon after those became a colony of the Europeans.⁵⁹ Eventually, all these independent behaviors have ended Ismail Pasha's political carrier. First and foremost, deposition of khedive Ismail proved that in the year of 1879 the Ottoman Empire still held the de jure and de facto rights on Egypt and both Britain and France still looked for the confirmation of the Sultan in the governmental change.

Moreover, weakening of the Egyptian power also harmed the authority in the Sudan. Modernization project of khedive Ismail both in Egypt and Sudan coasted a lot. Economic decline of the state also triggered the social uneasiness. Abolishment of the slave trade in Sudan affected the interest of the wealthier class detrimentally. The centralization policies on the religion created disquiets among the *ulema*, as well. Plus, the appointment of the retired Christian generals as an administrator of the Sudan to establish the state authority and to supervise the slave trade drew reaction of the local

⁵⁹ Muhammed Tandoğan, *Afrika'da Sömürgecilik ve Osmanlı Siyaseti*, (Ankara: TTK, 2013) pp.43-44.

people against the Egyptian administration. As seen, Sudanese affairs did not independent from the marches of the events in Egypt. Urabi revolt occurred in 1882 also leaded to neglecting of the Sudanese Mahdi uprising and finally become a threat for the Egypt's integrity.

2.2: The Urabi Revolt

In the reign of Muhammad Ali Pasha, *Mamluks* were eliminated from not only politics but also from the army. Higher posts in the newly established army were occupied exclusively by the Turkish speaking "Circassian" class while the Arabic speaking fellahin population held the lower ranks. Khedive Ismail had achieved to raise the number of soldiers in the army with particular *firman*s taken from the Ottoman Sultan. Yet, increase in number naturally lead to increase the number of Egyptians in the army, as well. However, Turks and Circassians were still holding the higher ranks though quantitative and proportional balance shifted towards the Egyptian soldiers.⁶⁰ This situation created a discontent among the soldiers and both side attempted to establish superiority on the other one.

Ahmed Urabi who was the leader of Egyptian uprising was a perfect example of the frustrated Egyptian soldier. He was born in 1841 as the son of a village leader; he was from a prosperous but rural background. Educated at *al-Azhar* and the military academy, he rose through the ranks to the rank of colonel. From 1879 onward Urabi appears to have been part of a secret society of nationalist officers, apparently supported in Istanbul by Said Halim Pasha, the khedive's uncle and heir to the throne under the traditional Turkish law of succession until the rules of succession in Egypt were modified by Ismail. 'Abd al-Halim was the Porte's choice as khedive in 1879, but was rejected by the British in favor of the more pliable Tewfik Pasha.⁶¹ Their slogan "Egypt for Egyptians" may have targeted not only the outside British and French but also the internal Turco-Circassian elite.

Urabi was justified in presenting himself as spokesman not only of the army, but also of the Egyptian people as a whole. According to Schölch, "Urabi was not a

⁶⁰ Süleyman Kızıltoprak, *Mısır'da İngiliz İşgali: Osmanlı'nın Diplomasi Savaşı (1882-1887)*, p.114.

⁶¹ Andrew McGregor, *A Military History of Modern Egypt: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Ramadan War*. (London: Praeger Security International, 2006), p. 163.

revolutionary leader... he did not strive for power, he had no interest in becoming a dictator or in forcing upon the country a particular political system. He wanted to be a protector and to take care that nobody would stray from the straight path, the path of Allah's commandments, of justice, equality, humanity and fraternity.”⁶² Indeed, political activities during the years 1881-1882 mostly developed because of European interfering in the Egyptian internal affairs. Since, the repercussion of French occupation of Tunisia was still vivid on entire Arab provinces. However, Wilfred Scawen Blunt who was an English aristocrat and poet in charge of diplomatic service in Egypt. He became known as the fierce opponent of imperialism and colonialism. In mid-December 1881 Blunt found a chance to meet with Urabi, due to his popularity with the Egyptians. His book “The Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt” written in 1907 was the major English-language source sympathetic to the ‘Urabi revolt. There, he stated:

Arabi, a presentable young fellow... accompanied Said to Medina the year before his death. It was during this close intercourse with the Viceroy that he acquired his first political ideas, which were those of equality as between class and class and of the respect due to the fellah as the preponderating element in the Egyptian nationality. It is this particular advocacy of fellah rights which distinguished Arabi from the other reformer of his day. The Azhar movement was one of the Muhammedan reforms, without distinction of the race. Arabi's was essentially a race movement and as such far more distinctly national and destined to be far more popular.⁶³

Blunt believed that Urabi riot was a nationalistic-religious one. However, in October 1881, the Porte's commissioner's incumbent by the Sultan in order to inspect Urabi movement came to the conclusion that “the apprehension that Egypt might become the center of an Arab national movement was unfounded. They had discovered loyalty only towards the Empire. The struggle against the Turco-Circassian power monopoly had not at the same time been a struggle against the “rights and privileges” of the Sultan in Egypt. Ismail had endeavored to loosen the ties to the Porte, not the Urabi.”⁶⁴ On the other hand, distinguished historian Kemal Karpat describes the Urabi revolt as nationalism against west. Besides he defines Abdülhamid's Pan -Islamism politics as religious nationalism, as well. But both of them had a different motivation.

⁶² Alexandre Schölch, *Egypt for Egyptians: the Socio-Political Crisis in Egypt, 1878–1882* (London: Ithaca Press, 1981) p.310.

⁶³ Wilfred Scawen Blunt, *The Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt: Being a Personal Narrative of Event*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1922), p. 100.

⁶⁴ Alexandre Schölch, *Egypt for Egyptians: The Socio-Political Crisis in Egypt 1878–1882*, p. 311.

Abdülhamid II saw this politics as a preventive measure while Urabi's intention was to end foreign domination in his country.⁶⁵

Briefly, it could be said that Sublime Porte and Abdülhamid II before the British occupation of Egypt failed to define the problem and develop a functional policy. In fact, they have known that Urabi movement was a result of social and economic conditions of Egypt and it showed the characteristics of nationalist rebel to some extent. Additionally they were aware of Britain and France's provocative attitudes but for solution they merely concentrated on the Urabi Pasha and administration problems. The Sultan applied the classical methods to tackle with Urabi. If Urabi Pasha has been taken away from the Egypt, the problem could be solved in the eyes of the Ottoman Empire. Two methods had been used to persuade Urabi Pasha. First, warnings reference to religion and second, threats supported by pejorative words. The first method has been used via dignified religious man and Ahmed Esad Efendi who was a prestigious man among Arabs was tasked with persuasion of Urabi. He reminded Urabi his religious responsibilities and warned him to stay away from creating disorder among Muslims. Second method was used through the medium of recognized generals. Ali Nizami Pasha and Derviş Pasha have been sent to Egypt in order to give him up the rebellion. They did not hesitate to address him derogatorily when needed. They have three main duties assigned by Abdülhamid. Firstly, they had to prevent any military entanglement of Ottoman force in Egypt. Secondly, Urabi pasha must have removed from the scene by inviting to Istanbul. Finally, Khedive Tewfik Pasha must have been supported as a legitimate representative of Sultan and thus preclude the British intervention.⁶⁶ On the other hand, Sultan Abdülhamid II has used different methods like issuing honors to him. In order to encourage persuasion endeavors, he was to be given the *Mecidiye* First Class and made Pasha. The first reason to grant this sign was to move him away from the Egypt and the second reason it could be an opportunity to change khedive and remove the concessions of Egypt. Although Urabi Pasha acted in a respected manner during negotiations and refrained from using unfavorable remarks against the Ottoman state, they did not reach a resolution.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Süleyman Kızıltoprak, *Mısır'da İngiliz İşgali: Osmanlı'nın Diplomasi Savaşı (1882-1887)*, p. 127.

⁶⁶ Selim Deringil, "The Ottoman Response to The Egyptian Crisis of 1881-82." *The Ottomans, the Turks and World Power Politics: A Historical Dictionary of Titles and Terms in the Ottoman Empire*. (Istanbul: Gorgias Press & The Isis Press, 2000), p.8.

⁶⁷ Süleyman Kızıltoprak, *Mısır'da İngiliz İşgali: Osmanlı'nın Diplomasi Savaşı (1882-1887)*, pp.121-123.

Abdülhamid was in favor of the solution without any conflict between Egypt and Ottoman Empire due to the fact that he was afraid of spreading of the movement to the other Arab provinces. Indeed, he was correct. Buzpinar's article showed that Egyptian refugees who immigrated to Syria right after the first communal fighting on 11 June facilitated the spreading of the news from Egypt. Apparently, The Muslims in Syria had a strong sympathy for Urabi Pasha seeing him as a champion of Islam. From their point of view, Urabi was a leader of Muslim who was waging of holy war against a Christian power rather than a nationalist leader.⁶⁸ In this situation, Ottoman Empire faced with a harsh dilemma. Whether they take a sharp stance and repress the Muslim sympathy for Urabi or show some degree of tolerance and allow a limited support for him. The former one would damage the Sultan's prestige and in the eyes of the Muslim, Sultan would seem to be cooperating with Christian power whereas the latter one would mean endorsing Urabi who rebelled against the khedive who is the legitimate authority of Egypt and representative of the Sultan-Caliph.⁶⁹

2.3: British Intervention in 1882

On 11 June 1882, an anti-Christian riot occurred in Alexandria and caused loses of lives from both Egyptians and foreigners. The riots were probably a spontaneous result of tension and excitement; but for British government it appeared as a massacre of Christians, probably provoked by Urabi. British forces had already begun to occupy some certain places by the reason of the security of Suez Canal. Fights among Egyptian soldiers under the command of Urabi and British troops had been continued for a while then in the region of *Tel-el Kebir* Urabi Pasha has been heavily defeats by British forces. Thereby Egypt was occupied by Britain in 1882. In effect, Britain has asked for the sending Ottoman soldiers to Egypt and declaring Urabi as a rebel but both demands were unanswered by the Sultan. Only one week before Urabi's defend, Abdülhamid declared him as a rebel. Furthermore, Urabi and his friends were charged in the court and Urabi pled guilty and was sentenced to death, but the sentence was immediately commuted to punishment of exile for a life. He went to Ceylon to pay his penalty. In 1901 he turned back to Cairo in the wake of khedive Abbas Hilmi's forgiveness. He

⁶⁸ Tufan Buzpinar, "The Repercussions of the British Occupation of Egypt on Syria 1882-83", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 2006, 36:1, p. 83

⁶⁹ Tufan Buzpinar, *The Repercussions of the British Occupation of Egypt on Syria 1882-83*, p.85.

spent his life in Cairo away from the politics and wrote his memoirs. He died in September 1911 in Cairo.⁷⁰ Indeed, Galbraith and Marsot point out that

[T]he disorders of 1882 were incited by the actions of Europeans, not by Urabi. It was the British and French fleet that stirred the rioting of June. It was the British fleet that opened a bombardment in July against forts and earthworks which had been ineffectually strengthened to defend Alexandria. It was the British, not Urabi, who violated the neutrality of the Suez Canal under the pretext that they were merely acting as the agents of the khedive against rebel.⁷¹

However, Although Urabi movement emerged against Britain-France political interference and financial domination and against the administration of Khedive Tewfik, it ended with occupation of Egypt in September 1882.

In the 1880s, Abdühamid II has been faced by four challenges: the first was the Egyptian army mutiny of 1882 led by Ahmed Urabi against the Khedive and second consequent British occupation of Egypt in 1882; the third was the Mahdist revolt which targeted the overthrow Egyptian rule in the Sudan in 1883-4 and the fourth deriving from the Mahdist revolt, was the occupation of African shores of the Red Sea by Britain, France and Italy in 1884-5. According to Yasamee, a specialist of Ottoman diplomatic history, Abdülhamid's attitude towards the third and forth challenges were mostly determined by his experience of the first and second. Owing to this approach, he summarizes the Ottoman response to the Egyptian crisis of 1881-2 in three main features. The first was fear of revolution. Abdülhamid suspected that Urabi revolt was an act of British plot hidden under the shadow of anti-European protestation. In reality, Urabi Pasha aims to establish an Arab government to defies the Islamic caliphate and Ottoman sovereignty in the Fertile Crescent and Arabia. However there is no document to verify this argument. But it is important to reflect Sultan's belief that his sphere of influence was fragile in Arabian lands. Although he had a centralized bureaucracy and standing army in reality he needed the support of local leaders whose political tendencies readily changed with regard to balance of power. The second feature of Abdülhamid's politics was the non-intervention. He decisively refused military attack against Urabi despite the intensive requests of Khedive Tewfik and European powers in spite of the British occupation of Egypt. The third feature developed in response to British invasion of September 1882 was the complete denial of the legitimacy of British

⁷⁰ Hilal Görgün, "Urabi Paşa", *Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi*, XLII, p. 168.

⁷¹ John S. Galbraith and Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot, "The British Occupation of Egypt: Another View", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, v. 9, n. 4 (Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 488.

occupation. He insisted on the Ottoman's sovereignty rights on Egypt in the *firman*s. The sultan in fact has no tool except for diplomacy to use against Britain. He tried to persuade other European powers in order to take effective action and support Ottoman supremacy in the region. But the efforts only sufficed to take guarantees from Britain that the invasion would be temporarily. In the long term, this would never occurred.⁷²

Egyptian question arose at a particularly bad time for the Ottomans. The empire still suffered from the consequences of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1888, the Cyprus Convention and the Congress of Berlin. Establishment of the Ottoman Debt Commission in 1881 and heavy war indemnities to Russia have weakened the economy. Large extent of its territories and populations had already been lost in the Berlin Conference. And finally, in May 1881 Tunisia was left to the French.⁷³ Because of all these troubles, Abdülhamid II and the Sublime Porte did not read the Urabi revolt accurately and took the necessary steps. The fear of spreading of the revolt to the other provinces decelerated taking decision. Sending troops would cause the killing of Muslim by Muslim in Egypt and Abdülhamid II had never approached to this idea. On the other hand, he used all diplomatic effort to deter Urabi from any kind of reaction against the Sultan. Although Urabi later on declared his loyalty officially, he was not trusted any more. Furthermore, his mutiny caused the invasion of Egypt by Britain. Although Britain formally recognized the Ottoman sovereignty in Egypt until First World War, their temporary occupation has never ended and thereby new phase of negotiation has started between Britain and Ottoman Empire through the agency of Ahmed Muhtar Pasha.

⁷² F.A.K. Yasamee, "The Ottoman Empire, The Sudan and The Red Sea Coast 1883-1889." In *Studies on Ottoman Diplomatic History V*, edited by Selim Deringil and Sinan Kuneralp, (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1990) p. 88-89.

⁷³ Selim Deringil, *The Ottoman Response to The Egyptian Crisis of 1881-82*, p.9.

CHAPTER III: THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN PERIOD IN THE SUDAN (1820-1881)

History of Sudan in between Egyptian invasion and prior to independence could be divided into three periods. The first “Turkiyya” includes Ottoman-Egyptian Rule in 1821-1881. It was followed by the Mahdiyya period lasting from 1881 Mahdi uprising to 1898 Omdurman defeat and finally the second “Turkiyya” which is called Anglo-Egyptian period in the years 1899-1955. Though, this thesis mainly concentrated on the period between 1881 Mahdi revolution and 1914 First World War, these three period would present a holistic view to understand the cause and consequences of the scramble for Africa in a particular case.

The conquest of the northern Sudan was undertaken by Muhammad Ali who was the Ottoman governor of Egypt in 1820. In 1822, Khartoum was founded as the headquarters of the Egyptian army. The fall of Darfur and conquest of the southern Sudan which was divided into two provinces; Bahr el-Ghazal and Equatoria occurred during the reign of Khedive Ismail. In the history of Sudan, this period became known as the (first) Turkiyya.

Ottoman jurisdiction over the Sudan appeared in a particular form. Egypt had become a part of Ottoman Empire by right of conquest in 1517. Muhammad Ali had been appointed as a governor-general in 1805. In the forthcoming years, he gained many concessions and began *de facto* to act independently. However, whether he unified Sudan with Egypt on behalf of the Ottoman Sultan or for the sake of himself, Sudan legally has been under the jurisdiction of Egypt indirectly of Ottoman Empire, as well.⁷⁴ There are several *firman*s declared by Ottoman Sultan that confirmed the Sudan

⁷⁴ Kemal Karpat, *Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State*. p. 268.

as an Ottoman province under the rule of Egyptian khedives. For instance, the *firman* on 13 February 1841, as follows:

Whereas, as by our previous ferman, we have confirmed you as viceroy of Egypt with hereditary rights on specific conditions and within well-defined limits, we hereby confer upon you the additional vice-regal rights upon the provinces of Nubia, Kordofan, and Sennar and all dependencies beyond the frontiers of Egypt proper...The exercise of such rights does not, however, confer any hereditary prerogatives. By the experience and wisdom of which you have given proof you are to administer such provinces and manage their affairs in accordance with my wishes to justice and with a view to ensuring the welfare of the inhabitants. You shall send to our Sublime Porte an annual statement of all the revenues of the above-mentioned provinces.⁷⁵

As could be seen, Ottoman jurisdiction on Sudan stems from Egypt's peculiar status. Though the invasion of Egypt by British forces in 1882 had altered the legacy of relations in between Ottoman sultan and Egyptian khedives, Ottoman sovereignty on both Egypt and Sudan had legally continued to the official termination of the Ottoman Empire in 1923.

3.1: Reasons of Sudan's conquest by Muhammad Ali

Egyptian historians justified the conquest of Sudan as *fath* from an Islamic point of view. To strengthen the religious justification of this conquest some of them even further claimed that Ottoman Sultan who was also *emir al-mu'minin* has demanded conquering of Sudan from his governor. Thereby, the legitimacy of this conquest on religious grounds could have been ensured. Second, Egyptian Muslims had close relationships with the Sudan since the Middle Ages and intermarried with the local population. Therefore, blaming Egypt due to conquest is not sincere and just because there were no separating borders between the two regions. Third, the Sudan was a prosperous country which had been continuously plundered by its primitive rulers. Some of the sources claimed that as a result of over-taxation and anarchy, people of Sudan had been impoverished. Hence, the people welcomed the Egyptian forces as their saviors. Fourth, there are also those who praise Muhammad Ali's invasion of the Sudan to discover the sources of the Nile and protect them from European invaders. Finally, still on positive side, Muhammad Ali had undertaken the *mission civilisatrice* since he saved them from the renewed *jahiliya*. When he first visited Sudan in 1838-9 at the age

⁷⁵ L. A. Fabunmi, *The Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations: A Case Study in Power Politics 1800-1956*, p.24.

of seventy, he brought back with a group of young Sudanese from the tribal and religious notable to educate them in the Egyptian Sunnite ideology.⁷⁶

On the other hand, Sudanese historians do not share same points of view with Egyptian historians. Mekki Shibeika one of the Sudanese scholars denotes that Muhammad Ali's administration was a typical Turkish one; it was highly centralized and aimed at maximum amount of money via taxes. He also emphasizes primitive nature of Sudanese society which should be civilized by Egyptians. Furthermore, another scholar Hasan Ahmed Ibrahim criticizes the paternalistic attitudes of Egyptian historians towards Sudan. He stressed that Sudan have been already Muslim before the conquest so there was no need to Egyptian interference in order to enhance Islam.⁷⁷ There are additional reasons of Egyptian conquest of Sudan. First, Muhammad Ali determined to annihilate the surviving *Mamluks* who had escaped to Dongola (today, located in North Sudan) following the 1811 massacre. He pursued them towards the inner sides of Sudan to prevent their reappearance as political rivals against him in the forthcoming years. Second, Muhammad Ali decided to establish a new modern army. Therefore, he had to eliminate those who opposed modernization in the present army. He compelled whether to dispatches them to Sudan where they would perish either way or relinquishes from their politic and economic privileges in Egypt. Third, Muhammad Ali was impressed by immense human sources of Sudan. At that time his main goal was to seek slaves for their army and monopolies. However most of these Sudanese slaves perished en-route or died of various diseases later on. According to figures given by some research, out of 20000 slaves gathered between 1820 and 1824 only 3000 remained alive in 1824. Moreover, the campaign itself was facing significant problems and had cost the Pasha a lot of money and one of his sons.⁷⁸ Finally, Muhammad Ali was looking for gold and other precious metals to fulfill his aspirations on Egyptian modernization.⁷⁹

Indeed, the reasons for the faults of the Turco-Egyptian government in the Sudan throughout this period was clear. Firstly, they originally went to Sudan with the conscious intention of exploiting it for slaves and gold. Exploitation remained main

⁷⁶ Gabriel R. Warburg, "The Turco-Egyptian Sudan: A Recent Historiographical Controversy", *Die Welt des Islam*, v.31 no: 2, 1991, pp.193-215.

⁷⁷ Gabriel R. Warburg, *Historical Discord in the Nile Valley*, (London: C. Hurst and Company., 1992), pp.38-39.

⁷⁸ Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's men: Muhammed Ali, His Army and the Making of the Modern Egypt*. (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.92.

⁷⁹ Gabriel R. Warburg, *The Turco-Egyptian Sudan: A Recent Historiographical Controversy*, p. 198.

motive at least of the local officials. But they were disappointed for both. Expected amount of gold could not be found. Slaves died on the route due to the various diseases. Secondly, there was a failure in the human material of the government officials. Service in Sudan was hated, and was regarded as a punishment; consequently only the worst types of officials were to be found there. Thirdly, they took into consideration of expansion rather than consolidation. Lack of communication and transportation made extremely difficult to control such a long-distance country.⁸⁰

3.2: Modernization in the Turco-Egyptian Period

There are three aspects of modernization in the Turco-Egyptian period. First, the introduction of technical devices; second, the development of a modern administrative system; and third, the direct impact of the west were the original source of the 'modernization' in Sudan society. The three western inventions played an important part in the nineteenth century Sudan: firearms, steamers and electric telegraph. These new devices enabled the northern society and its Turco-Egyptian rulers to overcome the two principal obstacles to move along the White Nile; tribal raids comes from riverfront and the immense barrier of the *Sadd* which is a vast swamp in southern Sudan blocking approach both to the Equatorial Nile and the Bahr al-Ghazal.⁸¹

In the first place, the Turco-Egyptian administration was highly centralized. The Sudanese provinces were directly connected to a department in Cairo. Although representatives of the ruling families continued to hold office, they were no longer autonomous. The power of government stems from especially its armed forces. The improvements in communication technology facilitated to control such a vast country. In the time of Ismail the introduction of steamers greatly increased control over the central riverine areas while the development of a telegraph network, though quite weak, contributed to centralization. With the support of these instruments, the Turco-Egyptian administration to a large extent achieved to provide security and order in the settled areas and along the main routes by suppression the turmoil among nomads and enforcing the tax payment.⁸²

⁸⁰ Mekki Abbas, *The Sudan Question: The Dispute over The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 1884-1951*. (London: Faber and Fabe, 1952), p.26.

⁸¹ Peter M. Holt, *Studies in the History of the Near East*, (London: Frank Cass, 1973), p.139.

⁸² Peter M. Holt, *Studies in the History of the Near East*, p.140.

The religious life of northern Sudan society was also greatly affected by changes imposed by Turco-Egyptian rule. Previously, the religious leadership has been in hands of hereditary teachers (*fakis*) of the religious sciences and Sufism. In the Turco-Egyptian period, the traditional Islam of the Sudan faced with two serious threats. On the one hand, the new regime tried to form friendly relationships with these religious leaders; on the other hand, they created a formal hierarchy consisting of *qadis*, *muftis* and other cult officials properly educated in Sunni thought as part of classical Ottoman legal system. They also facilitated the education of the Sudanese *ulema* at Azhar. Furthermore, In 1850s new arrangements made in the legal system of Egypt and Sudan paved the way for the administration of commercial and criminal code in secular courts. The change diminished the prestige of religious authority. Indeed, these courts lacked the credibility in the eyes of the Sudanese Muslim due to the fact that they implemented the Ottoman Empire's *Hanafi* School of law regardless of the Sudanese ties with Maliki School tradition in the area. The Turkiyya also encouraged a religious orthodoxy favored in the Ottoman Empire. The government has built many mosques and staffed religious schools and courts with teachers and judges trained in accordance with *Sunni* sharia at Cairo's Al Azhar University. The government promoted the traditional *sufi* branch *Khatmiyyah*, because its leaders made cooperation with the regime. But Sudanese Muslims condemned the official orthodoxy as decadent because it had rejected many popular beliefs and practices.⁸³

The new administration established by "the Turks" was relayed on a strict hierarchal structure between center and local authority. At the head of the affairs, there was a Governor-General, responsible to the viceroy in Cairo. Under him, the country was divided into provinces, each under its own *mudir*, or governor. A province was subdivided into districts, each under an administrator, who was called a *kashif*. The daily affairs of the people were still controlled by their own leaders. The great nomad tribes had their hereditary chiefs; while the villagers in the settled communities elected their own Sheiks, who were responsible to a district *Shaikh*, and he in turn to the *Kashifs*.⁸⁴

It should be here noted that all the government officials in Sudan were known as Turks. The term Turk was applied indiscriminately to Circassian, Kurds, Albanians,

⁸³Thomas Ofcansky, *A Country Study: Sudan*. Ed. by Helen Chapin Metz. (Washington: Federal Library of Congress, 1991), p.33.

⁸⁴ Mekki Abbas, *The Sudan Question: The Dispute over The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 1884-1951*, p. 9.

Syrians, Greeks, Egyptians, and indeed to all the races of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire. In later years, Egyptians also European official appointed by Egypt became more prominent. But for Sudanese, the government official remained simply Turks, even today in the more remote parts of the Sudan, the term still used to describe any European.⁸⁵ From a Sudanese historian Fadlalla's point of view:

Egyptian occupation of Sudan was disastrous. Under the new government established in 1821, which was known as the Turkiyah or Turkish regime, soldiers lived off the land and exacted exorbitant taxes from the population. They also destroyed many ancient Meroitic pyramids searching for hidden gold. Furthermore, slave trading increased, causing many of the inhabitants of the fertile Al-Jazirah, heartland of Funj, to flee to escape the slave traders. Within a year of pasha's victory, 30.000 Sudanese slaves went to Egypt for training and induction into the army. However so many perished from disease and the unfamiliar climate that the remaining slaves could only be used in garrisons in Sudan.⁸⁶

Most of the sixty years of Egyptian rule displayed inefficient administration because of the inferior quality of the administrative officers posted to Sudan. Just as Britain sent out the incapable officials to the colonies, some of the Egyptians dispatched to the Sudan as a punishment for crimes committed in Egypt or for incompetence at homeland; thereby they lacked public spirit.⁸⁷

3.3: Era of Ismail and Suppression of Slave Trade

Muhammad Ali's immediate successors, Abbas I (1849-54) and Said (1854-63), lacked leadership qualities and paid little attention to Sudan, but the reign of Ismail (1863-79) revitalized Egyptian interest in the country. In 1865 the Ottoman Empire relinquished the Red Sea coast and its ports to Egypt. Two years later, the Ottoman sultan granted Ismail the title of khedive. Egypt organized and deployed troops in the new provinces of Upper Nile, Bahr al Ghazal, and Equatoria and, in 1874, conquered and annexed Darfur. Ismail named Europeans to provincial governorships and appointed Sudanese to more responsible government positions. Under the pressure of Britain, Ismail had to take steps to complete the elimination of the slave trade in the northern Sudan. The khedive tried to establish a new European model army whose human sources no longer hinged on slaves. However, this modernization process

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p.9.

⁸⁶ Mohamed H. Fadlalla, *Short History of Sudan*, (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2004), pp.23-24.

⁸⁷ L. A. Fabunmi, *The Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations: A Case Study in Power Politics 1800-1956*, p.24.

created disquiet. Urban merchant class and the *Baqqara* Arabs which took benefits from slave trade were disturbed because of the efforts of slavery suppression.⁸⁸

We have to bear in mind that most of the people in the Sudan, especially those living in the remote parts and the nomads, were never brought completely under authority. Mehmed Mihri's traveler account written in 1326 (1908) also affirmed this issue. Because, he denoted that Sudanese people has not officially conscripted by government but if they voluntarily demand to join army, the government welcomed.⁸⁹ When Ismail Pasha came to power, his first goal was to re-establish a central authority in the Sudan. Therefore, he signed a decree of centralization and introduced reforms in Egypt and also in the Sudan. Telegraphic lines connected all the chief towns by ties the local district to center, a railway line was laid down from *Wadi Halfa* southwards, five primary schools were opened for the education in five important towns, and state subsidies were allocated to teachers and students in the Mosque schools.⁹⁰ There are three characteristic themes of the Egyptian Sudan which is broadly attributed the era of Ismail in the two decades. The first is a great expansion of the territories ruled by the Khedive. The second is an adamant struggle against the slave trade. The third is the increasing employment in high military and civil offices of men who were neither Muslims nor Ottoman subjects, but for most part Europeans namely, Christians.⁹¹ For instance, Charles Gordon who was appointed as governor-general of the Sudan was the first Christian and European to hold this post. The failures of the regime resulted from inefficient officials and their abuses centered on the taxes. Taxes were quite heavy for the people to bear, and in the levying of the taxes inhuman and cruel methods were being implemented. The majority of the administrative staff kept part of the money for themselves or accept bribes for allowing some people to avoid payment.⁹²

Slavery had been an institution of Sudanese life throughout history. Until 1843 Muhammad Ali maintained a state monopoly on slave trading in Egypt. Thereafter, authorities sold licenses to private traders who competed with government. In 1854 Cairo ended state participation in the slave trade, and in 1860 Egypt prohibited the slave trade in response to European pressure. However, the Egyptian army failed to enforce

⁸⁸Thomas Ofcansky, *A Country Study: Sudan*, p.34.

⁸⁹ Mehmed Mihri, *Sudan Seyahatnamesi*, p.204

⁹⁰ Mekki Shibeika. *British Policy in the Sudan: 1882- 1902*, p.11.

⁹¹ Peter M. Holt, *A Modern History of Sudan: From the Funj Sultanate to Present Day*, p.62.

⁹² Mekki Shibeika. *British Policy in the Sudan: 1882- 1902*, pp. 11-12.

the prohibition against the private armies of the slave traders because; the introduction of steamboats and firearms enabled slave traders to oppose the restrictions and bans. A further measure against the slave trade, embarked on June 1864, was the establishment of a force of river-police. But it failed again because of profound interests of mercantile community and lack of honest and devoted officials. In 1869 British explorer Sir Samuel Baker became the governor of Equatoria Province, with orders to annex southern part of the country and to suppress the slave trade. In 1874 Charles George Gordon, a British officer, succeeded Baker. Gordon conducted rather rigid policies; disarmed many slave traders and hanged those who defied him. By the time he became Sudan's governor general in 1877, Gordon to large extent succeed in controlling the slave trade.⁹³ The khedive concluded the Anglo-Egyptian Slave Trade Convention which determines the termination of the sale and purchase of slaves in Sudan by 1880.

Ismail and Gordon liked each other very well from the beginning, and their approach to the problem of the southern Sudan was same. Each believed that the only ways to suppress the slave trade were to establish good government, and to develop a profitable and legitimate trade along the river from the undeveloped area to capital; to establish friendly relationships with tribal families which had an influence on Sudanese people.⁹⁴ When Gordon was appointed governor-general of the Sudan he was faced with the consequences of Ismail's expansionist policy; disturbed frontier with Abyssinia, revolt in Darfur, and anarchy in the Bahr al-Ghazal.⁹⁵

The charge against Gordon was, firstly, concentrating on the abolition of the slave trade in order to the neglect of traditional conditions of the region. Secondly, the cruel methods implemented against the slave traders damaged the economy of the Sudan; it leaded to increasing the hostility of the people and weakening the prestige of government. Thirdly, employment of Europeans for crucial positions triggered native resentment towards all foreigners, including Egyptians. Fourthly, even though he acted on behalf of Egyptian government, indeed he served the interests of Britain.⁹⁶ All these factors alienated the Sudanese people towards the Egyptian and indirectly Ottoman administration and roused up xenophobia among the people.

⁹³ Thomas Ofcansky, *A Country Study: Sudan*, p. 34.

⁹⁴ Mekki Abbas, *The Sudan Question: The Dispute over The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 1884-1951*, p. 19.

⁹⁵ Peter M. Holt, *A Modern History of the Sudan: From the Funj Sultanate to the Present Day*, p.69.

⁹⁶ Richard Hill, *Egypt in the Sudan: 1820-1881*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p.145.

CHAPTER IV: THE MAHDIYYA PERIOD IN THE SUDAN (1881-1899)

Sudan uprising initially arose as a religious movement in 1881. The dispute between the Fashoda *mudir*, Rashid *Bey* who was charged of collecting taxes on behalf of the Egyptian Khedive and the son of a boat builder Muhammad Ahmad has pulled the trigger of the series of irrepressible incidents. After a while, in holy month Ramadan, Muhammad Ahmed declared himself as *al- Mahdi al- Muntazar* ‘the expected guide’, who would restore Islam and relieve the world from corruption. His name was associated with three unique titles in Islam - the imam, the successor of the Apostle of God and Mahdi. He envisaged himself recapitulating the role of the prophet, by restoring the community that prophet Muhammad had formerly established in holy places.⁹⁷ His message was simple enough: ‘I am the Mahdi, the successor of God’s prophet. Stop paying your taxes to the infidel Turks, and let any who come upon a Turk kill him for the Turks are infidels.’⁹⁸ At this point, it should be kept in mind that Turks refer to both Egyptian and European administrators rather than directly to Ottoman officials.

It is frequently asserted that the Mahdi revolt emanates from the oppression and misgovernment of the Egyptians. However, this claim was insufficient to explain the deeper reasons of the outbreak of the revolt in the certain place and time due to the fact that Sudanese people have been ruled by Egyptians for sixty years. Yet, timing of outbreak is precise and deserves to be examined in depth. Provincial authority, directly responsible for keeping peace and order in the region had failed to intervene the uprising at early stage. Sudanese historian Shibeika mentions an explanation offered by the Governor-General that Fashoda was not in telegraphic communication with Khartoum at that time and the only means of passing information and orders was the

⁹⁷ Peter M. Holt, *A Modern History of the Sudan: From the Funj Sultanate to the Present Day*, p. 78.

⁹⁸ H. L. Wesseling, *Divide and Rule: The Partition of Africa 1880-1914*, p. 59.

steamer which was obviously slow and ineffective in dealing with such an urgent matter.⁹⁹ Furthermore, at the beginning, the governors had high confidence and minimized the danger by attributing all the troubles to the Dongolese relatives of Mahdi who dealt in slavery. They thought that Sudanese would never be united because of the tribal jealousies. They believed those rivalries amid the tribes would prevent the movement reaching the degree of shaking the government's authority. However, they did not take account of the religious factor.¹⁰⁰

4.1: The Life of Sudanese Mahdi

Muhammad Ahmad was born on 12 August 1844 (27 *Receb* 1260) at Labab Island on the Nile in Dongola, and died in 22 June 1885 (9 *Ramazan* 1302) in Omdurman.¹⁰¹ He declared himself the Mahdi four years before his death in 1881. His family was long known as descendants of the prophet. Besides, his name and his father's name were the same with prophet Muhammad that was in accordance with some hadiths describing the expected Mahdi. His father Abdullah was a boat-builder and had given him his early education in reading and writing the Quran. When he was a child, his family moved to the town of Karari, near north of Omdurman where his father died on the journey. After his father's death, he continued to receive religious education in Sudan while his brothers dealt with their father's job, boat building. He took his first education from *Sheikh Amin al-Suwaylih* in the Gezira, and then subsequently went to Berber and became the pupil of the Sheikh Muhammad al-Dikayr.¹⁰² In those days, Sudanese students generally go to al-Azhar in Cairo in order to receive theological education. However, after his training Muhammad Ahmed chose mysticism way and became the disciple of *Sheikh Muhammad Sharif Nur al-Da'im*, who was the grandson of the founder of the *Sammaniyya* sufi order, *Ahmad al-Tayyib al-Bashir*. Later, as a sheikh of the order, Muhammad Ahmed spent seven years in seclusion and gained a reputation as a mystic and teacher. Then, he became *Sammaniyah* leader.¹⁰³ At the end of this period, He established his own *sufi* order on the Island of Aba on the White Nile, and married the daughter of his grand-uncle, Muhammad Sharif who resided on the island for some years. His two brothers

⁹⁹ Mekki Shibeika . *British Policy in the Sudan: 1882- 1902*, p. 30.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p.29.

¹⁰¹ For more information about the life of Muhammad Ahmad, see: Haim Shaked, *The Life of the Sudanese Mahdi*, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1978).

¹⁰² Mustafa Öz, "Muhammed Ahmed el-Mehdi," *Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi*, XXX, p. 496.

¹⁰³ Mohamed H. Fadlalla, *Short History of Sudan*, (New York: iUniverse, Inc.,2004), p.27.

Mohammed and Hamed, also lived there, dealt with good trade in boat building and supported the young sheikh.

Later on Muhammad Ahmed and Muhammad Sharif's ways were split. There are two narratives in the literature about this separation. First one narrated by Rudolph Slatin, an Australian in khedive's service who later became the first governor of Darfur Province appointed by Egypt. He cited that one day Muhammad Sharif has gathered his sheikhs and disciples to celebrate the feast of the circumcision of his sons and he had also allowed people to amuse themselves by singing and dancing as they liked. He would forgive in God's name, any sins that might be committed during the feast which were contrary to religious law. But Muhammad Ahmed took up a position against Muhammad Sharif and he stated that singing, dancing and playing were infringements against the law of God and no man even a sheiks could pardon such sins. When those thoughts reached Muhammad Sharif, he became angry and dismissed him from the order despite the numerous apologies and emotional appeals, refused to forgive him.¹⁰⁴ Second narration pointed out by Muhammad Sharif that Muhammad Ahmed declared himself the Mahdi and wanted Sharif obey him.¹⁰⁵ In the weak of this irreconcilable split, Muhammad Ahmad approached to rival leader of the *Sammaniyya* order, *Shaikh al-Qurashi*. He would accept him gladly due to the fact that there was a jealousy between him and Muhammad Sharif. Then, Muhammad Ahmad and his disciples made all preparations went to *Masallamiyah*. When *al-Qurashi* died in 1880, all his disciples pledged allegiance to Muhammad Ahmad. Around this time, Muhammad Ahmad first met with *Abdullah bin Muhammad al-Taaishi* who would become his caliph and head of the Mahdist state in the upcoming years.¹⁰⁶

4.2: The Manifestation of Mahdship

On 29 June 1881, Muhammad Ahmad publicly proclaimed himself as Mahdi. Indeed, idea of the Mahdship had been already present among the Sudanese people prior to Muhammad Ahmad's manifestation.¹⁰⁷ Muhammad Ahmad was aware of this expectation and told one of his dreams to the *Abdullah bin Taaishi* and other disciples

¹⁰⁴ R. Slatin Pasha, *Fire and Sword in the Sudan: A Personal Narrative of Fighting and Serving the Dervishes, 1879-1895*, trans. F. R. Wingate, (London: Edward Arnold, 1898), pp. 46.

¹⁰⁵ Ömer Koçyiğit, *From Sufi Movement to Statehood: The Mahdi Uprising in the Ottoman Sudan 1881-1885*, p. 15.

¹⁰⁶ Slatin Pasha, R. Slatin Pasha, *Fire and Sword in the Sudan: A Personal Narrative of Fighting and Serving the Dervishes, 1879-1895*, pp.47-48.

¹⁰⁷ For more information about Mahdship, see: James Darmesteter, *The Mahdi, Past and Present*, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1885).

that prophet Muhammad repeatedly heralded him as expected Mahdi.¹⁰⁸ Then, the Mahdi proclaimed a holy war against the foreigners. He collected his followers. He roused the local tribes. He wrote letters to all parts of the Sudan, calling upon the people to fight for a purified religion, the freedom of the soil. He promised to clear the land from the Turks. The watchword of the revolt is “Better, thousands of graves than a dollar tax.”¹⁰⁹ There are three principal groups in the Mahdi’s letter: The Turks, the evil *ulema*, and the unbelievers. By the Turks, he means alien officials of the Turco-Egyptian administration; by the evil *ulema*, the members of the official Islamic hierarchy who have indulged at the innovations of the Turks and have denounced Muhammad Ahmad’s claim to be the Mahdi. Behind these two groups there are “unbelievers” specifically, the British, the real owners of the authority in the Sudan.¹¹⁰ At that time, some of letters has reached Muhammad Rauf Pasha, the governor general of Sudan. According to Shibeika, Rauf Pasha should not be blamed not taking the matter seriously. Because; there was no such an incident in the history of Sudan that a Dervish could be a long-standing threat for the government authorities. However, Rauf Pasha’s reaction seems to be typically usual. He sent a telegraphic message to the *Qadi* (religious judge) of *al-Kawwah* and instructed him to go with two men to Aba Island and investigate the truth of the rumors. The orders were fulfilled and the *qadi* confirmed the rumors and sent a copy of one of the letters of Muhammad Ahmad to Khartoum. As expected, next step was to send a peaceful mission to so-called Mahdi in order to persuade him to give up his presumptuous claims. *Muhammad Abu al-Sa’ud*, the assistant Governor General, who had an experience and many connections with the Sudanese people selected by Rauf Pasha to conduct the negotiation process with Mahdi. It was also wise step that some relatives of Muhammad Ahmad accompanied the mission team. However, despite all the persuasion endeavors he did not change his position. Hence nothing remained but to send sufficient troops to capture Muhammad Ahmad. On 12 August 1881 the Mahdi Dervishes and Egyptian soldiers met in the battle of Aba and the Mahdi won his first brilliant victory.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ Mustafa Öz, “Muhammed Ahmed el-Mehdi,” *Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi*, p. 497.

¹⁰⁹ Winston Churchill, *The River War : An Historical Account of the Reconquest of the Soudan*, (London; New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1902), p. 19.

¹¹⁰ Peter M. Holt, *A Modern History of the Sudan: From the Funj Sultanate to the Present Day*, p.145.

¹¹¹ Mekki Shibeika . *British Policy in the Sudan: 1882- 1902*, pp.23-24.

The Mahdist movement demanded a return to the simplicity of early Islam, abstention from alcohol and tobacco, and strict seclusion of women.¹¹² Sometimes the Mahdi was called *caliphate al-Resul*, the successor of the Prophet and sometimes even they dignified him with the sacred title of *Nebi*, prophet. In truth the Prophet Mohammad occupied in the people's mind quite a secondary position, and the celebration of his birthday was forbidden by the Mahdi. Furthermore, Father Joseph Ohrwalder noted that one day two men discussed that the Mahdi would have a higher seat in heaven than the Prophet while god was higher than the Mahdi.¹¹³ On the other hand, According to him, the title of the Mahdi as successor of the Prophet demonstrates that this uprising was also directed against the Ottoman Sultan who claims this title.¹¹⁴ However, considering the Mahdi movements throughout the Islamic history, all of them, particularly the Sunnis, view the Mahdi as the successor of prophet Muhammad who reinvigorates the caliphate. Thereby the main motives behind the Sudanese Mahdi uprising needs to be deeply scrutinized to grasp why and when the rebellion occurred and against whom?

Firstly, to explain the timing of outbreak, the incidents have been occurring beyond the Sudan could be beneficial. With the deposition of Ismail in 1879, his successor, Muhammad Tewfik who was known as a puppet of the Europeans came to the power. This change paved way for the opposition gathered around the army leader, Urabi Pasha and eventually ended with the British occupation in 1882. The collapse of khedive's authority in 1879 and revolution attempts weakened Egypt's control over Sudanese provinces. In fact, there is no evidence that proving any direct connection between the supporters of Urabi in Egypt and Mahdi in the Sudan but emergence of both movements in such a close time and place pushes us thinking that both Urabi and Mahdi benefited from the power-vacuum caused by the disappearance of Ismail. However, a supporter of Urabi named *Ahmad al-Awwam* had been exiled to Khartoum after the Urabi's revolt attempt. He then wrote an account about the recent Egyptian affairs and contacted with the Mahdi's adherents. Because of his relationship he was tried and put to death. His work later publicized in Omdurman by the Mahdist authorities. But it was the final stage of Mahdi movement when the book reached the

¹¹² Mohamed H. Fadlalla, *Short History of Sudan*, p.27.

¹¹³ Father Joseph Ohrwalder, *Ten Years' Captivity in the Mahdist Camp 1882-1892*, p.67

¹¹⁴ Father Joseph Ohrwalder, *Ten Years' Captivity in the Mahdist Camp 1882-1892*, p.16.

people.¹¹⁵ Hence, It is not sufficient to deduce from his account that Urabi revolt had an considerable effect on the outbreak of the Mahdi riot.

As the reasons of the Mahdi revolt, an anonymous reporter who wrote set of letters in Egyptian daily newspaper, *Al-Ahram* explains it around the wrongdoings of the British administration in Sudan. According to this Egyptian writer, one of the causes of the revolt was the high-taxes imposed during the Gordon Pasha's governorship. The other one was the prohibition of the marrying of the girls who were under certain age. It was against the sharia law and increased tension on Muhammad Ahmad. Furthermore, *Na'um Shuqayr*, a Lebanese serving in the intelligence department of the Egyptian army published his Arabic book *Ta'rikh al-Sudan al-qadim wa'l –hadith wa- jughrafiyatuhu* in 1903 in Cairo which is the most comprehensive account on Sudan history. *Shuqayr* had worked on the primary sources and improved different and deeper understanding than his contemporaries who at that time studied on the nineteenth century Sudan. The successors did not go beyond the repetition of his findings and conclusion until the late 1950s.

He explained the reasons of the Mahdi revolt in four plausible factors. The first apparent reason was the mismanagement of Turco-Egyptian administration. The brutality and violence towards the local inhabitants increased the tension and when the time came turned out to take revenge. However, this does not explain the exact reason of revolt. Because; first Sudan was the exile place for the Egyptian officers who were mostly incapable and weak. Secondly, this mismanagement situation was not new and it was known in Sudan under previous rulers. Briefly, it was not an invention of the Ottomans. The second reason for the revolt was the heavy taxes levied from the Sudanese by the Turco-Egyptian rulers. In fact, most tax collectors demanded higher amounts than actual tax dues. However, the taxes had decreased during Khedive Tewfik reign but the brutal methods applied for extracting the taxes caused the initial resentment among the Sudanese. The third reason listed by *Shuqayr's* account was the suppression of the slave trade especially 1870s under Khedive Ismail. Sudan economy was based on slavery and the share of the slaves in the economy gradually increased over the years. As a result of the forbidding the slave trade, wealthy people lost their major source of income. Due to the fact that most extreme methods to suppress slave

¹¹⁵ P. M.Holt & M.W. Daly, *A History of the Sudan: From coming of Islam to the Present Day*, (Longman: Pearson Education, 2000), p. 76.

trade implemented by the Christian governors such as Baker, Gordon and Gessi, Sudanese people associated it with that religion. The fourth reason was the traditional politics of Turkish administration; favoritism implemented by Turkish administrators in favor of the *Khatmiyya* order and *Sha'iqiyya* tribe. There was no superiority of *Sha'iqiyya* tribe in the eyes of the other tribes whereas they were helping the rulers to collect taxes and thereby were exempt from the taxes. On the other hand, The *Khatmiyya* order had privilege because of its close connection with the holy city of Mecca and its rulers. This favoritism alienated all the other orders and created resent in Sudanese society.

Moreover, there were several reasons of Mahdi's success. Firstly, the government had not give an efficient response to Mahdi at the early stage of his riot. Secondly, Muhammad Ahmed's revolt largely coincided with the Urabi's uprising in Egypt which prevented the authorities sending sufficient troops to the Sudan. Thirdly, Egyptian battalions deployed in the Sudan were at first weak and unprepared. And lastly, both Egyptians and Ottomans did not develop a coherent efficient policy toward the movement. Their underestimation of Muhammad Ahmad's manifestation expanded the dimensions of the incident.¹¹⁶ In addition, fanaticism facilitated the advance of the movement. It gave the people motivation to fight and enabled them to gather under a common object: religion. It made all the personal and tribal disputes insignificant. For Churchill who was the British army officer and war correspondent during the Mahdi period, it seems like a communism under the flag of religion.¹¹⁷ According to him, the original causes of the Mahdi movement were social and racial. Before the Mahdi, Sudanese people were miserable and they were devoid of spirit. When the Mahdi came, he gave the tribes the enthusiasm they lacked. He put soul into the hearts of his countrymen to clean up the native land from foreigners. He roused the patriotism and religion in the Sudan. The movement only opposed to decaying system of government and society.¹¹⁸ Indeed, Churchill' view most concentrated on the nationalistic and religious factors. He believed that it was the beginning of a new nation whose founder was Muhammad Ahmad.

In this period, the Mahdi movement was mainly reinforced by three distinguished groups which were known as *Ansar* (helpers), just as the Prophet

¹¹⁶ Gabriel R. Warburg, *Historical Discord in the Nile Valley*, pp. 22-24.

¹¹⁷ Winston Churchill, *The River War : An Historical Account of the Reconquest of the Soudan*, p. 19.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.33-34

Mohammed's followers were known. There were first the genuinely pious men who were closely acquainted with him for years and unquestioningly bonded him at heart. They wished to be governed by the holy law of Islam in their region. When the Mahdi and others complained of misgovernment and purification, they were meaning theological corruption rather than political ones. A second group of the *Ansar* had more political concern. These were the tribes who had settled on the southern fringe of the Nile and worked as boatmen, traders and soldiers. Directly, or indirectly, they were connected with slave trade, and Gordon's policy for the abolishing of slave trade mitigated their prosperity. When Gordon and Ismail were gone, an opportunity to turn back to their old ways of life showed up. These men were neither theologians nor devotees, but they merely hide their political and economic interest under the veil of religion. The third group consisted of the *Baqqara* nomads straightforwardly oppose came under the central authority which required paying taxes. Hence, Mahdi's commitments 'to kill the Turks and cease pay taxes' was welcomed by them.¹¹⁹ Interestingly, Mahdi's war cry was not the "Down with the Christians!" but "Down with the Turks", indeed he means Egyptians. As previously explained, the word Turk was habitually used in the Sudan. Because, Sudanese people were not familiar with the changes in the political arena and were not aware of the Ottomans changing position in Egypt or capability to interfere to the Egyptian affairs.

After the failure of the first government expedition due to the disagreement between two commanders, without delay Rauf Pasha set up new plans for future war with Mahdi's Dervishes. A force collected from the surrounding provinces under the commandment of Muhammad Pasha Said organized the second expedition to Mahdi who at that time settled down Nuba Mountains, south of the Kordofan. But this second attempt also failed because of the advantageous positions of Dervishes who were accustomed to live in mountainous area. The successive victories and gained booties had increased the Mahdi's reputation among the Sudanese and strengthened the belief that he was the true Mahdi. At that time, Rauf Pasha thought that it was unnecessary to send new forces. If the movement left alone, it would eventually collapse itself. Hence, all operations suspended for a while.

In the meantime he informed Cairo about the new developments. Egyptian government who occupied with the Urabi Pasha's riot at that time and just managed to

¹¹⁹ Peter M. Holt, *A Modern History of the Sudan: From the Funj Sultanate to the Present Day*, p.79.

appoint *Abdülkadir Hilmi Pasha* as the governor-general of the Sudan. In the meantime, under the command of *Yusuf Pasha Hasan al-Shallali*, a new troop established against the Mahdi forces. But the commander likewise miscalculated the strength, the intelligence and devotion of his enemy. Moreover, when he advanced to the region of Qadir Mountain, his troops suffer from the increasing exhaustion. In such a time, *Ansar*, the Mahdi's adherents organized a surprise attack on 30 May 1882 (12 Recep 1299) and won a third overwhelming victory. The *Ansar* whose number already reached 8000 in the wake of the Aba battle, now gained more adherents particularly from the western tribes.¹²⁰ Mahdi thought that it was the right time to advance into Kordofan (today, constituting the central and southern area of Sudan) and capture El-Obeid (today, the capital of the state of North Kordofan, in southern Sudan), the provincial capital. He was in contact with the tribes who were in revolt against the Egyptian administration and took their support. On 19 January 1883, El-Obeid fell into the hands of Ansar. It was the first considerable town seized by Mahdi forces.

The last years of Turco-Egyptian rule in the Sudan were predominately directed by the British government since the British occupation of Egypt occurred in 1882. At first, it was regarded by Gladstone's government that occupation was a temporary measure which would end with khedive Tewfik's consolidation of power in Egypt again. Hence, the revolt in Sudan has not been taken into consideration by British government. Sudan affairs were beyond the responsibilities of Britain that merely avoided from further expenditures. However, a success in Sudan could restore the prestige of the Khedivate and Tewfik was allowed to establish an expeditionary force that mostly consist of Urabi's demoralized soldiers in order to capture Khartoum. Former British officer of the Indian Army, William Hicks was appointed as commander in chief and *Alaaddin Siddiq Pasha* accompanied him as governor-general. The first contact with *Ansar* occurred on 29 April 1883 and Hicks's army defeated the mahdist garrison in Merabi. Then he returned to Khartoum to prepare for el-Obeid's seizure where the Mahdi lived. Muhammad Ahmad had received the news of Hicks's attack and carried his camp outside the el-Obeid. The first contact between the two forces was made on 3 November and the clash had been waged for days in the forested area. On 5 November, the *Ansar* surrounded the Egyptian troops who were suffering from serious lack of water and sleep and Mahdi ordered a general attack. The battle at *Shaykan* ended

¹²⁰ Peter M. Holt, *The Mahdist State in the Sudan: 1881-1898*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), p. 50.

with the great defeat of the Egyptian troops and both *Alaaddin* and Hicks Pasha and his 250 Egyptian soldiers have been massacred.¹²¹

One week later, Muhammad Ahmed took the city of el-Obeid. This victory increased enormously the prestige of the Mahdi, not only in the Sudan but also all Muslim populated areas in the world. The delegators from all over the Muslim world, Hejaz, Tunis, Morocco came to visit the Mahdi and listened his summons. The administration of Khartoum began to withdraw the garrisons with entire ammunition from the Fashoda, *al-Kawwa*, *Shatt* and *Dueim* because of the fear that Mahdi's next attack would target the capital. The most serious consequence of the *Shaykan* battle was the collapse of the Egyptian administration in Darfur and *Bahr al-Gazal*.¹²² The western part of the Sudan had come under the rule of Muhammad Ahmad.

The battle of the Mahdi continued after the fall of al-Obeid. He sent Osman Digna, the ex-slave holder in Sewakin to the shore of Red Sea on 8 May 1883. By receiving the support of the neighboring tribes he defeated the British and Egyptian forces in the eastern part of the country. British government who undertook the protection of Red Sea ports compelled to intervene in the issue. Right after the harsh debates in the parliament, three battalions had been sent to Sewakin under the command of General Graham. When he dealt with the forces of Osman Digna, the *Ansar* had already surrounded Tokar, near the Red Sea in northeastern Sudan. Graham's effort had remained ineffective and in 1884 eastern Sudan except Sewakin fell totally under the rule of Mahdi.

At the beginning, the British government led by Gladstone and his liberal party did not wish to intervene Sudanese affairs. According to them, the Sudanese were a people rightly struggling to be free from the yoke of the corrupt Pasha's of Egypt and the slave-traders.¹²³ However, the successive defeats confronted both Egyptian and British governments with the problem of the future of the Sudan. British government recommendation was to evacuate the Sudan outright. This suggestion created disquiet in Cairo and caused the resignation of all ministers. Armenian Christian Nubar Pasha who would implement the advice formed a new ministry. At this juncture, the Pall Mall Gazette led public opinion that Charles Gordon should be sent to the Sudan to tackle the

¹²¹ Mustafa Öz, "Muhammed Ahmed el-Mehdi," *Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi*, p. 497.

¹²² Peter M. Holt, *The Mahdist State in the Sudan: 1881-1898*, p. 65.

¹²³ Harold Macmichael, *The Sudan*, (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1954), p. 45.

situation. As a result of this press campaign in Britain, Gordon was sent out to fulfill a mission which was variously understood by the different parties. The British government charged him of reporting on the best method of carrying out evacuation. However, Baring who was the British agent and consul-general in Cairo thought that Gordon was instructed to perform the evacuation. On the other hand, he was appointed as governor-general by the Egyptian khedive in order to restore the government. Due to the misunderstanding and confusions in the communication, Gordon took the last order seriously.¹²⁴ Indeed, Egyptian government was opposing to Charles Gordon's appointment to such a post of command. Because the movement in the Sudan was a religious and appointment of a Christian to crucial position would result in alienating those tribes who had still remained loyal to the Egyptian government.¹²⁵ However, he arrived in Khartoum on 18 February 1884.

Charles Gordon, born in 1833, was a British general distinguished himself in the Crimean and Chinese war. He is known as the first Christian governor to be assigned to Sudan on behalf of the Egyptian khedive. From 1874 to 1876 he was the governor general of Equator region. He was tasked to establish regular administration and reports on the developments about the region. In 1877, he became the governor of whole Sudan and he was granted the title of Pasha. During the years of 1877 and 1879, khedive Ismail charged him of two significant matters: suppression of the slave trade and improving the Egyptian-Sudan relationships. The convention between the British and Egyptian governments for the suppression of the slave signed on 4 August 1877 has been one of the important outcomes of his period.¹²⁶ Moreover, he was also to deal with solving settlements problems with Ethiopia, an uprising against the khedivate in Darfur, and controlling of Bahr al-Ghazal, which was in the hands of the son of a slaver.¹²⁷ When the time was 1884, Charles Gordon had already known the Sudan and its people. His extraordinary military success in China and his earlier service in Sudan put forward his name in the British public. However, religious devotion, military strength and political skill of the Mahdi have been underestimated and Gordon has been appointed for the task but despite his long service his ability was execrating. Firstly, he was almost ignorant of Arabic. Secondly, he excessively used his mind and he deluged both his

¹²⁴ Peter M. Holt, *The Mahdist State in the Sudan: 1881-1898*, pp. 85.

¹²⁵ Mekki Shibeika, *British Policy in the Sudan: 1882- 1902*, p.148.

¹²⁶ Ali Bilgenoğlu, *İngiliz Sömürgeciliğinin Mısır ve Sudan Örneğinde Karşılaştırmalı Bir Çözümlemesi*.

(Unpublished PhD. thesis, İzmir Dokuz Eylül University: 2013), p.267.

¹²⁷ Ömer Koçyiğit, *From Sufi Movement to Statehood: The Mahdi Uprising in the Ottoman Sudan 1881-1885*, p. 23.

superiors and subordinates with detailed and complicated schemes. Thirdly, he had strong and strict prejudices.

For instance, the crisis living with *Zubayr Pasha* who was an old slave trader and a leader of a military force in Sudan had never been settled. Plus, the mood of the Sudanese had been changed in 1880s. British public opinion saw Gordon as emancipator of slaves whereas he was the man who destroyed the foundations of their prosperity in the eyes of Sudanese.¹²⁸ A few days before Gordon's arrival in Khartoum, his proclamations have been publicly displayed in the vicinity of province. According to those proclamations, first Mahdi was recognized as governor of Kordofan, second the taxes were reduced and lastly slave trade was allowed from now on.¹²⁹

When Gordon came to Khartoum, Muhammad Ahmad carried his garrisons from al-Obeid to Omdurman located opposite the city of Khartoum and Osman Digna held the Red Sea coast. Berber had already fallen under the rule of *Ansar*. Thereby, Gordon was in a tight corner. He went to battle with eight thousand soldiers but he did not take into account that Sudanese soldiers under his command could change their sides at the battle. As it might be expected the first regiment of the troops consisting of the Sudanese soldiers abandoned the battlefield. Only Egyptian soldiers continued to war. The forces of the Mahdi seized the city of Khartoum on 26 January 1885, and killed General Gordon. The major cities of Egyptian Sudan from Red Sea to Darfur and from Dongola to Bahr al- Gazal now came under the domination of Muhammad Ahmad. The center of the state has been moved to Omdurman and new mosques and buildings have been established there.¹³⁰

In the first, it was a mistake to send any British official to Khartoum. The task he had to perform was well high impossible of execution, and his nomination involved the assumption of responsibilities on the port of the British government which it was desirable to avoid. Secondly, if anyone was to be sent, it was a mistake to choose General Gordon. In spite of many noble traits in his character he was wanting in some of the qualities which were essential to the successful accomplishment of his mission. Thirdly, when once General Gordon had been sent, he should have been left a free hand to long as he kept within the main lines of the policy which he was authorized to execute. It is, in my opinion, to be regretted that general Gordon was not allowed to employ Zubeir Pasha but any view held as to the probable results of employing him must be

¹²⁸ Peter M. Holt, *The Mahdist State in the Sudan: 1881-1898*, pp. 80-81.

¹²⁹ Veysel Akdoğan, *Sudan Mehdisi'nin İsyanına Dair Bazı Osmanlı Vesikaları (1881-1885)*, p. 30.

¹³⁰ Mustafa Öz, "Muhammed Ahmed el-Mehdi," *Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi*, p. 498.

conjectural. Fourthly, the question of whether an expedition should or should not have been sent from Suakin to Berber in the spring of 1884 depends on the military practicability of the undertaking a point on which the best military authorities differed in opinion. Fifthly, a great and inexcusable mistake was made in delaying for so long the dispatch of Gordon relief expedition. Sixthly, the government acted wisely after the fall of Khartoum in eventually adopting a defensive policy and in ordering a retreat to Wadi Halfa. Lastly, it may be avoid that the British government were extraordinarily unlucky. Whatever amount of foresight be shown, success in doubtful and difficult enterprises, such as the Gordon mission and the Nile expedition, must always depend a good deal on adventitious circumstances which can not be foreseen, and over which no government can exercise any control.¹³¹

Gordon's death had affected the British nation deeply. Prominent journal of those days 'The Times' had summed up the British people's reaction saying that the shock caused by the news of the fall of Khartoum had no parallel in the experience of that generation. On Saturday afternoon, 16 February 1884, British people arranged a public demonstration against the government's policy in Egypt and Sudan.¹³² Gladstone had to resign as prime minister in 1885. Thereby, Mahdi had accidentally relieved Abdülhamid II of his greatest enemy Gladstone.¹³³ However, the Sudanese Mahdi unexpectedly fell sick and died because of typhus on 22 June 1885 (9 *Ramadan* 1302). Thus, the revolutionary phase of the Mahdiyya ended and consolidation process started with his successor caliph Abdullah.

When the people heard of the death news, they were surprised and felt disappointed. Because he died before he fulfilled his commitments. They thought that he was the false one. The province was boiling and the leaders of society convened to discuss the current situation. At this moment, his successor, *Abdullah bin Muhammad al-Taaishi*, proclaimed himself the caliph of the Mahdi. He was already chosen by the Mahdi as his successor before his death. After a long discussion and struggle, the caliph Abdullah became the legitimate ruler of Sudan. He ruled the Mahdist state for thirteen years until its defeat in 1898 when the British army triumphed against the Mahdist forces. He coined silver money on behalf of him¹³⁴ and declared himself "Sultan-us

¹³¹ Elvey Baring, *Modern Egypt*, v.2, p.33-34

¹³² L. A. Fabunmi, *The Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations: A Case Study in Power Politics 1800-1956*, pp. 41-45.

¹³³ Kemal Karpat, *Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State*, p. 270.

¹³⁴ "Devletlü efendim hazretleri, Mütemehdi namına sim mecidiyeyi takliden yapılmış ve Hicazda ele geçirilerek bu kere nezarete götürülmüş olan bir parça gümüş aynen ve leffen arz ve takdim kılındı. Ol babda emr-u ferman hazret-i veliyü'l emrundur. Fi 26 rebiyü'l ahir sene 1306 ve fi 15 kanun-ı evvel sene 1304. Telgraf ve Posta Nazırı"
BOA, Y..MTV. 36/88 23 Rebiyyülahir 1306 (27 December 1888)

Sudan”.¹³⁵ His declaration was also a challenge to Ottoman Sultan’s both religious and wordly authority. Abdülhamid II was concern about the strategic position of the region. It was very close to Hejaz area and spreading of the ideas or any attack organized by the caliph’s troops was threatening the security of the holy places. Hence, when the Sultan learned that caliph Abdullah proclaimed himself as sultan, he immeadiatly ordered sending of three or four small-sized steamers in order to protect the shores of Hejaz. Also, another five steamers in Jedda could be reinforced other ships founded in Grete and Paris if any rapid attack occurred. After a month later, a silver coin found in the Hejaz area increased the tension in the region and demonstrated the seriousness of the event.

4.3: Overthrow of Mahdism

After the death of Mahdi, Sudanese riot lost its importance in the frame of Egyptian question. Britain reached the conclusion that similar structure of administration with Egypt cannot be established in Sudan yet. Hence, Britain did not change its policy for the next decade and stayed in Egypt and watched the events in Sudan. Evelyn Baring¹³⁶ who was the de facto ruler of Egypt had pursued wait and see policy towards the Sudan which was based on there main arguments. First of these arguments was that as long as British forces or Egyptian forces under the command of British officers remained in Egypt, Dervishes ruled by caliph Abdullah could not be a serious threat for Egypt. Second, as long as Egyptian security was ensured no attempt should be made for the reconquest of Sudan until Egypt’s military and financial

¹³⁵ “Hartum’da bulunan mütemehdi Abdullah’ın “sultan-us Sudan” unvanıyla bi-t’telkib ilan-ı keyfiyet olunması sevahil-i hicaziye’nin nezaketini taz’if eyleyeceğinden sevahil-i mezkurenin muhafazası için irsalı Hicaz vilayetinden arz ve inhâ olunan üç-dört küçük vapurun serian tehiyyesiyle gönderilmek üzere atebe-i ulyaya arz-ı keyfiyet olunması vilayet-i müşarünileyhaden bu kere dahi telgrafla vaki olan isti’cal üzerine te’kiden emr ü ferman buyurulduğu şeref-vürud eden tezkire-i aliyye-i asafanelerinde işar buyurulmuştur. Basra için tertib ve techiz olunmuş olan iki kıt’a vapur Basra sevahilince derkar olan ehemmiyet ve elzemiyet ve ol babda canib-i bab-ı âliden vuku’ bulan işarâta mebni ledel-arz şeref sunuh buyurulan emr ü ferman-ı keramet-i unvan hazret-i şehinşahi mantuk-ı âlisi vechile oraya gönderilmek üzere bulunmuş ve hal-i hazırda elde techiz edilmiş başka vapur kalmamıştır. Mamafih zaten Cidde’de beş kıt’a sūfūn-i hūmayun bulunduğu gibi orası için müretteb olub ba-irade-i seniyye-i hazret-i hilafet-penahi muhtacin-i hüccacı almak üzere gönderilen Paris vapuru da ba’del-avde yine oraya gönderileceğinden şu halde Cidde’deki vapurun miktarı altı kıtaya balığ olacağına bi’l-arz mütemehdinin hareketından sevahil-i Hicaziye için endişe edilecek bir cihet-i melhuz olsa bile sefâin-i mezkure icab eden nukat-ı mühimmeye taksim ve tayin olunduğu halde emr-i muhafazaya kifayet edebileceğine nazaran sevahil-i mezkure için yeniden vapur tertip ve irsaline pek de lüzum görülmemekte ise de mamafih oraya sefine irsalı sureti emr-ü ferman buyrulduğu takdirde ahşap Ertuğrul Firkateyn-i hūmayun mücehhez ve müheyya bulunduğuundan onun Girid’e ve Girid’de bulunan Fırat ganbot-ı hūmayununa dahi Cidde’ye irsalı münasib olacağıının ve bu babda emr-ü irade-i keramet-i âliye-i hazret-i şehinşahi her ne suretle şerefrîz-sūnuh ve sudur buyurulur ise mantuk-ı âlisi infaz kılınacağıının arz ve ifadesine ibtidar kılındı. Ol babda emr-ü ferman Hazret-i menlehül-emrindir. Fi 8 Muharrem sene 1306 (1888). Nazır-ı bahriye.”

BOA, Y.. PRK.ASK, 50/47, 8 Muharrem 1306 (14 September 1888).

¹³⁶ For more information about the life of Evelyn Baring see: Roger Owen, *Lord Cromer: Victorian Imperialist, Edwardian Proconsul*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

situation afforded. Indeed, the construction of Aswan Dam in 1895 could be interpreted that increasing revenues through agricultural expansion could provide a fund in order to make possible the reconquest. Finally, Baring believed that Egypt's welfare depended on Nile and a weak Mahdist state could not be threat for Egypt however if an European power seized the control of Sudan, this policy should be reconsidered.¹³⁷

The second phase of the dispute in the wake of the policy of abandonment accepted by Egyptian government did not open until 1896. In the meantime certain events had taken place which resulted in the reconquest of the Sudan. The first event was the death of General Gordon who was sent to the Sudan to carry out the policy of abandonment. His death created a great outcry in Britain and left a deep impression on the minds of the British people. Thereby, 'avenging of Gordon' was one of the direct reasons for the re-conquest of the Sudan. It gave a strong motive for both British soldiers to fight in such a distance place and society. Secondly, in the 1890s scramble for Africa began to be heated. Italy and France was competing with Britain for gaining sphere of influence in the vicinity of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The first threat to the British imperial aspirations came from Italy. She gained the protection of Abyssinia as regards foreign affairs by signing the Treaty of Ucciali with Ethiopia in May 1889. On 15 April 1891 Italy and Britain made an agreement by which Italians gained temporary occupation of Kassala (today, the capital of the state of Kassala in eastern Sudan) from Britain in order to weaken dervishes who were their common enemies. Through this agreement, city of Kassala was invaded by Italy in 1894 with the justification of protection of Masawwa and Sewakin ports. On the other side, for Britain Kassala was insignificant so long caliph Abdullah remained in power. Therefore, Britain aims to diminish his power through Italia in order to reoccupy the Sudan. Second attempt against the British influence in the Nile valley came from France. France had never recognized the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 and opposed the British domination in the Nile region. Therefore, she intended to utilize her expedition force to penetrate Eastern part of central Africa and then reach the upper Nile. But Salisbury declared that Britain would not recognize any French authority over the Nile land. But he came up with commercial privileges rather than political concessions. Through those treaties Britain guaranteed that Nile Basin was evidently recognized under the British sphere of

¹³⁷ Muddathir Abd al-rahim, *Imperialism & Nationalism in the Sudan: a Study in Constitutional and Political Development, 1899-1956*, (Oxford, Clarendon press, 1969), pp.23-24.

influence. Third, Egypt changed its approach towards the Sudan because of the development of irrigation and emergence of storage problem in Egypt. Sudan in a while gained an importance in the eyes of the Egyptian authorities not only for the security measure but also guaranteeing their water supply. Fourth, new khedive in Egypt and Liberal government in England came to the power. Abbas II was declared as the new khedive on 16 September 1892 when he was just seventeen. The young khedive was different from his predecessors in terms of being an extreme nationalist and Anglophobe. He felt discomfort with British interference in Egyptian affairs and he dismissed the entire ministers who favor the British without the consent of British Consul-General which was the custom during his father's reign. During his ten years of office, many crises between him and Lord Cromer have occurred. He remained in power until the declaration of First World War. On the other hand, coming of the liberal government to power in 1892 had prompted to increase hopes amid the Egyptian nationalists who thought that liberal foreign policy would act in direction of evacuation of Egypt.¹³⁸ Furthermore, caliph Abdullah was losing strength in Sudan and his adherents gradually turned their face to the Sultan.¹³⁹

These circumstances by creating tense atmosphere paved the way to the re-conquest of Sudan. British government intended to dispatch an expeditionary force composed of Egyptian and British troops to Dongola in 1896. One of the reasons of this rapid expedition was the Italians call for help. They had taken a heavy defeat toward the Ethiopians and they were suspicious of Ethiopians and Dervishes ally to capture Kassala. In the first part of Dongola campaign, The Khedive encountered with Ottoman strong resistance in order not to send Egyptian forces to act against Muslims. However, the Sultan's protestations were ineffectual. On 27 March 1896 the Ottoman Grand vizier telegraphed to Khedive to remind him that Egyptian military force was a part of the Imperial army and the use of these troops particularly against the Muslims was depended entirely on the permission of the Sultan. But such permission neither asked nor granted to the Khedive for the Dongola campaign.¹⁴⁰ But Abbas II kindly refused this order with the friendly consultations of Lord Cromer and he guaranteed that there

¹³⁸ Mekki Abbas, *the Sudan Question: : The Dispute over The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 1884-1951*, pp.40-41.

¹³⁹ “....Sudanlıların Mısır’a taaruzu şöyle dursun bazılarının kendi beyinlerinde hüküm süren asayişsizlikten himaye-i hükümete iltica eyledikleri dahi fi 15 Cemaziyelahir sene 1314 tarihli ve 131 numarolu ariza-i çakeremde dermeyan kılınmıştır...”

A.MTZ. (05) 13/43 15 Cemaziyelahir 1304 (21 November 1896)

¹⁴⁰ Muddathir Abd al-rahim, *Imperialism& Nationalism in the Sudan: a Study in Constitutional and Political Development, 1899-1956*, p.26.

would be no encroachment on Sultan's right and the intent of expedition was the same with 1883 campaign which Ottoman Sultan put no objection.¹⁴¹ After then, the advance to Dongola began in 1896 and ended with hoisting of Egyptian flag on the province headquarter.

While Dongola campaign had been done in order to relief the pressure upon Italians and for an anticipated attack of French troops, Khartoum campaign was actualized purely due to the financial concerns in 1896. Kitchener who found a chance to serve under the command of François Wingate who was British intelligence officer in Egypt was charged as the chief commander of campaign. Kitchener hoisted the British and Egyptian flags side by side in Khartoum as symbol of the concurrent domination of Egypt and Britain over the Sudan. Following the defeat of Dervish forces in Atbara, in 1898, Kitchener crushed the followers of Mahdist movement at the battle of Omdurman.¹⁴² Thus, the Britain had taken the revenge of Gordon Pasha. When the city was surrounded, they first came to the tomb of Muhammad Ahmed and killed all guards in the tomb. The body of Sudanese Mahdi removed from his grave and his head was cut off from his body. After his nail ripped off, the rest of body threw into the Nile.¹⁴³

Re-conquest of Sudan had changed the balance of power in the Nile valley to the detriment of France which claims right on Nile as well as Britain. Hence, when French officer Marchand reached Fashoda on July 1898 hoisted a French flag there in order to compel Britain reach an agreement with France. After the hearing of this event, Kitchener immediately went to Fashoda and informed Merchand that his act was the direct violation of British and Egyptian's rights on the valley of Nile. He solely remained to protest the act and after then fervent negotiations embarked on between the parties. Eventually, a few weeks later they reached an agreement. According to the convention, France had given up her claims on the whole Nile Basin and in return Congo and Chad Basin was relinquished to France sphere of influence. The re-conquest of the Sudan had been performed by English and Egyptian troops on behalf of the Khedive of Egypt. On January 4, 1899, at Omdurman Cromer made speech to the notables of Sudan, saying that *"You see that both the British and Egyptian flags are floating over this house. That is an indication that for the future you will be governed by the Queen of England and by the Khedive of Egypt."* In fact, Cromer did not support the

¹⁴¹ Mekki Abbas, *The Sudan Question: The Dispute over The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 1884-1951*, p. 44.

¹⁴² İsmail Hakkı Göksoy, *The Establishment of Anglo-Egyptian Rule in the Sudan, 1897-1914*, p.7.

¹⁴³ Ali Akyıldız ve Zekeriya Kurşun, *Osmanlı Arap Coğrafyası ve Avrupa Emperyalizmi*, p.458.

direct annexation of the country because of financial burdens. Annexation could also attract French, Turkish and Egyptian's reaction towards the Britain. Besides, he was opposed to the recognition of Sudan as a part of either Ottoman Empire or Egypt. Thus, it was decided that Salisbury's two-flag formula was set out in the form of convention between British and Egyptian government.¹⁴⁴ The reign of Mahdism in the Sudan thus ended on 2 September 1898, at the battle of Omdurman.

The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement had recognized Britain as the de facto ruler of the country with the Egyptian co-governance. Yet, there was no reference to the Ottoman sovereignty over the Sudan. And once, Cromer had questioned the validity of such document. Because Ottoman *firman*s prohibits Khedive making any treaties with foreign powers except commercial and customs conventions.¹⁴⁵ Despite of this reality, British and Egyptian flags were jointly hoisted for the purposes that the theory would become reality in the Sudan case. Indeed, Ahmed Muhtar Pasha has taken the attraction of the Porte to the incidents. On 10 December 1898, about six months ago from official declaration of Cromer, he sent a cipher telegram to the Porte and informed them about the two flags plan of Britain and Egypt for the Sudan.¹⁴⁶ With the conditions of agreement, Britain obtained many privileges in Sudan. Khedive's authority in the Sudanese affairs stipulated the consent of British governor. Egyptian laws and regulations were no longer valid in the Sudan territory and Europeans had gained the right to trade and reside freely.¹⁴⁷ This was the first step to diminish the Egyptian authority in Sudan and separate it forever. In fact, to separate Sudan from the Egypt was not a new idea for Britain. According to Mehmed Muhsin's claim, they were bearing in mind this issue since the Gordon Pasha's salvation campaign.¹⁴⁸

Since 1896, Ottoman Empire had resisted the British occupation in the region. Although the Ottoman State did not accept the act, Sudan remained Anglo-Egyptian administration and became a part of British colony system. In fact, Sudan legally

¹⁴⁴ İsmail Hakkı Göksoy, *The Establishment of Anglo-Egyptian Rule in the Sudan, 1897-1914*, pp.9-10.

¹⁴⁵ Mekki Shibeika, *British Policy in the Sudan: 1882- 1902*, p. 412.

¹⁴⁶ "Mısır fevkalade komiserliğinde varid olan şifreli telgrafname suretidir.

Lord Cromeri'in geçen gün Hartum'da meşaih urbana şayana dikkat bir nutk verdi içinde en mühim noktalar zirde arz olunur şu iki bayrağın yan yana bulunması badema kraliçe ile hidiv tarafından müştereken hüküm ve idare olunacağına alemtedir. Serdar ikisinden de iktidar-ı kamileyi haiz olduğundan hakimeniz işte yanınızdadır..... başkasına müracaat olunmayacak ve hertarafına tesviye olunacaktır. Kraliçe her hükümdardan ziyadehalkdır sizlerde onlar gibiartık eski zamanlardan kurtuldunuz din ve..... kata bahs etmemiştir. Nutk bit- telgraf Avrupaya gitti ol babda. Fi 28 kanun-i sani 1314. Ahmed Muhtar"

BOA, A. MTZ. (05) 14B/ 85 28 Kanun-i sani 1314 (10 December 1898).

¹⁴⁷ İsmail Hakkı Göksoy, *The Establishment of Anglo-Egyptian Rule in the Sudan, 1897-1914*, p.12.

¹⁴⁸ Mehmed Muhsin, *Afrika Delili*. (Kahire: el-Felah Ceridesi Matbaası, 1312), p.338.

depended on Egypt, Egypt also under the suzerainty of the Ottoman State and thus indirectly, Sudan was still a territory of Ottoman State. Hence, Ottoman State had refused to recognize the administration situated in Sudan. Because; it was contradicting with the previous Ottoman *firman*s.¹⁴⁹ Nevertheless, Ottoman state neither accepted the British rule nor made a counter-attack to modify the current situation. In addition to this, the outbreak of First World War caused the rupture of relations with the Ottomans and the Sudanese and Britain had unilaterally annexed the Sudan into its colonies. At the end of the war, Ottoman state had to be compelled signing the Treaty of *Sevr* that Ottomans relinquished their legal right over Sudan according to the articles 113-114 of the treaty. But this treaty has never come into force due to the establishment of Turkish republic. Therefore, new Turkish state had renounced all political and legal rights on Sudan with the Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923.¹⁵⁰ Sudan had come under the rule of British until 1956 as a part of colony.

¹⁴⁹ BOA, İ..MTZ. (05), 32/ 1867 17 Zilhicce 1325 (21 January 1908).

¹⁵⁰ Tarig Mohamed Nour, *Sevakin'de Türk-İngiliz Rekabeti*, (Unpublished PhD thesis, Istanbul University, 2006), pp. 316-317.

CHAPTER V: OTTOMAN RESPONSE TO THE MAHDI REVOLT

5.1: The Mission of Ottoman High Commissioner Ahmed Muhtar Pasha

According to Yasamee, Abdülhamid's response to the Mahdi revolt could be analyzed with three decisive features: fear of revolution, non-intervention and legalism. The revolt had broken out in 1881 when Muhammad Ahmad proclaimed himself to be the expected Mahdi. The uprising gradually gained strength in the remote west of the Sudan, however in the summer of 1883, Mahdi's ally Osman Digna had carried the revolt into the eastern part of the country. It was the first time that Ottoman Empire noticed the severity of the incident and felt the fear of revolution. In the earliest document regarding the movement sent to Osman Pasha, the governor of Hejaz, stressed the stopping of the revolt and more importantly propounds the suspicion of a British plot.¹⁵¹ The date of this document, December 1882 is very important, because it shows that only one year after the emerging of the rebellion Ottoman authorities have been informed about the incident. Apparently, at the beginning stages of the movement, they could not see a considerable threat to the state by the local governors that thereby they did not see informing the center as necessary. Besides this, Egyptian government was preoccupied with another uprising started by Urabi Pasha in Egypt at the time. When the government of Cairo noticed the seriousness of the movement in the Sudan,

¹⁵¹ "...Sudan'da zuhur eden şaki-i ma'hudun İngilizlilerin amal ve talimatı üzerine hareket eden bir ikinci Urabi demek olup meazalik Mısır'ı zabt ve Devlet-i Aliyye'ye olan itaatını kat' eyledikten sonra teavvuzen billah memalik-i saire-i şahaneyi tecavüze alet kılınmış bir İngiliz desisesinden ibaret olduğu anlaşılmakda ise de, bu hususa dair ittılaat ve tahkikat-ı lazımenin ala vechi's-sihha atabe-i şahaneye arz olunması irade vü ferman buyurulmuşdur..." quoted in Ömer Koçyiğit, *From Sufi Movement to Statehood: The Mahdi Uprising in the Ottoman Sudan 1881-1885* p.82.

BOA, Y..PRK.BŞK, 7/14, no: 1, 29 Muharrem 1300 (10 December 1882).

Mahdi had already won his first successes and attained a striking position in the region.¹⁵²

Abdülhamid II had seen a parallel with the Urabi movement. According to him the “false Mahdi” was the “second Urabi”. His followers were consisted of former Urabists who had escaped to Sudan in 1882 and like Urabi and his supporters they were vermin.¹⁵³ Additionally, the two movements shared the same goal and same master. The sultan believed that Mahdi’s aim was to establish an “Arab government” with the secret support of Britain who challenge Ottoman authority in Arabia and Ottoman possession of Caliphate. This appraisal could be seen odd because Urabi Pasha’s revolt had political characteristics whereas Mahdi’s uprising seems more religious. However presence of the revolt in the eastern Sudan where it might easily spread cross the Red Sea into Arabia made the Sultan excessively worried. Because Red Sea shores were bound to each other with numerous trading links and Osman Digna himself was the slave trader who had certain connections in Hejaz.

Furthermore, the strategic position of Egypt located across the Holy Cities was increasing the contingency of the spreading of revolt to the Holy places. Consequently, Ottoman government’s first concern was to prevent the insurrection from spreading into neighboring regions.¹⁵⁴ The second decisive feature of Abdülhamid’s policy towards the Mahdi revolt suggested by Yasamee was the non-intervention. The question of Ottoman intervention arose when the Egyptian government lost control of the Sudan in the last quarter of 1883 when the Mahdi had annihilated the Egyptian expeditionary force. The khedive had neither troops nor the funds in order to initiate the fresh campaign and the Britain refused to intervene. At the same time, it instructed the Khedive to abandon entire Sudan together with his territories along the Red Sea and Somalia coast. The khedive immediately turned to his suzerain and asked whether the Sultan could permit a recruitment of volunteers among the populations of the Ottoman Empire. If Egypt could gather a fresh army, thereby Sudan might be held. At the time, Evelyn Baring, British consul of Cairo stated the Egyptian government’s thoughts with those sentences:

The policy of withdrawal from Sudan was very unpopular in Egypt. No one seriously wished Turkish troops to be employed. Everyone felt that the remedy would be worse than the disease. The Egyptian government

¹⁵² Peter M. Holt, *The Mahdist State in the Sudan: 1881-1898*, p. 33.

¹⁵³ Selim Deringil, *The Ottoman Response to the Egyptian Crisis of 1881-1882*, pp.9-10.

¹⁵⁴ F.K.A. Yasamee, *The Ottoman Empire, The Sudan and The Red Sea Coast 1883-1889*, p. 91.

as in the days of Urabi was afraid that if Turkish troops once come into the country, they would not leave it again. The British government gave a half-hearted assent to the employment of a Turkish force.¹⁵⁵

Baring believes that Turkish occupation presents more danger than its advantages and explained the British approach as the following:

Dervish rule in the Sudan was without doubt an evil, but even at that time it could be foreseen that the evil would in all probability only be temporary. A Turkish occupation would have been on evil of a more permanent nature.¹⁵⁶

However, Egyptian government thought that the best solution of the question was to invite the aid of the Sultan. They wished the British government to arrange the conditions under which Turkish aid would be afforded, the principal of these conditions being that the Sultan's troops should leave the country when their presence was no longer required. Sharif Pasha, Khedive's minister pointed out that as the rebellion in the Sudan was a religious movement, it would probably gather strength if the British or Indian troops were employed. However, inviting Turkish troops into the Sudan would not be an advantage for Egypt. Hence, the abandonment of Sudan within certain limits was recommended by the British government.¹⁵⁷ Abdülhamid's response to the demand of troops was explicit. He refused the proposal with precise argument:

If permission is given for the troops which Egypt wishes to recruit, this will plainly mean that they become a Turkish army in the service of the English. To outward appearances they will be dispatched against the Mahdi; but in truth, as part of the intrigues adopted by the English, they will be united with the vermin gathered around the Mahdi, and we shall have caused all of them to be used against ourselves. It is manifest what degree of difficulties the Empire's position will suffer from a second Urabi problem.¹⁵⁸

Although Sultan's own ministers was in favor of sending troops because this was the only way to protect integrity of the Empire's lands, they failed to change the Sultan's opinion.¹⁵⁹ Because, he was afraid of confronting the same consequences as in the Egyptian questions and sending troops means the joint operation with the British forces against the Islamic population, therefore it was impossible. Abdülhamid II repeated his view that the Mahdi revolt was a British-inspired plot and the Sudanese question could not be separately solved from the Egyptian question. The reports sent by

¹⁵⁵ Evelyn Baring, *the Modern Egypt*, p.387

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, *the Modern Egypt*, p.354.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p.373-79.

¹⁵⁸ F.K.A. Yasamee, *The Ottoman Empire, The Sudan and The Red Sea Coast 1883-1889*, p. 91.

¹⁵⁹ İ.MTZ(05) 23/1096 24 Cemaziyelevvel 1300 (2 April 1883).

Ahmed Muhtar Pasha have been also confirming the suspicion of the Sultan. Because, Muhtar Pasha believes that actual intention of the Britain in the Sudanese incident was to separate Sudan from the Egypt and then takeover the Sudan.¹⁶⁰ Hence the Sultan insisted that Ottoman intervention could not be discussed without a pre-agreement about British evacuation of Egypt. Besides, he was afraid of Ottoman troops' attempt to attend Mahdi's army and Urabi's supporter.¹⁶¹ Therefore, he conducted policy of indifference to the Sudan and beyond the Egyptian territories. On the other hand, Britain came up with a new offer for the Ottoman occupation of the Khedive's Red Sea territories. The Red Sea coast had a vital importance for the British imperial goals and the presence of the French troops at *Obok* had disturbed the British government. The foreign secretary Granville said to Ottoman ambassador that Ottoman occupation was desirable. Regarding the invasion of Zeila although the Sublime Porte were favorable sending troops in order to reestablish the order in the region, the Sultan did not move and Zeila was occupied by British. They paid Egyptian tribute to the Porte and finally Egypt and Istanbul agreed to stop paying tributes.¹⁶²

Abdülhamid II was reluctant to divert from his main concern that before comprehensive Egyptian settlement, he would not take a step further. Even his grand vizier Said Pasha criticized the Sultan to avoid sending troops neither for Egypt nor western shores of *Bahr-ı Ahmer* because this policy caused losing of these territories.¹⁶³ The third decisive features of his response arose out of the legalism discussion. According to him, British decision to separate the Sudan from Egypt was a breach of the Sultan's *firman*s which guaranteed the integrity of the Khedive's territories. Moreover, the warning about French annexations and possible Italian intervention in Saharan Africa did not prevent the Sultan to place priority to overall Egyptian settlement. Even in these circumstances Abdülhamid refused to intervene in the region.¹⁶⁴ On June 1885, two important developments occurred regarding the Egyptian question. First was the death of Mahdi and second was the change of

¹⁶⁰ BOA, YEE. 118/17 17 Cemaziyelahir 1303 (23 March 1886).

¹⁶¹ Kemal Karpat, *Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State*, p. 270.

¹⁶² Elving Baring, *the Modern Egypt*, v.2, p.53-54.

¹⁶³ Ali Akyıldız ve Zekeriya Kurşun, *Osmanlı Arap Coğrafyası ve Avrupa Emperyalizmi*, p. 415.

"Mısır'a asker gönderilmediği gibi Bahr-i Ahmer sevahiline de asker gönderilmek arzu olunmadığından Musavva, Zeyla, Sevakın, Tacura, Aseb, Berbere ve Harar kita-i münbite ve vasiaları ve Somali arazisi velhasıl baştanbaşa Bahr-ı Ahmer sevahil-i garbiyesi ile bu sevahilin içlerinde vaki mahallerin memleket-i Osmaniye'den çıkmasına hep sevk-i askerden imtina etmekliğimiz sebep olmuştur."

¹⁶⁴ F.K.A. Yasamee, *The Ottoman Empire, The Sudan and The Red Sea Coast 1883-1889*, pp. 90-96.

government in Britain. Lord Salisbury came into the power in Britain as the head of conservatory party.

At the time, Britain was isolated from the international community because of Egyptian occupation. Salisbury, successor of Gladstone, wanted to overcome this loneliness approaching Ottoman Empire in order to strengthen its position in the Middle East and forestall the growing hostilities in the Muslim colonies. On 22 August 1885, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff had been sent to Istanbul in order to negotiate Egyptian question. Salisbury warned him about three strategic matters: first, Britain should have made more benefit from other European states if it was forced to withdraw from Egypt. Second, Britain should be rescued from the international isolation and third, the opposition must be weakened towards Britain due to the Egyptian question. The main mission of the Wolff was to reduce the degree of protests coming from Ottoman Empire and France. Hence, he immediately announced that Britain recognized all sovereignty rights of the Ottoman Empire in Egypt.

Then, he put pressure on the Ottoman Empire on the three subjects: First, he tried to persuade the Ottomans for sending troops to the Sudan in order to suppress the Mahdi uprising. Because it was a religious movement and only Muslim soldiers might cause the dissolving of Mahdi dervishes. Secondly, he proposed appointing two high commissioners from British and Ottoman sides for the administrative arrangements in Egypt. Lastly, he tried to procure acceptance of the international treaties signed by Khedive Tewfik. On the other hand, the main concern of the Ottoman side during the negotiations to set an exact date for the Egyptian evacuation. On 24 October 1885 Wolff and Foreign Minister Said Pasha ended negotiations and agreed on certain issues. Therefore, Egyptian question turned to be a matter between Ottoman and Britain and Ottoman Empire had officially accepted Britain's existence in Egypt by signing the agreement.¹⁶⁵ The convention concluded that Ottoman and British high commissioners should be sent to Egypt in order to fulfill the obligations of Article VI which had a particular importance regarding the Egyptian deadlock:

[A]s soon as the two high commissioners shall have established that the security of the frontiers and the good working and stability of the Egyptian government are assured they shall present a report to their respective

¹⁶⁵ Süleyman Kızıltoprak, *Mısır'da İngiliz İşgali: Osmanlı'nın Diplomasi Savaşı 1882-1887*, pp. 192-196.

governments who will consult as to the conclusion of a convention regulating the withdrawal of the British troops in a convenient period¹⁶⁶

Sir Henry Drummond Wolff and Ghazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha¹⁶⁷ were appointed as joint commissioners to fulfill the stipulations of the Egyptian Convention signed at Istanbul on October 1885. Primary mission of both Ahmad Muhtar and Wolff was to monitor the current situation and to write reports concerning the agreed reforms in the Egyptian administration and army as well as the ongoing negotiations with Mahdi supporters.¹⁶⁸ Muhtar Pasha's appointment as an Ottoman high commissioner was welcomed by the Egyptians. The Arab press congratulated his new mission flatteringly. Daily journal *el-Zaman* wrote as follows:

When the information has reached Egypt, all were pleased, both natives and foreigners because of Moukhtar Pasha Ghazi's reputation. He is highly upright, wise and self-composed, is a man of few words who listens much. If spoken to, he gives a short but clear reply. He also is a man learning.... his excellency is energetic, and can be severe if need be.¹⁶⁹

At the beginning Muhtar Pasha's appointment created a good effect in the Egyptian society. However, he did not seem to think his stay would be short duration. Because; he brought with him his wife, his children and his harem of twenty-four slaves. His wife was the daughter of an *ulema* family. This fact attracted this influential class sympathy to him. Throughout his speeches, he appealed to the religious feelings of people and gained the dignity of the Egyptians. In time, this situation interpreted that Muhtar Pasha intended to remain permanently in Egypt and overshadow the powers of Khedive himself. The main duty of the Ottoman High commissioner was to maintain security and order in the Sudan, to make necessary arrangements in the Egyptian administration and to guarantee the Egyptian borders. Then he was expected to write a report and start the evacuation process.¹⁷⁰ Hence, at the beginning the gravity of the meetings was the Sudan question used by Britain as threat to Egyptian security.

With regard to the Sudan issue, Muhtar Pasha who had considerable experience of Mahdis in Yemen thought that Mahdism in the Sudan had attained such dimensions

¹⁶⁶ M.P. Hornik, "The Mission of Sir Henry Drummond Wolff to Constantinople 1885-1887", *The English Historical Review*, v. 55, no: 220 (October 1940), p.606.

¹⁶⁷ For more information about the life of Ghazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha see: Rifat Uçarol, *Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa: Bir Osmanlı Paşası ve Dönemi*, (İstanbul, Milliyet Yayınları, 1976),

¹⁶⁸ Selim Deringil, "Ghazi Ahmed Mukhtar Pasha and the British Occupation of Egypt", *The Ottomans, the Turks and World Power Politics: A Historical Dictionary of Titles and Terms in the Ottoman Empire*. (İstanbul: Gorgias Press & The Isis Press, 2000), p. 36.

¹⁶⁹ Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, *Rambling Recollections*, volume: II, (MacMillan and Co., London, 1908), p.298.

¹⁷⁰ Süleyman Kızıltoprak, *Mısır'da İngiliz İşgali: Osmanlı'nın Diplomasi Savaşı 1882-1887*, p.198.

not to deal with so easily. The religious feelings of the Sudanese were so great that as long as the Christian troops or negotiators were on the front, it was hopeless to wait the tranquilizing of the movement. It just served increasing the fanaticism. So the Egyptian force should advance alone in the Sudan without any accompanying British troops.¹⁷¹ Then he prepared a report to give Wolff, Khedive and Sublime Port. In his report, he advised to raise the number of Egyptian soldiers who was in charge in Sudan and to reorganize the Egyptian army under the command of Egyptians. Then the decreasing of the number of the foreign soldiers would achieve savings and there would be no need for British army in Egypt. However, this proposal had been refused by the British government on the pretext that Egypt's budget was inadequate to increase the number of Egyptian army.¹⁷²

As known Britain had occupied Egypt with the excuse of Urabi Pasha uprising. In fact, its main intention was to protect security of the Suez Canal and enhance its interest in East and Far East. Salisbury was aware that the legitimacy of Britain's position in Egypt in the sight of international community to large extent depends on a compromise with Ottoman state, the legal suzerain of Egypt. An agreement over the Egyptian question could be defused the tension with France which was already intolerable and it would relieve the Britain from the heavy burdens of constant concessions granted to Germany.¹⁷³ Before the fall of Khartoum, Britain was hiding behind the claim that Mahdi revolt threatens the security of Egypt thereby Britain had to remain in the region until the riot suppressed. However its sole aim was to delay evacuation as much as possible and make the occupation indefinitely prolong. And now, according to Muhtar Pasha's reports, the British were putting an objection for their evacuation plan that is necessary the restoration of order in Sudan. Yet, they were opposing any Ottoman endeavors to reorganize the Egyptian army which could stabilize the situation in the region. Conversely, Wolff's suggestion was sending Ottoman troops to appease the revolt which was an inadmissible proposal for Abdülhamid II. On the other hand, Muhtar Pasha asserted that keeping Egypt under the occupation was also damaging the British's prestige and dignity amid the Muslims who lives in India. According to following reports sent by Muhtar Pasha denotes that Britain was in favor

¹⁷¹ Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, *Rambling Recollections*, v. II, pp.301-303.

¹⁷² Süleyman Kızıltoprak, *Mısır'da İngiliz İşgali: Osmanlı'nın Diplomasi Savaşı 1882-1887*, pp.204-205.

¹⁷³ M.P. Hornik, *The Mission of Sir Henry Drummond Wolff to Constantinople 1885-1887*,p. 604.

of the separation of Egypt and Sudan; it would thus hold the strategic place where located in the cross of holy cities.¹⁷⁴

Egyptian question was still conserving its vagueness. But however, the existence of a commissioner of the Ottoman State in Egypt was providing confidence and reliability among the Egyptians. Thereby, Muhtar Pasha firmly refused Britain's suggestion moving the negotiations from Cairo to Istanbul.¹⁷⁵ It was not a new idea for Muhtar Pasha. Wolff had raised the issue a few months ago and repeated it several times. According to Wolff, it would make easier to accomplish their mission properly because the communication with Istanbul by telegraph or mail is naturally slowing down the process. However, Muhtar Pasha refused this proposal. The presence of Ottoman commissioner in Cairo was important to prevent British effort expanding their influence as the occupying power. Therefore from the Ottoman point of view it was an attempt to get Muhtar out of the Egypt.¹⁷⁶

As a consequence, the deliberations and bargaining between Wolff and Muhtar Pasha ended with failure. Wolff left Muhtar in Cairo and negotiated the draft agreement of 1887 directly with Sublime Port. Ottoman government has waged his attitude to determine the exact date of evacuation. In response, Wolff explained that the fixation of the date could be depended on the certain accords on the followings: neutralization of Egypt, a sufficient number of British officers to remain within the Egyptian army, reserving the right of occupation in case of domestic turbulence or any foreign invasion. On the other hand, Ottoman government had not understood the actual meaning of neutralization and frames of the right of reoccupation. Thus they put forward their counter-proposals: British troops should abandon the Egypt within eighteen months and British officers in the Egyptian army should leave one year later and the British right of reoccupation could be exercised just in the case of foreign occupation.¹⁷⁷

Those proposals had not satisfied Britain. However, at the time Bulgarian negotiations were proceeding between Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria and Ottoman side did not wish to lose Britain's support and the threat, breaking off the relations had already raised, compelled the Ottoman Empire to agree on some points. Owing to these circumstances, On 22 May 1887 Britain and Ottoman Empire signed a draft agreement

¹⁷⁴ Rıfat Uçarol, *Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa: Bir Osmanlı Paşası ve Dönemi*, p.190

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p.199.

¹⁷⁶ Oded Peri, "Ottoman Symbolism in British-Occupied Egypt 1882-1909", *Middle Eastern Studies*, (2005), p.109.

¹⁷⁷ M.P. Hornik, *The Mission of Sir Henry Drummond Wolff to Constantinople 1885-1887*, p. 614.

that had never been ratified by the Ottoman government. According to the agreement Britain would evacuate Egypt at the end of the three years but with the provision that any external or internal threat could be postponing this withdrawal. Besides, there was no reference to the Sudan or the Red Sea coasts in the articles of convention. Then, Muhtar Pasha wrote a report and he criticized that the convention was including stipulations that violate the Ottoman's sovereignty rights in Egypt. Furthermore, Russia and France had objected to the absence of binding timetable for British evacuation and protested the convention by threatening the Ottoman Empire to invade Syria and Eastern Anatolia. Therefore, through the pressure of great powers, Ottoman state refused to ratify the treaty.¹⁷⁸ In the following period, Ottoman Empire has never given up his right of sovereignty in Egypt.¹⁷⁹

Muhtar Pasha has continued to remain in Egypt though his British counterpart Wolff was recalled after the signing of draft agreement. He waged his high commissioner mission until proclamation of the Second Constitution (*Meşrutiyet*). Indeed, he was the prominent living symbol of Ottoman power, legitimacy, and sovereignty in British occupied Egypt any more. Muhtar Pasha's continued presence was largely symbolic and its only real value was to show that the Ottomans still held on their legal status as the sovereign power. He was the first Ottoman representative sent from the Istanbul to Egypt since the heirs of Muhammad Ali Pasha represented the political authority of Sultan. So the existence of another representative now had a further meaning for separatist Egyptian government and British as occupying power. Furthermore, the continuous presence of prominent war-hero in Egypt bolstered the

¹⁷⁸ Süleyman Kızıltoprak, *Mısır'da İngiliz İşgali: Osmanlı'nın Diplomasi Savaşı 1882-1887*, pp.229.

¹⁷⁹ "Kongo hükümetinin sudana doğru ilerlemek istediği noktaları mısır taalluku olup olmadığının işarı Muhtar paşa hazretlerine yazılması üzerine evvel emirde sudanın bir kıta haritası bab-ı alice hidiviyet-i Mısıriyeden talep edilerek suretinin kendisine irsali münasib olacağı ifadesini şamil cevaben gelen tahriratın takdimine ve böyle bir haritanın gönderilmesi hidiviyet-i müşarünileyhaya tebliğ edildiğine dair enmile piray-ı tazim olan fi 8 ramazan 1311 tarihli tezkere-i hususiye-i sedaratpenahileri melfufuyla lede'l takdim meşmul-u negah-i ali olmuş ve sudan kıtası sahihsiz ve hal-i araziden madud olmayıp firdevsi aşıyan sultan Abdülaziz han hazretlerinin devr-i saltanatlarında büyük pederi ismail paşa hazretlerinin hidiviyeti hengamında zikr olunan Sudan kıtasında Darfur ve hartum vesair mevaki ba idare-i seniye sevk edilen asakir-i Mısıriye-yi şahane marifetiyle feth ve zabt ile taht-ı tasarruf-u idareye idhal edilerek oralarda mehakim tesis olunmuş ve ahalisine vergi tarh edilerek kendilerinden asker alınmış velhasıl oraları mısır ilhak ve ilave olunarak keyfiyet-i ilhak hidiviyet-i mısıriye ısdar ve ihsan olunan feramin-i alide tasrih ve beyan edilmiş olduğu malum bulunduğu halde kıta-i mezkureye arasında bazı taraflardan ve Kongo cihetinden tecavüz edilmek istenilmekte olduğundan büyükpeder ve pederi zamanlarında bu suretle tasarruf ve idare altına alınmış olan mahal-i mezkureye vuku bulan tecavüzata meydan verilmeyerek mısır idaresine alınan ve fermanlarda musarrarh olan mahal ve arazinin velhasıl hudud-ı mısıriyenin muhafazasına itina ve dikkat edilmesi luzumunun ve lede'l hace buraca dahi düvel-i ecnebiye nezdinde teşebbüs-ı mukteziyede bulunulacağının hidiv mısır paşa hazretlerine ba tahrirat tebliğ ve işar ve buralarının beyan ve tebliğiyle komiserlik vezaifi bu nokta-i nazardan ifa etmesi hususunun dahi muhtar paşa hazretlerine izbar olunması mukteza-i irade-i seniye-i hazret-i hilafetpenahiden bulunmuş olmağla ol babda emr-u ferman hazreti veliyul emrundur. Fi 10 ramazan sene 1311 ve fi 5 mart sene 1310 Serkatibi hazret-i şehriyari Süreyyadır."

BOA, İ.MTZ(05) 29/1584, 10 Ramazan 1311 (17 March 1894)

Ottomanist feelings against the non-Muslim invaders.¹⁸⁰ Later on, this duality would gradually cause set of legitimacy problems between the khedive and Muhtar Pasha. His interference in the internal affairs of Egypt was disturbing for both Britain and Khedive himself. Even, an article had been published in Times newspaper on 23 January 1886 which claimed that Ahmed Muhtar Pasha wishes to acquire the Egyptian Khedivate.¹⁸¹ After the Wolff's return, Britain had never recognized Muhtar Pasha as an official authority. However, Muhtar Pasha had always acted in accordance with the interest of Ottoman state and hence he was accused of interfering in the internal affairs of the Egypt by compelling the ministers for resignation. This paternalistic attitude had bothered the Khedive that he had eventually complained about the pasha to the Sublime Porte. On the contrary, Muhtar Pasha advocated himself by claiming that he was protecting the rights of Ottoman state in the Egypt.¹⁸²

In fact power of sanction of the Pasha has been very restricted. For instance, when khedive Abbas Hilmi wished to travel to Europe without a stop in Istanbul, Muhtar Pasha made an effort to prevent this journey but, he had failed and in 1894 khedive left Cairo. As it is understood, the position of the Pasha has not gone beyond to giving advices. Ottoman government has seen Muhtar Pasha as an intermediary between Khedive and itself sometimes his position was utilized to put pressure on the khedive and the British consul.¹⁸³ Later on, fight for legitimacy has gradually escalated and the khedive began to ignore the Pasha in state protocols. His unique status in Egypt was open to such violations. From Ahmed Muhtar points of view, the ranks given directly by Sultan should be on the front in the protocols.

At that point, Muhtar Pasha's period of office deserves to further deliberation, his long lasting duty in Egypt might be explained with Sultan's personal attitude towards him as well. Although Muhtar Pasha had appointed to this crucial position because of his prior achievements which brought him to Ghazi title, Abdülhamid had never desired such strong man in the vicinity of him. Hence, he had benefited from his experience in the significant, delicate subject and achieved to hold him for a long time such a distant place as well. However, Sultan had never given up to control his acts strictly. For instance, Abdülhamid had informed about the establishment of a new

¹⁸⁰ Oded Peri, *Ottoman Symbolism in British-Occupied Egypt 1882-1909*, pp.103-104.

¹⁸¹ BOA, Y.A.HUS 187/84 19 Rebiyyülahir 1303 (25 January 1886)

¹⁸² BBO, YEE, 2119/39 14 Ramazan 1309 (12 April 1892) see also: Rıfat Uçarol, *Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa: Bir Osmanlı Paşası ve Dönemi*, p. 231

¹⁸³ Rıfat Uçarol, *Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa: Bir Osmanlı Paşası ve Dönemi*, p. 238.

community called *cumhur-u Islam* on 22 October 1905 and ordered to take necessary measures against the new formation. Moreover, he accused the Muhtar Pasha of disloyalty and supporting idea of Islamic republic. The tension and mistrust between Ahmed Muhtar and Sultan had reached the ultimate levels in the 1900s.¹⁸⁴ But Uçarol's assertion is not convincing enough. Because; *Osman Nuri Pasha* had also been awarded the title Ghazi as a result of his struggles during the siege of *Plevne*. He received the order of *Mecidiye* and several medals for his services to the empire. Contrary to Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, Abdülhamid kept him around without any fear of revolution against himself. On the other hand, Despite Muhtar Pasha's several demands for returning to Istanbul, the Sultan extended his service for twenty-three years and only at the time of revolution he could find a chance to come back. It probably stemmed from Abdülhamid's trust to him that he was one of the people who were able to overcome such a tough duty.

5.2: Pan-Islamism as a Political Response

The idea of Pan-Islamism (*İttihad-ı Islam*) was a political ideology emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century particularly in the reign of Abdülhamid II in order to unite all Muslims over the world against rapid colonization movement. However, before it has been used for political purposes, it was present among the Muslims as an expression of brotherhood, unity and solidarity feelings by taking its sources from the Koran and Hadith. The concept was firstly used by Namık Kemal on 10 May 1869 in daily newspaper, the *Hürriyet* (Freedom) and then discussed in the other publications of the Young Turks especially in the journal of *Basiret*. The term of Pan-Islamism, counterpart of the *İttihad-ı Islam* has been probably used in the western literature in 1875. Later on, the term was subject to several *risales*, journals and newspapers. It was thought as one of the ways like Ottomanism and nationalism to prevent the state's decline and salvation of the all Muslims.¹⁸⁵

There were two different aims of Abdülhamid's Pan-Islamism. First, in the external world, he attempted to communicate with all Muslim communities who were under the rule of foreign invasion under the frame of caliphate and he tried to establish a network between Ottoman Empire and them. Thus, he would use this interconnection

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.278-279

¹⁸⁵ Azmi Özcan, "İttihad-ı İslam," *Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi*, XXIII, (İstanbul: 2001), p. 470.

against the European colonizers. In this direction, raising the awareness of the Muslim society gained an importance. The second aim was for internal politics. Increasing Muslim population after the 1877-1878 Ottoman –Russian War, compelled the state to establish a common political, social and cultural consciousness by utilizing the ideological function of the caliphate. Thus political unity and a common identity would be created among the Muslim populations who were living in the Ottoman Empire. The most important means to reach those aims were the religious orders which had large scale of communication network with the people and capability to mobilize them. The other tool was the *Hajj*. Gathering of the Muslims comes from all over the world in the Mecca paved the way for the propaganda activities. Istanbul became a break place and their food and accommodation expenditures defrayed by the state. The third one was to charge the powerful local rulers for the administration of Arab provinces and the last was the press.¹⁸⁶

In essence, Abdülhamid did not aim to gather all Muslim population under one political unity. At least, the limits of his *de facto* power have not allowed acting in accordance with this goal. Hence, the politics of Pan-Islamism mainly served for the purpose of creating solidarity and brotherhood among all Muslims in the world against the common enemy. The main goal of this idea was to strengthen Muslim unity under the frame of caliphate and to create a resistance against western colonialism that began to dominate Muslim territories in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. But the attempts were confined to set of diplomatic endeavors such as dispatching gifts, letters and officials to the local rulers of the certain places.¹⁸⁷ Abdülhamid II was aware of the boundaries of this policy as he was restricted with balance of power among the great powers and Ottoman state's actual strength. So he had never furthered it beyond the cultural attempts.

In the case of Mahdi revolt, Abdülhamid II thought that it was a British- inspired plot to some extent manipulated by the Urabi Pasha advocates who fled to Sudan in the wake of British occupation. According to Sultan, the main goals of the Mahdi movement was to establish an Arab government, to bring the Hejaz and Arabian Peninsula under control and finally to constitute an Arab caliphate in the region. He was worried about the spreading of the movement to Hejaz and then to holy cities. However,

¹⁸⁶ Gökhan Çetinsaya, *II.Abdülhamid Döneminin İlk Yıllarında İslam Birliği Hareketi (1876-1878)*, (Unpublished master's thesis, Ankara University, 1988), pp. 5-10.

¹⁸⁷ BOA, YEE, 122/3, 19 Cemaziyelahir 1309, (20 January 1892).

he was reluctant to interfere in the Sudanese issue any way. Even, Britain had threatened the Sultan by making political alliances with the Arabian tribes to jeopardize his caliphate.¹⁸⁸ Nevertheless he had not changed his attitude and refused to send troops to bolster the new Egyptian army which would be sent against the Mahdi forces. Because; he was afraid of serving British aspirations unintentionally and joining of Ottoman soldiers to Mahdi dervishes or Urabi followers. Furthermore, sending troops would mean killing of Muslims by Muslims and it would harm the prestige of the Sultan as a caliph of the world Muslims. Hence, he sufficed to follow closely the course of events. In 1885, Mahdi's unexpected death changed the dervishes' stance towards the Sultan. The successor of the Mahdi, caliph Abdullah loosened his hostile attitude as a reaction the French penetration into the central Africa. It pushed Abdülhamid II to honor Abdullah by sending gifts, letters and embassies.¹⁸⁹

However, Ottoman intellectuals have criticized Sultan's policy of inaction. Filibeli *Ahmed Hilmi Şehbenderzade* was one of them. He argues that Abdülhamid II has not pursued a policy of pan-Islamism. He classified Pan-Islamism into three sub-categories. According to his classification, first idea is the political unity (*İttihad-ı Siyasi*); the other one is the religious unity (*İttihad-ı İslam*) and final, a social unity (*İttihad-ı İctimai*). From *Ahmad Hilmi's* point of view, Abdülhamid was not able to protect his own territories, so he could not adapt Pan-Islamism as a political unity. Secondly, he did nothing to actualize the religious unity among the Muslims. Conversely, he provoked them to each other and used the Turks against Arabs and Arabs against the Albanians. Thus he antagonized them by featuring the discrepancies. Lastly, as a social unity Pan-Islamism has been only implemented during the first period of Islam. Carrying out this notion had never come to the mind of Abdülhamid II.¹⁹⁰

While he argued the notion Pan-Islamism, he used as an example of Abdülhamid's policy towards the Sudanese uprising. According to him, if Sultan Abdülhamid had sent twenty-thirty preachers, teachers and such officers to the Sudan which was an easy act to do this, he might have precluded the revolt and stop people's joining to false Mahdi. Such an act could be reinvigorating impact on the Sudanese

¹⁸⁸ Azmi Özcan, "İngiltere'de Hilafet Tartışmaları 1873-1909", *İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi*, v.2, 1998, p. 65.

¹⁸⁹ Kemal Karpat, *Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State*. p. 269-271.

¹⁹⁰ Şehbenderzade Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, *Senusiler ve Onüçüncü Asrın en Büyük Mütefekkir-i İslamiyesi Seyyid Muhammed es-Senusi*, (İstanbul: Bedir, 1997) pp. 43-45.

Muslims. However, Abdülhamid either did not thought this option or his anxieties hindered him.¹⁹¹

It should be kept in mind that *Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi* was one of the opponents of the Sultan. His personal hatred could be understood when his brief life story took into consideration. He was born in 1865 in *Filibeli*. (today, Plovdiv in Bulgaria) Then he graduated from *Galatasaray Mektebi Sultani*, began his first official job in *Duyun-i Umumiye İdaresi* (Public Debts Administration). He was commissioned to Beirut and escaped to Egypt with the influence of the Young Turks, and joined them there. In Egypt he had published a humorous newspaper called *Çaylak*. Because of the censor in the press, his newspaper has been banned and he was exiled to Fezzan, in Libya. He could return to Istanbul after the Young Turk revolution and he began to publish *İttihad-ı İslam* paper for a short time. After the closing of his newspaper, he wrote for *İkdam*, *Şehbal* and *Tasvir-i Efkar* newspapers. He died in 1914.¹⁹² As seen, the life of Ahmed Hilmi gives clues about his personal hatred of Sultan Abdülhamid. He was in favor of Pan-Islamism against nationalism which had began to influence Ottoman communities. He stated that the separation of Muslim nations from Ottoman Empire could be prevented only by way of Pan-Islamism. If the Muslims were to lose their unity, they were condemned to be occupied by the European colonizers like the region of North Africa. On the other hand, when the Mahdi uprising arose in the Saharan Africa, the Ottoman Empire was dealing with many problems. As an internal problem, state had lost the war against Russia three years ago and it had brought heavy economic and political burdens to the state. On the other hand, remote Ottoman territories were exposed to colonialism threat and Egypt and Tunis had already fallen under foreign rule. For this reason, if the Sultan had attempted to send an army which were heavily defeated just three years ago, this could backfire and cause insurmountable consequences.¹⁹³

On the other hand, the hesitant policy of Abdülhamid towards the Sudanese revolt could be understood from the changing balance of power in Europe. Because, neither Egypt nor Sudan was the first territory came under the domination of foreign power. For instance, India had been invaded by the British Empire before nineteenth

¹⁹¹ Şehbenderzade Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, *Senusiler ve Onüçüncü Asrın en Büyük Mütefekkir-i İslamiyesi Seyyid Muhammed es-Senusi*, p.61

¹⁹² Abdullah Uçman, "Şehbenderzade Ahmed Hilmi," *Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi*, XXXVIII, p. 424.

¹⁹³ Ömer Koçyiğit, *From Sufi Movement to Statehood: The Mahdi Uprising in the Ottoman Sudan 1881-1885*, p.111.

century. In 1857, the great Indian munity also called India's first war of independence had been started and three-years struggle had ended with the bloody suppression of the rebellion by the British army. Undoubtedly, Muslims were one of the most effective groups of people during the mutiny. However, Britain had known to benefit from the penetration and prestige of the caliph over the Indian Muslims. At that time, Britain helped the Ottoman Empire in the 1856 war against the Russia. Besides, all the great powers of Europe had promised to respect its independence and territorial integrity. Under these circumstances, the Sublime Porte assumed a mild attitude towards the British during the mutiny. They were allowed passage of British soldiers from Egypt and Red Sea to suppress the riot. The recapture of Delhi had welcomed by the Ottoman authorities and a congratulatory address had been sent; Sultan Abdülaziz had donated even a large amount of money for the British soldiers whose families were damaged during the uprising.¹⁹⁴

On the other hand, in the reign of Abdülhamid II, Anglo-Boer war had arisen and the Sultan had acted in favor of Britain. When he heard of the news that Young Turks, who were the so-called anti-imperialist intellectuals of Ottoman state, went to the British embassy and expressed their hopes for British victory in southern Africa; Sultan Abdülhamid had punished them with banishment. But the cause of this punishment was not necessarily meant that Abdülhamid was against the imperialist policies of Britain in Argentine but he resented them to visit the British embassy without permission.¹⁹⁵ In the case of Sudanese Mahdi, Abdülhamid tried to raise concern on Indian Muslims about the British activities which damage the unity of Muslim world. Just for this purpose, a loyal Indian man was employed in *Dersaadet* to influence the Indian Muslims against Britain.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁴ “Hint vukuatında feda olanlar için taraf-ı eşref-i hazret-i padişahiden ihsan buyurulmuş olan bin lira sterline dair şehri halin yirmi yedi tarihiyle irsal buyrulan tahrirat-ı telgrafile-i nezaretpenahileri ahz olundu. Mebaliğ-i mezkurenin teslimi dünkü gün icra olunarak havadisı gerek Londra ve gerek İngiltere'nin memalik-i sairesinde münteşir olamamış ise de Morning Post ve Times ve Londra'nın sair başlıca gazeteleriyle Daily News gazetelerinde yazılan fıkralarda leffen takdim ile kesb-i fahr eyler. Ve herhalde işbu inayet-i celile-i padişahinin bil-cümle İngiltere tarafından kemal-i muhabbet ve memnuniyetle kabul olunacağı ve vaktiyle verilmiş politikaca bir büyük inayet olduğundan ziyadesiyle tesirat-ı hasane hasıl edeceği hususlarına itimad-ı acizanelerimi beyan ederim...” quoted in Özcan, Azmi, “1857 Büyük Hind Ayaklanması ve Osmanlı Devleti”, *Review of Islamic Studies* (ed.) Mahmut Kaya, v. IX, (Publications of the Faculty of Letters, Istanbul University 1995) p. 274

BOA, İ.HR 7802, no: 1, 14 Muharrem 1274 (4 September 1857)

¹⁹⁵ Şükrü Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) p.83.

¹⁹⁶ BOA, Y.PRK.BŞK. 45/82, 9 Şevval 1313 (24 March 1896).

As seen, Ottoman Empire naturally like other states acted in the direction of its self-interest. Religion definitely was an integral part of the policy-making process, but they did not abstain from making pragmatist choices. In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was seen as the “sick man Europe” and after the Treaty of Berlin, Britain had pulled back its support towards territorial integrity of empire’s lands. So-called temporary occupation of Egypt was the first sign of the changing balances among the great powers. At this juncture, Abdülhamid’s indecisive attitude for the Sudanese issue could be explained on three certain points. First, military and economic resources of the empire were inadequate to afford a campaign in such a distant place. Second, minor local conflicts could become an excuse for imperialist powers to intervene in the regions. Last, spreading of any clash to the Hejaz area could give irreparable damage to the prestige of the Sultan. For these reasons, Abdülhamid did not show a hostile attitude towards the local Muslim rulers or mutineers despite of serious pressures, threats, promises of land and other persuasion endeavors comes from great powers even he was not content of their radical conducts. However, if he had an enough power to deal with the rebellions, undoubtedly, he would have never stop for a while or hesitate to act against them.

5.3: Ottoman Perception of the Sudanese Mahdi

Although Ottoman state did not attempt a military intervention to suppress the Mahdi revolt, the state took several measures in order to control the march of the events as much as it can. The description of Muhammad Ahmad gave us certain visions to understand the perception of the Ottoman Empire. As discussed above, at the beginning of the riot, local rulers did not even inform the center about the recently initiated events due to the fact that they did not perceive it as a serious threat. Yet, in a few months the marches of the events changed and turned to Mahdi’s favor. In the Ottoman archival documents Mahdi was consciously labeled as *mütemehdi*. It literally means “the pseudo Mahdi” or “false Mahdi”. Ottoman officials believed that he was not the real Mahdi. Because there were always people who proclaimed themselves as Mahdi. Although they did not listen summons from Muhammad Ahmad or witnessed his manner of life, Ottoman statesmen were used to such claims, thereby they preferred to use the word, *mutemehdi* to define Muhammad Ahmad. After certain points, when the Muhammad Ahmed won certain triumphs against the Egyptian soldiers, his intention became clearer

for the statesmen. It was no longer tolerated since he challenged the territorial integrity of Ottoman lands and sultan's caliphate as well. Then, on 28 November 1883, with the edict of Sublime Porte, it was ordered that he would be labeled as the *shaqi* instead of *mutemehdi*. The *shaqi* denotes a bandit or rebel in general. Particularly in the translation of Turkish, Arabic and French newspaper, it was enunciated using of the word, *shaqi* to define Muhammad Ahmad.¹⁹⁷ Indeed, throughout the Ottoman history, the phrase of *shaqi* has been used for the people who neglected their responsibilities towards the Sultan knowingly or unknowingly. However, defining of the banditry or mutiny has been arbitrary. Not to send annual tributes, to neglect the sending aid to the poor of holy cities or to keep the provisions which would be sent to the center were sufficient to make a ruler, *shaqi*.¹⁹⁸ As in the case of Mahdi, to rebel against the absolute authority of the Sultan and declare a "holy war" against the Muslims was treasonous acts which damage the prestige of Sultan as caliph. For this reason, he was immediately named as *shaqi* and in the same month a translation of *risale* has been published in four days and sent to around of Damascus, Yemen, Iraq and Sudan in order to confute the claims of the Mahdi.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁷ "Sudanda zuhur eden şakiye dair encümen-i hususide cereyan eden müzakerat-ı mutazammın tanzim ve takdim kılınmış olan mazbata-i manzur-ı ali buyruldu. Mazbata-i mezkurenin hatimesinde bunun bir kere daha müzakeresiyle netice-i muzakeratın tekrar arz -ı luzumu dermeyan olunmasına ve fi 5 teşrin-i sani 99 tarihiyle müverreh olup dünkü gün bu tarafa vasıl olan ve bir sureti leffen savb-ı sami-i sadaretpenahilerine irsal kılınan telgrafnamede merkum şakiye dair hicaz valiliğinden verilen malumat ve hususuyla ingilterenin bir büyük harp gemisinin Aden'den Sevakine geldiğini ve bir miktar asker ile topları hamilen diğer bir İngiliz sefinesi dahi gelmek üzere bulunduğunu mervi olduğunu mutazammın bulunan fıkra ile mütemehdi ihtilalinden dolayı Sevakın misüllü mahaller ahvalince vuku bulacak tekallübata bab-ı alic ne nazarla bakılacağına ve ne gibi teşebbüste bulunulacağına dair malumat verilir ise hicazca dahi ona tevfi-k-i meslek olunması mucib-i istifade muhsenat olacağını mutazammın olan işar bi'l vucuh caleb-i nazar-ı dikkat ve itina görünmesine mebn bunlar dahi komisyonca ilave-i müzakerat olunmak lazımeden olmasıyla binaenaleyh işbu telgrafname mündericatında tezekkürüyle verilecek kararın ve bu babda lazım'ül ittihaz olan tedabir-i mükemmelenin serian arz ve izbarı ve şaki-i merkum hakkında mütemehdi tabirinin istiğmalı kat'an muvafık-ı hikmet ve maslahat olmayacağı zikr olunan mazbatada mühürleri bulunan zevat-ı fahham nezdlerinde dahi tasdik olunacağı cihetle adeta izhar-ı şekavetle böyle birçok fesadların hudüsüne bais olan bir habisin müstehak olduğu şaki namıyla yad edilmesi iktiza edeceğinden bundan böyle gerek her türlü muhariratta ve gerek Türkçe ve Arapça ve Fransızca gazetelerin cümlesinde merkumun şaki namıyla yad olunması zımmında icab edenlere tenbihat-ı ekide-i katiyye icrası mukteza-i emr-i ferman hazret-i padişahiden olmağla ol babda emr-i ferman hazret-i veliyu'l emrundur."

BOA, İ. MTZ.(05), 23/1115, no: 2, 27 Muharrem 1301 (28 November 1883).

¹⁹⁸ Jane Hataway, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İsyan ve Ayaklanma*, (İstanbul: Alkım, 2010), p.166.

¹⁹⁹ Y.PRK.UM. 6/27, 11 Muharrem 1301 (12 November 1883).

CHAPTER VI: OTTOMAN PERCEPTION OF ITS OWN PERIPHERY: THE QUESTION OF OTTOMAN COLONIALISM/ORIENTALISM

6.1: Ottoman Colonialism/Orientalism Debate in the Historiography

When Herzog and Motika's study of *Orientalism alla turca: Late 19th century/early 20th century Ottoman Voyages into the Muslim Outback* published in 2000, it paved the way for an important discussion topic of the late Ottoman historiography. During nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire came across with set of intellectual challenges which occupy many historians' research agenda at the present time. Together with modernization processes, Ottoman response to the European expansion, colonization and orientalism studies in the academy has been accelerated and new sources have begun to take attention of historians. The *rihla* –literature which is the subject of Herzog and Motika's study is one of them. Although these traveller accounts do not offer an objective picture of the period, to some extent the instrumentality of them could not be undeniable. There are some basic questions in the late Ottoman historiography that many scholars are in quest of the answers. Why Ottomans travelled from the one end of the Islamic world to the other, why they went to where they went? And how the Ottoman travellers see non-Muslims, Bedouins or nomads. Shortly how they construct the otherness in their mind? These are some questions that travel reports could have satisfactory answers.²⁰⁰

These traveller accounts would also be illustrative for the discussion of Ottoman colonialism and orientalism. Up to now, the relationship between Ottoman imperial center and peripheral provinces has been discussed in terms of economic and political point of view.²⁰¹ But Edward Said's understanding of center and periphery is a fresh

²⁰⁰ Christoph Herzog and Raoul Motika, "Orientalism *alla turca*: Late 19th/ Early 20th Century Ottoman Voyages into the Muslim 'Outback'." *Die Welt des Islam*, v.40, i.2, (July, 2000).

²⁰¹ See, Mehmet Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi*, (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2000) and Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

topic in the Ottoman history.²⁰² The first attempt to associate orientalism with Ottoman Empire has commenced with Herzog and Motika's article and it has added a great deal to the Ottoman studies. In their article, Herzog and Motika put forward that Ottoman Empire has a civilizing mentality, referring to certain traveller accounts such as Ahmed Mithad Efendi's *Rikalda Yahud Amerika'da Vahşet Alemleri*, Mehmed Mihri's *Sudan Seyahatnamesi*, Sadık el-Müeyyed's *Habeş Seyahatnamesi*, and Abdülkadir Cami Bey's *Trablusgarb'dan Sahray-ı Kebire Doğru*. The article argues that Ottoman perception of its orient was different from European sense of Orientalism. The concept of *Orientalism alla Turca* indeed denotes peculiarity of Ottoman approach to its orient. According to Herzog and Motika's analysis, Ottoman perception of civilization was two-fold: Islam and western modernity whereas European's conceptualization of civilization is solely based on the Christianity. Ahmed Mithad Efendi claimed that for Europeans the difference between savagery and civilization stemmed from the Christianity. If a savage people accepted Christianity, he/she is regarded as civilized by Europeans whereas most civilized people of India and China were deemed in the category of barbarians. However, Ottoman travellers praised the Japanese people as civilized even though they were not Muslim or they despise the Berber tribes of Sahara as savage, because they were a threat to trade and even settled people. Therefore for Ottomans civilization means the combination of western modernity and Islam.²⁰³ On the other hand, unlike the European counterparts, Ottoman travellers avoid from monolithization of its orient or Muslim people and take into consideration of their differences. They developed a hierarchical stratum on Muslim communities expanding from savage to brother and declared their superiority over all of them. This sense of superiority was the common point of the all traveller accounts and legitimizes their civilizing mission.²⁰⁴ All in all, Herzog and Motika summarize their arguments as follows:

Reading moderns Ottoman travelogues which deal with voyages to the Muslim outback makes it clear that the construction of otherness was multifaceted. There existed no overall picture or discourse which defined the non-Ottoman Muslim. However there seems to have been a common feeling of Ottoman superiority vis a vis the rest of the Islamic world which included a hierarchy of relegations ranging from "our little brother" Afghanistan to "those

²⁰² Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık, *Travel, Civilization and the East: Ottoman Travellers' Perception of the East in the Late Ottoman Empire*. (Unpublished Phd thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2010).

²⁰³ Christoph Herzog and Raoul Motika, *Orientalism alla turca: Late 19th/ Early 20th Century Ottoman Voyages into the Muslim 'Outback'*, p. 192.

²⁰⁴ Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık, *Travel, Civilization and the East: Ottoman Travellers' Perception of the East in the Late Ottoman Empire* p.54.

savages” Tuaregs who were implied to be incorrigible desert bandits. Perhaps not surprisingly, Iran appears to be placed right at the bottom of this hierarchy.

In 2002, another contribution to the Ottoman orientalism studies came from Ussama Makdisi with the same headline published in *American Historical Review*. Unlike Herzog and Motika’s emphasis on differences of European and Ottoman perception of Orient in the Saidian discourse, Makdisi’s Ottoman Orientalism begins with “in the age of western-dominated modernity, every nation creates its own orient. The nineteenth century Ottoman Empire was no exception.” By Ottoman orientalism, he means “a complex of Ottoman attitudes produced by a nineteenth-century age of Ottoman reform that implicitly and explicitly acknowledged the West to be the home of progress and the East, writ large, to be a present theatre of backwardness.”²⁰⁵ According to Makdisi, Ottoman Empire’s attitudes towards its periphery were almost same with the sights of European colonial powers. With the *Tanzimat* reforms, Ottoman ruling elites acknowledged the inferior position of the empire as a sick man of Europe vis a vis European great powers and decided to modernize the empire.²⁰⁶ Therefore the Ottoman Empire adopted the same colonial tools in order to civilize its periphery and began to approach its provinces by a reformist imperial gaze. In a Saidian understanding of Orientalism, there is an ontological and epistemological difference between modern, civilized and rational west and backward, savage, primitive east. Indeed, Makdisi point out that when the Ottoman Empire decided to redefine itself as a rational central bureaucratic state by partnership with the West, the relationship between center and periphery turned into the relationships between empire and its colonies.

Then, Selim Deringil carried the discussion of Ottoman orientalism one step further by publishing his article ‘*They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery*’: *The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate* in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* in 2003. He tries to comprehend the late Ottomans’ mentality of civilizing mission and their project of modernity. According to Deringil, “in the nineteenth century the Ottoman elite adopted the mindset of their enemies, the arch-imperialists, and came to conceive of its periphery as a colonial setting”.²⁰⁷ He indeed believes that Ottoman Empire had to imitate the western colonial empires in order to survive among the great powers and represent a similar stance towards its periphery. So he proposes a

²⁰⁵ Ussama Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 107, No. 3 (Jun., 2002), p.769.

²⁰⁶ Ussama Makdisi, *Ottoman Orientalism*, p.770.

²⁰⁷ Selim Deringil, “‘They live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery’: The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post Colonial Debate”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Apr., 2003), pp. 311-312.

new term “borrowed colonialism” to describe nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. As seen, both Makdisi and Deringil equate Ottoman modernization process with colonization. Islam composes common significant points of the discussions and also seen as a means of legitimization of the colonial rule over the peripheral Arab lands. Furthermore, the concept of “civilizing mission” and “white man’s burden” forms the backbone of their arguments.²⁰⁸ The rhetoric of the governing elites towards the inhabitants of the periphery resemble with the colonial rulers of Britain or France. For instance, one of the official translators of empire, Mehmed Izzet by referring to peoples and tribes living in the south of Ottoman Libya said: “*these peoples who are savage and heretics can only be saved by an invitation into the True Faith.*”²⁰⁹

On the other hand, Ottoman orientalism/colonialism thesis has been criticized by many scholars. First, Mustafa Palabıyık in his PhD thesis *Travel, Civilization and the East: Ottoman Travelers’ Perception of the East in the Late Ottoman Empire* claimed that the Ottoman perception of the Orient does not totally fit into Said’s three pursuits of Orientalism. First of all, Said’s orientalism is based on an institutional and systematic study of orient with all dimensions such as language, race and beliefs. However, in the imperial schools the oriental languages like Arabic and Persian have been taught for many centuries. Besides, the orient is never subject of any anthropological or archaeological search in the Ottoman Empire. Additionally these sciences have been never studied as intensively as Europeans. Osman Hamdi Bey who is the founder of archaeology museum in Istanbul is the exception for nineteenth century due to the fact that his endeavors are not adequate to prove that there is a widespread oriental literature in the Ottoman Empire. However, his studies and actions had been put forward both by Makdisi and Deringil as a justification for Ottoman orientalism. Secondly, for Said, orientalism is based on a sharp ontological and epistemological distinction between orient and occident and it mainly results from the religion. Uncompromising nature of Christianity and monotheistic religions, Ottoman Empire unavoidably situated itself in the side of Orient. Although in the nineteenth century acknowledged the superiority of the western civilization in certain fields, they were not about questioning of the truth or superiority of Islam. Finally, the important component of Said Orientalism is civilizing mission or “white man’s burden” which fits into some extent into the Ottoman case and

²⁰⁸ Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık, *Travel, Civilization and the East: Ottoman Travellers’ Perception of the East in the Late Ottoman Empire* p. 57-58

²⁰⁹ Selim Deringil, *They live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery: The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post Colonial Debate*, p.312.

highlighted by Herzog and Motika, Makdisi and Deringil, as well. They argued that Ottoman perception of orient shaped within the framework of modernization. In this context, Ottoman governing elite put themselves into the center of more developed but Oriental group and thereby others naturally became backwards who need to be modernized by them.

All in all, in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire partly shared the same discourse with its European counterparts yet it does not mean that Ottoman Empire was a hard-core colonial power like Europeans which exploited their colonies in every sense.²¹⁰ First and foremost, Makdisi and Deringil's approach which consider Ottoman center-periphery relations, as a colonial sort of relationship is quite disputable. Because, territories which Makdisi and Deringil named as "colonies" were close or far "provinces" in the eyes of the any Ottoman ruler in the nineteenth century. Moreover, the subjects who were the inhabitants of these provinces were become the legally equal citizens of the empire from the period of *Tanzimat*.²¹¹ In the discourse level, Ottoman modernization process could resemble with colonial attempts but in essence it is a different story. Then, two shortcomings of Saidian Orientalism emerged insofar. First, generalization and selective literature review. Second is the monolithic perception of Orient.²¹²

In years, Makdisi and Deringil's Ottoman orientalism/colonialism thesis continued to be criticized by many sides. Recently, Muhammed Talha Çiçek in his recent book *War and the State Formation in Syria* asserted, considering Cemal Pasha's governorate in Syria right before fall of the empire that Makdisi neglects the balance of power in the region. Because, in the nineteenth century there was competition for influence between the Ottoman Empire and western states on the Arab province. The European great powers had already begun to have an impact upon the Arabian people via educational and religious institutions. Missionary activities had been intensified and inclinations of the people had turned towards the western side.

Under these conditions, according to Çiçek, "Ottoman Empire had to persuade its Arab citizens that their state was as progressive as its Western counterparts and

²¹⁰ Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık, *Travel, Civilization and the East: Ottoman Travellers' Perception of the East in the Late Ottoman Empire*, p.63.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.71.

²¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 85-87.

prevent them from developing sympathies toward the Western powers.”²¹³ Ottoman elites’ involvement with modernization process in the Arabian land was the result of such reaction against the western threat of colonization. Secondly, the blur between state formation and colonization processes weakens the basis of a thesis by looking the example of Britain and France. Furthermore, he argued that Ottomans imitated its Western peers’ treatment towards their own citizens rather than their treatments in the colonies. Thirdly, he accepted the Ottoman elites’ superior stance on sort of Arab communities by categorizing them as backward. Yet, he does not restrict this glance just with Arab people and mentions existence of same attitudes towards even Turks. Fourthly, Çiçek challenged Makdisi’s claim which Ottoman Empire aimed to transform itself into a Turkish-dominated structure that indeed the argument is disputable at least in the case of Cemal Pasha’s governorate in Syria. Because, although Cemal Pasha to some extent Turkified the Syrian bureaucracy, he did not use this method in order to civilize it with a colonial mission rather it was aimed to broke western influence in the region by superseding it with Ottoman. Moreover, the Arabian officials who were amenable to western impact were not simply discharged but they were sent to equal positions in Anatolia. And Çiçek rightly posed that was it possible for an Indian to be a sub-governor in a British town.

Finally, with reference to Kayapınar, he put forwards that Makdisi’s understanding of orientalism is different from Edward Said. There is no historical, cultural, ethnic or geographical basis to prove there is an ontological and epistemological disparity among Turks and Arabs.²¹⁴ Besides, he propounds that Makdisi’s article generates two judgments in the minds of the readers. First, Ottoman Empire’s territory is just composed of the lands of modern Turkish Republic and thereby the beyond this geography all expansions peculiarly toward the Arabian land is illegitimate. Second, Turks are the main ethnic group that constitutes the Ottoman community and ruling elite forms the Turks who had ethnic consciousness. So the other ethnic groups except Turks were the deviation from the usual.²¹⁵

²¹³ Muhammed Talha Çiçek, *War and State Formation in the Syria: Cemal Pasha's Governorate During World War I, 1914-1917*. (Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern History, 2014), p. 15.

²¹⁴ Muhammed Talha Çiçek, *War and State Formation in the Syria: Cemal Pasha's Governorate During World War I, 1914-1917*, p.16.

²¹⁵ M. Akif Kayapınar, “Ussama Makdisi ve “Osmanlı Oryantalizmi”” *Divan İlmi Araştırmalar*, v.20 (2006/1) p. 311-312.

Abdülhamit Kırmızı has reached a satisfactory answer about the debates on modernization and civilizing mission in the late Ottoman Empire by delving into the *vilayet* reports. Unless Makdisi and Deringil's stance, he seems to be close to Herzog and Motiza's approach. According to Kırmızı, ethnic and linguistic differences among the members of the Ottoman society were not rigidly institutionalized in the provinces like French Algeria or British India. In fact, he does not deny the officials feeling of superiority on the provinces but he explained this rational neither by means of imperialism nor by means of colonialism but with the concept of civilizing mission. Besides he concludes that such kinds of attitudes towards the Arab land cannot be restricted with the rulers of certain provinces, conversely similar discourses are voiced by the rulers of the Anatolian provinces of the empire. For instance, Ferid Pasha who became a Grand Vizier after his governorship in Konya, largest province of late Ottoman Empire could be suitable example as a modern Ottoman bureaucrat. During his mission as judicial inspector in *Diyarbakir*, he wrote many provincial reports that he described local population as savage and nomadic who live in the darkness of ignorance. Therefore he advocates the impossibility of implementation of the imperial regulations prepared for the more civilized districts of empire in such a backward part of the empire. Moreover, there are emphasizes on the development and progress in agriculture, trade, education and public works in order to proliferate the general happiness and wealth of the population. As it seen, in the mind of Ferid Pasha, progress and prosperity were the main concepts and he reappraises the communities, Turkish-dominated or not by the frame of development. People who were underdeveloped in terms of agriculture, trade, education and public works were backward in his view and he had a mission in order to enhance their wealth and prosperity, in other words to civilize them.²¹⁶ But shortly it is not a peculiar attitude merely towards Arab but also towards all ethnic groups.

Additionally, Thomas Kuhn's studies on Yemen set forth that Ottoman bureaucrats viewed the province of Yemen and its inhabitants as uncivilized and culturally inferior, as well. From Kuhn's departure point removing *Nizamiye* tribunals in Yemen during the 1880s and turning back to Sharia courts was a sign of institutionalizing the differences in the Empire. According to him, "by dismantling the *Nizamiye* courts Ottoman bureaucrats in Yemen and Istanbul confirmed their perception

²¹⁶ Abdülhamit Kırmızı, "Going Round The Province For Progress And Prosperity: Inspection Tours And Reports By Late Ottoman Governors", *Studies in Travel Writing*, v.16-4, 2012, p. 387.

of the indigenous population as savages who could not be ruled like the more civilized Ottoman subjects in other parts of the empire.”²¹⁷ However, regarding the differences and paying attention to demands of the local population does not necessarily mean a colonialist stance. On the contrary, it could be interpreted as respect to their preferences and demands. Also, Karen Barkey, in her great book *Empire of Difference* argues that underlying reason of longevity of the Ottoman Empire is the flexibility of its rule and regulation in accordance with ethnic, religious and sectarian differences.²¹⁸ Moreover, in his history of Yemen and of Sanaa Ahmed Reşid represented the campaigns of 1870-73 as a pre-emptive act to protect Muslim lands from the expansionist Christian colonial rule.

As it is seen, for Muslims, colonialism much more associated with the Christian European powers who occupied the parts of Ottoman lands such as Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt.²¹⁹ In Yemen’s case, colonialism debates could simply have gone through another way. Because, there was a sharp difference between Yemeni people who were represented in parliament during both constitutional periods and disenfranchised subjects of British India. Superiority feelings and modernization endeavors of Ottoman bureaucrats could not be denied in the nineteenth century but it does not always means that Ottoman Empire had a colonial aspiration on the certain parts. Because, huge part of the empire had been already conquered at least three hundred years before and these territories have been the organic part of the empire. The inhabitants of these lands were also citizens regardless of whether or not they were “civilized”. Conversely, people of India or Algeria were solely subjects who were deprived of all legal rights. Besides, in the Ottoman case, “savages and backwardness” were not perceived as biological, namely they were not socially unconvertible categories. So, it is assumed that Ottoman authorities believed there was not an existence of insurmountable cultural differences between rulers and the ruled.²²⁰ Hence, the representation of the Yemeni deputies in parliament is noteworthy. Finally, it is important to bear in mind that, although the Turkish-speaking Sunni elite has ruled the empire, it did not create privileged situations

²¹⁷ Thomas Kühn, “Shaping and Reshaping Colonial Ottomanism: Contesting Boundries of Differences and Integration in Ottoman Yemen, 1872-1919”, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, v. 27/2, 2007, p. 316.

²¹⁸ See, Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective*, (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

²¹⁹ Thomas Kühn, *Shaping and Reshaping Colonial Ottomanism: Contesting Boundries of Differences and Integration in Ottoman Yemen, 1872-1919*, p. 330.

²²⁰ Edip Gölbaşı, “19.yüzyıl Osmanlı Emperyal Siyaseti ve Osmanlı Tarih Yazımında Kolonyal Perspektifler”, *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, v. 13, 2011, p. 209.

for Turkish speaking people who lived in Anatolia. For this reason, it could not be mentioned that there was a colonial imperialist stance on the other culturally different groups of people²²¹

Cem Emrence's article *Imperial Paths and Big Comparisons: the Late Ottoman Empire* has also added a great deal to the fierce debates on modernization and colonization of the late Ottoman historiography. He provides a comprehensive overview of historiographical trends and sets new directions for late Ottoman history. He showed that firstly, late Ottoman historiography has still confined to center-periphery model and maintained dualistic and state centered narratives. Secondly, he suggests a "historical trajectory" framework as a better analytical tools and empirical strategy which is spatial, path-dependent, and comparative.²²² In the nineteenth century, Ottoman Empire had embarked on large-scale reforms in every corner of the empire. The influence of these reforms on the members of educated bureaucratic class was impressive and they "envisioned a socially elitist, politically centralist, and culturally modernist project to transform the Ottoman Empire"²²³ Those self-assigned bureaucrats have seen Arabs, tribes and non-Sunni version of Islam with "orientalizing contempt". Explaining of Post-*Tanzimat* Ottoman history with a special reference to colonialism and orientalism thesis is a deadlock.

Thereby Emrence's offer for approaching the nineteenth century Ottoman history from three regional trajectories coastal, interior, and frontier could be a step to go beyond the center and periphery, macro and micro, global and domestic dualistic views. His frontier trajectory is peculiar to Ottoman Middle East and he mentions two guiding policy principals applied into the frontier regions: first, to flourishing trustful networks in order to carrying out modernization project and second, to bargain and negotiate with local leaders through the leverage of Islam.²²⁴ Mustafa Minavi points out that adaptation of the idea of periphery for the Ottoman frontiers needs to be reconsidered. As Emrence puts it well, these concepts are born out of ideological stances. Utilizing center-periphery paradigm leads to biased interpretation of Ottoman government's action on eastern provinces as an extension of European colonial

²²¹ Cemil Aydın, Cemil Aydın, "Emperyalizm Karşıtı Bir İmparatorluk: Osmanlı Tecrübesi Işığında 19.Yüzyıl Dünya Düzeni, *Divan Dergisi*, v.44, 2007/1, p. 12-22.

²²² Cem Emrence, "Imperial Paths, Big Comparisons: the Late Ottoman Empire," *Journal of Global History* 3, 2008, p.289.

²²³ Cem Emrence, *Imperial Paths, Big Comparisons: the Late Ottoman Empire*, p.296.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.304.

practices amid the civilized “self” and uncivilized “other”.²²⁵ When Ottoman historiography examined over the center-periphery dilemma, all routed unavoidably goes to colonialism/orientalism thesis.

Sabri Ateş in his article entitled *Orientalism and our East* published in 2007 brought a different perspective to the debates on the Ottoman orientalism and colonialism. He distinguishes the perception of the east of the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic. According to him, Ottomans’ glance to his periphery was not exclusionist and negative. It signs the civilizing mission of the center. The final aim of the state was not assimilate or destroy the different ethnic groups or rural people. On the contrary, Ottoman state aimed to make them primary component of the state and confidential subject with their all differences. However, this approached has been broken in the republican area and rejected by republican elites. It should be kept in mind that primary components of the Ottoman Empire were not the nomadic rural people. The ideal citizen of the empire after the *Tanzimat* reforms was the people who were living in the city and *Sunni* Muslims. What is striking that people who were the outside of this definition cannot be alienated but they can transform into the settled, *Sunni* Muslims. For this reason, Ottomans inserted the nomads into the bottom of the civilization hierarchy and forced them become settled and *Sunni*. But, Turkish republic interpreted this transformation with strict nationalist sense. When Ottomans perceive their periphery as province or rural, Republicans see their east as other by internalizing the European racial based theories.²²⁶

In a nutshell, the nineteenth century was the age of reform whose great transformation has been carried out along the vast territories of the empire. In parallel with the changes and transformations in the world’s political and economic structure, Ottoman Empire felt the need of making reforms promptly. Although decision of modernization process has been taken by internal wish, it has been put into practice by imitating the west. Western educated bureaucratic class initiated the process. In particular to army, then all institutions of the state have been reorganized in accordance with its western counterparts. This also reshaped the state-society relations and to some extent it changed the ruling elite’s glance towards inhabitants of eastern provinces. Can Veyselgil’s master thesis shed light on the Ottoman perception of its periphery through

²²⁵ Mustafa Minavi, *Lines in the Sand: The Ottoman Empire’s Policies of Expansion and Consolidation on its African and Arabian Frontiers (1882–1902)*, (Unpublished PhD thesis: New York University, 2011).

²²⁶ Sabri Ateş, “Orientalism ve Our East”, *Doğudan*, issue 1, (September 2007).

traveller accounts and personal memoirs of high Ottoman officials who had served in the Arab and African provinces. Moreover we learned that many Ottoman intellectuals, who had never had a chance to travel to eastern part of the country, read the European traveller accounts. These European sources have an impact on their perception of east.²²⁷ Hence, his study is important to show that Ottoman intellectuals' perception of east was shaped by the thoughts of western travellers.

It could not be denied that the Ottoman ruling elite had feelings of superiority on the rest of Ottoman society. But it does not necessarily mean that they have an imperialistic/colonial mindset like its European peers. It is palpable that they use similar discourses when they described the "other". Generally the orient was characterized as backward, primitive and savage on the contrary the center represents the scientific, the rational and the civilized. As Kırmızı addresses that these people had a mission to civilize these group of people. But it is not peculiar attitude towards just Arabs, Bedouins, or other non-Sunni groups. Turkish ethnic groups in Anatolia have also come across with similar treatments. Hence, there were no distinct criteria independent from the ruler's self preference that describes the status of being civilized or not. Moreover, it should be born in mind that, despite the fine line between civilizing mission and colonization, Ottoman mission has not gone beyond the other side of the line. Under the umbrella of Ottoman, all groups of people could find a place for themselves with certain rights and freedoms. The concept of "alla Turca" or "borrowed" which is used to describe Ottoman experiences on the East signs the differences of it from the European experience inside and stresses its peculiarity.

6.2: Sudan As A Case Study for Ottoman Perception of Its Periphery

Our knowledge about the lives of the nineteenth century Sudan and Ottoman perception of Sudanese people is generally based on the traveler accounts of the Ottoman officials and intellectuals. Mehmed Mihri's *Sudan Seyhatnamesi*, Sadık el Müeyyed's *Afrika Sahra-yı Kebirinde Seyahat and Habeş Seyhatnamesi*, and Cami Baykurt's *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları ve Jön Türkler*, are the main sources to have an idea about the Ottoman perception of its periphery. My aim in this chapter is to put forward the Ottoman's gaze to the Muslim and non-Muslim Bedouin

²²⁷ Can Veyselgil, *The Ottoman Empire and the Rest of the World: Late Ottoman First Person Narratives Regarding the Ottoman Perceptions on the non-European World and the Ottoman Periphery*. (Unpublished Master thesis, Sabancı University, 2011), p.232.

communities in Africa and shows the similarities and differences from European colonial discourses. Particularly Mahdi revolt and the Mahdi's himself would be my basic concern to explain the Ottoman bureaucrats' approaching to this society and this movement.

Mehmed Mihri (1849-1915?) was born in Kirkuk as a son of local mullah. He took his first education there and around 1864 came to Istanbul and became a protégé of Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, the uncle of Egyptian Khedive Tewfik. He worked in the Sublime Porte's Translation Office several years then in 1878 appointed to the position of Ottoman Consular in Khoy, Iran. Between 1880s and First World War he undertook a service in the Khedivial family. During his career, Mehmed Mihri, had learned certain languages of the period and wrote several linguistic and literary books. In 1909, he accompanied Khedivial Prince Yusuf Kemal in his three months long hunting trip in the Nile Valley stretching into the Sudan. Later on he published a report about his voyage entitled *Sudan Seyahatnamesi*.²²⁸

In his account, Mihri glorifies Islam and ascribed a civilizing mission to it. According to him, the criterion for the civilization is the combination of the western technological advancements and Islam as the most accurate way of belief. Although the local people of the Sudan learned Islam from the Arabs such as reading the holy book and some religious knowledge, they were still quite far away from civilization. Through Islam, they relieved themselves from the ridiculous pagan customs.²²⁹ From this departure point, it could be deduced that Ottomans had a mission to spread the Islam to the non-Islamic people and to correct the false Islamic practices. It gave them a sense of superiority over the non-Muslim societies. In many sentences, he clearly mentioned about their strange and weird customs from their toilet habits to their hairstyles.²³⁰ In addition to this, Mihri regarded these tribal people as savage because of their different attitudes and customs from himself. For instance, the *Mitu* tribe's women were savage

²²⁸ Christoph Herzog and Raoul Motika, *Orientalism alla turca: Late 19th / Early 20th Century Ottoman Voyages into the Muslim 'Outback'*, p. 152.

²²⁹ Mehmed Mihri, *Sudan Seyahatnamesi*, p. 157

"Medeniyetten henüz pek uzak olan Sudan maarifçe pek geri ve lisan-ı Arabi üzere okuyup yazmağa ve tilavet-i Kuran-ı Kerim'e muktedir olanları dahi nadir ise de büsbütün hal-i vahşette dahi değildir. Din-i islamla beraber Arablardan hayli malumat ıktibas etmişlerdir. Havasının harareti iktizasınca avam-ı ahâlinin çoğu yalnız bir peştemal sarıp, yarı çıplak gezseler de şehir ve kasabalar ahalisi ve ileri gelenleri alelhusus Arab fellahları mükemmel surette telebbüs ederler. Her ne kadar ahlak ve adat-ı kadimelerinden bazılarını ... etmişler ise de henüz müşrik olan Afrika-i vasatı ve cenubi ve zencilerinin gülünç adetlerinden İslamiyet sayesinde kendilerini kurtarmışlardır."

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 208

"Şillik kabilesi kıvrıkcık saçlarını bir tarz-ı garip ve acayip tarzda örürler.... Rivayete bakılırsa bu akvam-ı vahşiyeninde hayvanat tezeğini, derisini ve sidiğini böylece istiğmal ile güzel güzel tuvalet(!) yapmaları sebebsiz ve hikmetsiz değildir. Her sabah tuvaletinin icrasından sonra ekseri erkekler bu hal ve heyet-i garibe üzere ellerinde mızrak akşama kadar nil sahillerindeki sazlıklarda ve ormanlarda gezinirler."

in the eyes of Mihri because they changed the form of their lips and imitated the wild animals shapes.²³¹ Moreover, their skills in the making of pottery, shoes and leather craft were the sign of their ability to be civilized. However, their houses made up of straw and cane were the indicator of their nomadism.²³² One of the important features of Mihri's account was the using of the photographs in the book. Those half -naked savage people who were dancing with their lances attracted the attention of his master, Prince Yusuf Kemal and he himself took the photographs by arraying them like in a military order.²³³ Indeed, taking photograph is one of the symbolic acts to address the relationship between photographer and the person who is photographed. It is also related to who is subject and who is object in the frame. The object is the bedouin people in this case and Khedivian Prince Yusuf Kemal is the subject who examines the object. There is a hierarchical relationship among their positions and it refers the superiority feeling favors the prince. Furthermore, if the photographs throughout the book are to be taken into consideration, it is obvious that khedivian Prince looks like a European governor rather than his Eastern counterparts. When the bedouins first saw the prince, they probably thought that he was a European who clothes like Europeans and even think like them. The mentality behind the prince's mind was not so much different than his European counterparts. They were savage, backward and primitive groups of people deprived of the blessing of the civilization. Although these savage people did not differ from the mankind and became happy and sad with similar things, they could be easily marginalized by the usual minds.²³⁴

²³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 215

"Mitü kabail-i kadınları yüzlerini dudaklarını, insana hayret verecek derecede kesip doğrarlar; bu hususda birbirlerine rekabet edercesine ilerlemişlerdir. Bunlar alt dudaklarının büyüklüğüne kanaat etmeyüp güya tenasüb ve intizam hasıl etmek için üst dudaklarını dahi hatra ve hayale gelmeyecek surete sokarlar. Bu vahşi karılar melbusatta ve gerek saçlarının intizamında hayvanat-ı vahşiyeden bazılarının şekil ve heyetini taklid ederler ise de dudaklarının böyle peyda heyetine getirilmesinin sebebini anlayamadım."

²³² *Ibid.*, p. 157-158

"....topraktan çanak çömlek ve desti ve kub gibi şeylerin imalı hususunda dahi maharetleri vardır. Derileri kendileri dibağat? ettikleri gibi bundan ayakkabı ve mevadd-ı saraciye vesaireyi de imal ederler. Şu sanatlara olan ehliyetleri medeniyete olan kabiliyetlerine delalet etmekle beraber meskenleri umumiyet üzere kamıştan üstleri saman ve otlar örtülü dairevi kulübelerden ibaret bulunması da hal-i tavr-ı bedeviyetlerine delildir."

²³³ *Ibid.*, p. 201

"....şarkı söyleyerek gelip bir vaz'ı ihtiram ile vapurumuzun karşısında durdular. Benimle kapudan birlikte karaya çıktık. Bu vahşi adamların yanına gittik; bunlar Arapça bilmediklerinden tercüman vasıtasıyla ne maksad ve meram üzerine böyle alay ile yanımıza geldiklerini sual ettiğimizde prens hazretlerini ziyaret için geldikleri cevabını aldık. Prens müşarünileyh henüz Şikargâhdan avdet etmemiş olduğu için bir saate kadar avdet edeceklerini kendilerine tefhim eylediğimde artık bunlar usul ve adatları üzere şarkı söyleyerek hepsi birden raks etmeğe başladılar bu sırada avdet eden prens hazretleri dahi bu hali görünce sinematografla fotoğraf alet ve edevatını celb ettikten sonra bunları usul-i askeri üzere saf tertib ve tanzim idüp bizzat kendileri bu vahşi adamların birkaç nev-ü tarzı üzere resimlerini aldılar."

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 211

"Bu yam yam ahalisi herkesin dediği gibi kuyruklu olmayıp bizzat gördüğüm bu vahşiler nev-i beşerden asla farkları olmadıktan başka bizim gibi mucib-i esef veya meserret olan ahvalde ya mutesif veyahut memnun olurlar."

On the other hand, Prince Yusuf Kemal's dressing and behaving like a European governor indicates his feeling of inferiority vis a vis Europeans. Can Veyselgil draw attention one more important issue about Mihri's *Sudan Seyehatnamesi*. According to him, Mihri uses the rhetoric of empty lands similar to colonialist power. He seems to internalize this rhetoric and perceived the Ottoman Empire as an equally colonialist power rather a victim of colonialism. As a potential Ottoman colony, Sudan was the direct competition area between France and Ottoman Empire.²³⁵

Sadık el Müeyyed (1858-1911) who was born in Damascus descended from the prominent *Azmzade* family in Syria. He received an education in military school and gained various military posts during his career. In 1884 he became an aide-de-camp of the Sultan and he took a part in the committee sending Germany in order to congratulate Wilhem II's throning in 1887. Same year, he was charged of taking the Sultan's gifts to Senusian *Sheikh Mahdi el-Senussi* in Libya. He visited the *Sheikh* in the lodge near to *Cağbub* town and prepared a report about the life of the dervishes and their allegiance to Sultan. He presented his report to the Sultan via Dervish Pasha on 3 December 1887. Then he was promoted to the rank of *binbaşı* on August 1888. Sadık el Müeyyed has been sent to the region for second time in the 1895. Similar to his first visit, he delivered the presents of the Sultan to the *Sheikh Senussi* and after his return to Istanbul he shared his two months experiences with the Sultan in a report and published his observations as a travelogue, *Afrika Sahra-yı Kebirinde Seyahat* in 1895.²³⁶

In 1896, the Ethiopian emperor Menelik II sent a diplomatic delegation to Istanbul to contact with Ottoman state and in return Abdülhamid II sent a delegation committee led by Sadık el Müeyyed to Ethiopia in 1904. During his three months travel in Ethiopia, he recorded his observations and collected information about the people and their customs and traditions. Later on, he presented his experiences as a report to the Sultan and published it as a traveler book, *Habeş Seyahatnamesi*, in 1904.²³⁷

In many places of his book, Müeyyed mentioned about the willingness of the local people to see him. Wherever he visited, people welcomed him enthusiastically. When they recognized that he was sent by the caliph, they prayed for the Sultan and displayed

²³⁵ Can Veyselgil, *The Ottoman Empire and the Rest of the World: Late Ottoman First Person Narratives Regarding the Ottoman Perceptions on the non-European World and the Ottoman Periphery*, p. 143.

²³⁶ İdris Bostan, "Sadık el Müeyyed Paşa" *Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi*, XXXV, p. 399

²³⁷ İdris Bostan, "Sadık el Müeyyed Paşa" *Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi*, p. 400.

a great amount of respect and care.²³⁸ This was a usual ceremony for Müeyyyed that he encountered such celebration in all Muslim countries. For instance, Somalians' welcome ceremony was so magnificent that Europeans living in the region said it was the most populous and stirring celebration they have ever seen.²³⁹

On the other hand, being Muslim or non-Muslim did not so much differ for Müeyyyed to categorize the local people as savage or not. For instance, Somalian people were Muslim and most of them were praying. But they did not take an adequate religious education. For this reason, they had a reputation with their bloodshed. In the wedding night, husband's beating of his wife to make her obedient was seen as a savage custom for Müeyyyed.²⁴⁰ Conversely, another tribe who was naked except for their private part was regarded as half savage by Müeyyyed that they were no ties with the religion.²⁴¹ According to Müeyyyed, desert people were dressing primitively. Some of them were barefooted; some wore pattens. Nevertheless, their warlike appearance left an indelible impression on people.²⁴²

Indeed, Müeyyyed used the similar colonial and orientalist discourse in his travelogue. When he arrived to Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia became a guest of *Hacı Ahmed Efendi*. He saw a gramophone in the residence of his host and become surprised because of encountering with a gramophone in Addis Ababa.²⁴³ This was a spectacular example to addresses the Ottoman prejudices over its periphery. Further, Müeyyyed treated a person who felt sick probably because of eating raw meat and grease

²³⁸ Sadık el Müeyyyed, *Habeş Seyahatnamesi*, p. 59

"Somaliler benim, taraf-ı eşref-i hilafet penahiden gönderildiğimi anlayınca büyük bir coşku(?) ve hevesle yanıma koşarak her yerde olduğu gibi şevketli Padişahımız Efendimiz Hazretlerine dua ettiler. Heyetimize hoş geldiniz dediler gerekli hürmet ve riyeti gösterdiler. Tren Hareket edinceye kadar Somalililer çoğaldıkça çoğaldı. Büyük bir kalabalık meydana getirdiler. Heyetimizin buraya gelişi bunlar için sanki özel bir bayram oldu. İstasyonlarda binlerce Somali, Halife-i Peygamber-i Zi-şan Efendimiz Hazretlerine olan bağlılık muhabbetlerini izhar ediyorlardı."

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.66.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p.59.

"Somalililer Müslüman'dır. Çoğu namaz kılıyor. Ama henüz layıkıyla dini terbiye görmemişlerdir. Bu nedenle bazıları kan dökücülük ve katliamlarla şöhret bulmuşlardır. İlk zifaf gecesinde giya itaatkar kılmak için, kocanın zevcesini bir kamçıyla dövmesi bazan kanını akıtması gibi vahşiyane adetleri vardır."

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p.237-238.

"Avret yerlerinden başka her tarafları çıplaktır. Bazılarının bellerindeki futadan başka omuzlarında da futa vardır. Manzaraları müthiş. Çünkü yarı vahşidirler. Bir dinle mütedeyyin değildirler. Bir erkek besleyebildiği kadar kadın alır. Bazılarının yedi, sekiz karısı vardır. Silahları ellerindeki bir harbi ile bellerindeki büyük bir bıçaktan ibarettir. Bunlar Habeş cinsinden olmayıp kendi başlarına bir kavimdir."

²⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 45.

"Bu reisler ilkel bir şekilde giyinmişler. Kimisi yalınayaktı. Kimisi Hicaz'da giyilen nalinlar gibi nalin giymişti. Buna rağmen insan üzerinde heybetli bir etki bırakıyorlardı. Vali onları görünce tokalaştı. Hepsini hatrını sordu. Kendileri reis olmakla beraber her biri cengaverlik timsali olarak gösterilebilecek tunçtan bir heykel gibi görünüyordu."

²⁴³ Can Veytselgil, *The Ottoman Empire and the Rest of the World: Late Ottoman First Person Narratives Regarding the Ottoman Perceptions on the non-European World and the Ottoman Periphery*, p. 115.

during his travels around Ethiopia. Müeyyed manages to heal the person through his anti-dysentery pills and then he claimed that Ethiopians resorted to the White men for their various illnesses. In the eyes of these people, whites were doctor, surgeon and omnipotent for everything.²⁴⁴ Müeyyed's performing of treatment was not only sign of his sense supremacy over the non-European societies but also sign of his equality with a European. Besides, Veyselgil takes an attention one more point about the colonial rhetoric in Müeyyed's account. According to him, when Müeyyed learned that there were cheap animals in the region, he contemplated to construct cheese and sausages factories to benefit from the comparative advantages of Ethiopia. Because animals were abundant and pastures were free. Trade of these animals' bones and skins was also easy. But Ethiopians was ashamed of using the sheeps and goats for milk because these were the right of the babies of the animals whose size were small to produce large amount of cheese. Müeyyed said that he often advised them benefitting from this source of wealth. Veyselgil argues that Müeyyed's approach is "the imaginary imposition of a series of civilized institutions on the landscape".²⁴⁵

Müeyyed frequently used the rhetoric of the noble savage, as well. He depicted morally superior and non-degenerated picture of "Bedouin" people. Once he said Bedouin, he expressed not to mean savage. He mentioned about the Bedouin people with the glorious words such as brave and elegant men who had excellent morality.²⁴⁶ Even their children were prideful that they never accepted the money given by Müeyyed as tip. Although they have simple dresses, modest houses and little food, they did not feel inferiority. They were not greedy and they were chaste people.²⁴⁷ However, these positive descriptions do not always necessarily mean that his real thought about Bedouins was quite favorable. During his journey Müeyyed met with a black man, *Fakih* Yusuf and described him: " Although he was black, he was very polite, gentle,

²⁴⁴ Sadık el- Müeyyed, *Habeş Seyahatnamesi*, p. 106.

" Buranın ahalisi hastalıkları ve her dertleri için beyazlara müracaat ederler. Onların nazarında beyazlar tabiptir, cerrahdır, her şeye muktedir. Beyaz renge ise pek itibar etmezler."

²⁴⁵ Can Veyselgil, *The Ottoman Empire and the Rest of the World: Late Ottoman First Person Narratives Regarding the Ottoman Perceptions on the non-European World and the Ottoman Periphery*, pp. 144-145.

²⁴⁶ Sadık el-Müeyyed, *Afrika Sahra-yı Kebirinde Seyahat*, p. 8.

"Bedevi demekten meram bunları vahşi göstermek değildir. İleride sırası geldikçe anlatacağımız bu adamlar pek güzel ahlaka malik ve zariftirler."

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

"Hiçbirine hatta çocuklarına bile bahşiş kabul ettiremedim. Kendileri bir şey vermeden başkasının verdiğini almak onlarca muayyebattan imiş. Libasları birer mavi gömlek ile birer takyeden, meskenleri hakir kulübelerden, nafakaları hurma veya deve sütünden ibaret olan bu çöl evladının nasıyelerinde alaim-i ibtilal ve zillet görülmez. Bilakis hepsi istiğna ve iffetin numune-i mücessemidir."

wise and poet.”²⁴⁸ This sentence implies that expected black person was different than this man. Moreover, Müeyyed placed a bet with a Bedouin about the their arrival time to the hill. But Müeyyed’s prediction was wrong and they arrived the hill very late compared to his prediction. Thereupon he said that he could not believe to be embarrassed in front of the Bedouin.²⁴⁹ Actually, this expression signs his feelings of superiority over the Bedouin.

As known, Sadık el Müeyyed’s mission was to bring the Sultan’s gifts to Senussi Sheikh. In his traveler account, he gave lots of information about this prominent dervish lodge and its activities in the region. The influence of the order was very widespread in the Saharan Africa and his sheikh and disciples were loyal to the Ottoman Caliphate and advised local people to obey the Sultan. Plus, they were aware of the competitions on their living space for this reason the sheikh refused the gifts sent by great powers. They maintained the security and order in the vicinity of their lodge and guide the Bedouins in the path of civilization. They taught the religion, agriculture and commerce, as well. They were desert civilizers who were the agents fulfilling the civilizing mission.²⁵⁰ The other Ottoman traveler, Abdülkadir Cami Bey also regarded the Senussian lodges as a part of new and civilized world among the black tents of the Africans, Berbers and Arabs.²⁵¹

Cami Baykurt was born in 1878 in Istanbul as a son of a lieutenant general, Mehmet Münir Pasha. He received his education from *Soğuk Çeşme Askeri Rüşdiye Mektebi* and *Kuleli Askeri Mektebi* and graduated from military school as a lieutenant in 1896. He learned French language and read set of philosophy and sociology books. After his graduation, he was appointed to Ghat district of *Trablusgarb* as administrative governor and military commander in 1905 in order to trace French colonial threat. In 1908, he was elected to the Ottoman assembly as a deputy of Fezzan. He wrote his memoirs regarding Tripoli in 1910 under the name of *Trablusgarb’tan Sahra-yı Kebire*

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.64

“Mümaileyh Zenci ise de gayet terbiyeli, nazik, fasih ve oldukça alim ve şairdir.”

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

“...Mansur Efendi artık ilerlemeyerek bir nokta-i tevaffuk intihabıyla kafilenin vürudunu beklememizin münasib olacağını söylediyse de ben bedevilere karşı mahcub kalmayı bir türlü havasalama sığdıramadım ve öteden zerrin şua bir fanus-ı cesim gibi tulu eden kamerin yavaş yavaş mavileşen aydınlığı içinde yolumuza devam etmek cihetini iltizam ettim.”

²⁵⁰ Can Veyselgil, *The Ottoman Empire and the Rest of the World: Late Ottoman First Person Narratives Regarding the Ottoman Perceptions on the non-European World and the Ottoman Periphery*, p. 244.

²⁵¹ Cami Baykurt, *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler*, p.39.

*Seyahat*²⁵² and later on wrote *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat* with Halide Edip's encouragements.²⁵³ Throughout his long journey, Baykurt came across with several tribes and he gave variety of information about daily lives of the local people. Their clothes, foods, beverages, traditions and customs, religions, rituals and tribal relations were taken into consideration by him.

Herzog and Motika give a striking example to understand the Ottoman perception of the local people. The Tuaregs who were the Berber tribes of the central Sahara were savages and a threat to security. They did not like the Ottoman management and harmed the caravan trade and even feared the settled population. Plus, They did not pay their taxes. The overall picture drawn by Cami Bey about Tuaregs was negative. He described them as bloodthirsty, greedy, cowardly and big-mouthed. Cami Bey did not make a plan to civilize these tribes, but he saw them as subjects of the colonial rule.²⁵⁴

According to him, the inhabitants the city of Ghat was living a "polis" life of first civilization age.²⁵⁵ When he arrived there, there was a *qadı* and a *qaimakam* from a local population who represent the Ottoman Sultan. They had still continued the slavery mode of production and matriarchal systems. This system functioned well until the *Tanzimat*'s monolithic regulations. But this system was primitive and old any more.²⁵⁶ For Cami Bey, people who dealt with the gaining of wheat by rubbing two stones are inferior to Arabs who used the hand mills. They were living in the Neolithic era.²⁵⁷ In other place, Cami Bey defined these poorest tribes as the lower strata of the society in terms of being civilized and claimed that he were processing wheat like Stone Age people.²⁵⁸ He claimed that Tuaregs were living a miserable life but even worse *Tibu*

²⁵² Cami Baykurt, *Trablusgarp'tan Sahra-yı Kebire Doğru*, (İstanbul:Ark Yayınları, 2011).

²⁵³ Cami Baykurt, *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler*, (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2009), pp. xi-xii.

²⁵⁴ Christoph Herzog and Raoul Motika, "Orientalism "alla turca": Late 19th / Early 20th Century Ottoman Voyages into the Muslim 'Outback'", pp. 192-193.

²⁵⁵ Cami Baykurt, *Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Hayat: Çöl İnsanları, Sürgünler ve Jön Türkler*, p. 194.

"Gat cemaati ilk medeniyet çağının küçük siteler hayatını yaşıyordu."

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 196.

"Gat'a geldiğim zaman Osmanlı Padişahını burada temsil eden yerli halktan bir kaymakam ve bir de kadı vardı. Fakat hakimiyet iptidai halk cumhurunu temsil eden kapı senatosu elinde idi. Osmanlı devleti Müslüman olmayan dini cemaatler hakkında olduğu gibi göçebe akvamin geniş imparatorluğunun bucaklarında iptidai siteler hayatı yaşayan cemaatlerin de eski kölelere dayanan içtimai ve hukuki nizamını değiştirmeye kalkmamıştır. Tanzimatçılığın tek çeşitli düzenini her yerde tatbik sevdasına düşünceye kadar memleketi rahatça idare edebilmiş olması bu serbest tutum sayesinde olmuştur."

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 204

"Gat cemaati köle iktisat düzeni matriarka usulü ile eski çağlardan bir numune idi. İki taşı birbirine sürterek buğday öğüten Gatlı ve Tuareg ise medeniyetçe küçük el değirmeni kullanmak mertebesine yükselmiş olan Kuzeyin çöl Arabına göre neolitik devrin insanı."

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

"Kuzey Afrika Sahrası'nın göçbeleri arasında Azgar Tuareg'i şüphesiz en yoksul olanlardandır. Şati'nin Arablarına nazaran medeniyetçe çok aşağı derecededirler. Arap'ın hiç olmazsa çadırında küçük bir taş değirmeni vardır. Halbuki

tribes lived in the south of Fezzan were more inferior than *Tuaregs* that they were not different from bunch of monkeys walk around the extinct volcano of *Tibesti*.²⁵⁹ On the other hand, Although Sadık el Müeyyed said that *Senusians* welcomed him enthusiastically and they were intimately loyal to the Sultan, Cami Bey did not optimistic as much as Müeyyed. He thought that *Senusians* displayed xenophobic attitudes towards themselves like they showed *Berberian* tribes. It was time to leave the last territory of the Ottoman Africa. He felt as despised parasite in this distant place conquest by his ancestors and accused the Sultan Abdülhamid due to this miserable state.²⁶⁰

As we known from the Mahdi's own letters to Muslim leaders, his movement had religious characteristics and "his revolution was against the Turks who changed religion and replaced it by *kufî*". Muhammad Ahmed and then his caliph wrote similar letters to Khedive and invited him true religion. Once their call failed, they declared holy war (*jihad*) against the Turks. The revolt was only way to live true religion due to Turkish mismanagement and corruption.²⁶¹ Mahdi revolt from the Ottoman points of view was a rebellion (*harekat-ı isyaniyye*) against Christian governor of the country and Egyptian maladministration.²⁶² Right after the Mahdi revolt (29 June 1881), the nationalist Urabi uprising had outbroken in Egypt on September 1882. Indeed, the first document regarding the Mahdi revolt reached Istanbul on December 1882. Hence, it was a year after when Ottoman government received the news of rebellion. As mentioned before, probably at the first stages of the movement, it was not taken seriously by the local governors. Egyptian rulers were preoccupied with the Urabi revolt, so Mahdi's uprising

Tuareg hatta Gat'ın şehirli halkı bile iki taş parçasını birbirine sürterek buğday öğütmekte idiler. Taş devrinin insanları gibi."

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p.211.

"Tuarg'ın serseriyane ve sefil hayatı işte böyledir. Fakat Afrika'nın Büyük Sahrasında onlardan daha aşağısı yok değil. Fizan güneyinde, Tibesti'nin sönmüş eski volkanları üzerinde yaşayan Tibuların o civarlarda dolaşan maymun sürülerinden farkları çok azdır. Hiç olmazsa Targi'nin kirli bir yorganı vardır."

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p.40.

"O Sünusiler ki Berber kavimlere has yabancı düşmanlığını bize karşı da göstermekte idiler. Her hal ve tavırlarıyla Son Osmanlı Afrikası'nı da bırakıp gitmek zamanı gelmiş olduğunu bize anlatmak ister gibi davranmaktaydılar. İmparatorluğa o zamanki inkılapçı Türk nesli için bu hal ne elem verici bir şeydi. Biz bu imparatorluğu kurmuş olan şanlı ecdadın namert torunları, baba mirasının bu uzak köşelerinde hor görülen sığıntılar olduğumuzu gördükçe bu düşkünlüğümüzün yegane mesulü Sultan Hamid'e kinimiz artıyordu."

²⁶¹ Gabriel Warburg, *The Turco-Egyptian Sudan: Recent Historiographical Controversy*, p. 196.

²⁶² Ali Akyıldız ve Zekeriya Kurşun, *Osmanlı Arap Coğrafyası ve Avrupa Emperyalizmi*, p.410.

"Cenubi Arabistan'da olduğu gibi Merkezi Afrika'da dahi müzmin bir surette hüküm-ferma olan Mehdi hareketinden biri bin üç yüz sene-i Hicriyye'sine dğru Sudan-ı Mısırı'de zuhur etmeğe başlıyor. İsmail Paşa'nın Sudan cihetlerinden mülhakat-ı Mısriyye'nin hududunu tevsî ile Darfur'da, Kerdefan'da ve Hatt-ı İstiva gölleri mıntıkasında tesis eylediği idarenin memurlarının zulm ve irtikabı, rüesa-yı kabailin basilica menba-ı varidatı olan esir ticaretinin ilgası ve böyle bir idarenin başında Hristiyan ve ecnebi memurlar bulunması yüzünden ahali-i mahalliyyenin nefret ve şikayetini mucip olması ve muhafaza-i inzibata kafi kuva-yı askeriyyenin fıkdanı gibi esbab-ı mütenevvia-i içtimaiyye ve idariyye hidiv-i müşarünileyhin evahir-i vilayetinde zemini bir hareket-i isyaniyye için hazırlamış bulunuyor."

was neglected. Due to this time proximity among these revolution attempts though Mahdi's rebellion started earlier than Urabi's, the Ottomans were more concerned by the Urabi revolt. Even in a personal memorandum, Abdülhamid would draw a comparison between the Sudanese Mahdi and Urabi referring to the Mahdi as 'brigand worthy of the title- a second Urabi (*Urabi-i Sani*) Urabi became in the Sultan's mind, something of an epithet for rebellion. Abdülhamid regarded Urabi and his supporters as "vermin".²⁶³ So the Sudanese Mahdi was also perceived as vermin because he was threat to Sultan's political and religious authority. However, if the news about the Mahdi rebellion reached on time to the Sultan, probably Urabi would be called as Mahdi-i Sani (a second Mahdi) and the approach of the Sultan to the Urabi uprising or Egyptian question would be changed.

At the beginning Muhammad Ahmed was named as *mütemehdi* (false Mahdi) in the archival documents. After the certain victories of Mahdi, an edict of Sublime Porte ordered on 28 November 1883 that he would be labeled as the *shaqi* instead of *mutemehdi*. The *shaqi* denotes a bandit or rebel in general. In the eyes of Ottoman authorities, he was rebellious against the rule of the Sultan and threat to the territorial integrity of the Empire.

Abdülhamid II was more concerned about the spreading of the Mahdi's ideas to the Hejaz province. Furthermore, one of the important generals, Osman Nuri Pasha had been appointed to the governorship of Hejaz in 1882. Osman Nuri Pasha as a veteran statesman and general had prepared a report about the reforms in the Hejaz area on 17 July 1885. This report is also crucial source to understand the Ottoman's stance towards its periphery close to Sudan. In general sense, this report was a reflection of the policies based on order and progress in the provincial administration. At the beginning of the report, the union of the Muslims has been emphasized and Pasha advised to increasing relationship between Ottoman Sultan and Hejaz. The second theme of the report was the reforms on the administration, economy, judge, education, and transportation for progress and continuation of the state. He used *bedeviyet* and *medeniyet* words in order to define nomadism and sedentary. According to him, nomad people had to be settled otherwise they would wage their primitive customs and deprive of the blessing of the civilization. Furthermore, the transportation was under the control of the nomadic tribes who tended to robbery and banditry in Hejaz and particularly in the *Hajj* season threatened

²⁶³ Selim Deringil, *The Ottoman Response to the Egyptian Crisis of 1881-1882*, pp.20-21.

the security of the roads.²⁶⁴ Furthermore, he believed that there are six conditions for the continuation of the state in the path civilization: division of the politics, constructing of the state buildings, establishing *nizamiye* tribunals, extending of science and education and advancing the means of arts and industry, arranging of the incomes of the certain region, and constructing roads and bridges.²⁶⁵

Indeed, Osman Nuri Pasha has seen the nomadic people as an obstacle in front of the progress and development of the state. Because, state cannot penetrate into the people and impose sanctions to regulate the social life in the state of the nomadism. At this juncture, people has been alienated and hated from the state. They would protect their savage customs and traditions by depriving of the happiness of the civilization in the state of nomadism and poverty. Because of their necessity, they would attack the settled areas and they would apply to state in order to satisfy their requirements. Hence, they became an insufferable burden for the state. Nomadic people cannot participate the civilized world due to the fact that they were destitute of civilized laws and education.²⁶⁶

Briefly, Osman Nuri Pasha approached the nomadic people from the modernizing perspective. State structure, laws, education, buildings, science and art were all the signs of civilization for him. Nomadic people who were lack of these blessings were the backward and savage who resist the rules and regulation of the civilized world. For this reason, they should be forced to settle down. Moreover, in 1886, the reasons of Osman Nuri Pasha's removal from his duty stemmed from his strict administration which neglects the local customs and traditions of the Hejaz people. As seen, Ottoman state was not in favor of the enforcing policies toward the local people. When they noticed that Osman Nuri Pasha's project alienated the people and disinclined to the state, he was discharged from the governorship of Hejaz province. However, the permission of the state to implement the modern laws and regulations on the nomad people to some extent prove that the state favored Osman Nuri Pasha's policies but at the end his dismiss was the other indicator that there was a limit of the state to gain the alliance of these people whether they were backward or not.

²⁶⁴ S. Akşin Somel, "Osman Nuri Paşa'nın 17 Temmuz 1885 tarihli Hicaz Raporu", *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi*, v.29 (Ankara University,1996).p, 1-4.

²⁶⁵ S. Akşin Somel, *Osman Nuri Paşa'nın 17 Temmuz 1885 tarihli Hicaz Raporu*, p. 9.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

To conclude the Ottoman orientalism/colonialism debate, it could argue for the Sudanese Mahdi case that Ottomans perceived Sudan territory as an integral part of Egypt and namely of their own. So it could be said that Ottoman Empire saw these distant territories as colony. Mahdi revolt was a rebellion attempt against the Sultan's caliphate because Muhammad Ahmed was named himself as the successor of the God's prophet like the Ottoman Sultan. For this reason it could be claimed that the Mahdi challenged the religious authority of the Sultan. Furthermore, he refused to pay taxes and thereby revolted against the status quo. He was a usual *shaqi* (bandit) in the eyes of the State. His movement was the insurrection. (*harekat-ı isyaniye*).

However, Egypt's colonial aspirations on Sudan were obvious since Muhammad Ali Pasha's reign. From the very beginning, Egyptian rulers conquered the country for the sake of its immense human and material sources. Later on the modernization projects put in practice in the Sudan. Slave trade was abolished and taxes collected more centrally. Veteran European governors were charged to manage the country. When Egyptian rulers followed the patterns of western civilization, to large extent they resembled to Europeans. As seen Mihri's traveler account Prince Yusuf Kemal who visited the Europe several times was dressing like a European ruler, hunting the animals and taking photographs with them. He saw the local people as savage, backward and uncivilized who needed their help to find the right way. Egyptian ruler's approach towards these local people was undistinguished from the any European governor. They had embraced the European values to be modern or civilized. The modernizer gaze of Egyptians was clear for the Sudanese people.

On the other hand, I thought that this perspective cannot generalize for all Ottoman governors or Sultan's himself. For the case of Sudanese Mahdi, archival documents did not give us any impression that Ottoman central elites saw the Sudanese people or Mahdi himself as savage or backward. It is possible that the diplomatic and official language of the documents hinders to get such an idea or examined documents are inadequate to claim such argument. Yet, Sadık el Müeyyed's travelogue gives us an idea to understand their mentality. He was from Syria and probably familiar with the tribal culture. For this reason, we came across many sentences glorify the bedouins, tribes and local people in his account. The main aim of his travel was to strength the feelings of solidarity and brotherhood among the Muslim societies via sending gifts to local rulers and sheikhs. It could be said that he was the symbol of Abdülhamid's

politics of Pan-Islamism in Africa. He was also supporter of this policy as understood from his account. However, it is certain that he had some prejudices about the people of desert. Regarding the Mahdi revolt, he briefly mentioned his confrontation with some Mahdi dervishes during his journey but he did not use any negative words when he talked about this event.²⁶⁷ For this reason, it is hard to say that Ottoman Empire, if we keep the Egypt outside, colonized the Sudanese territory and performed western type of colonial policies. However, the superior gaze toward the region or the movement was very straightforward.

²⁶⁷ Sadık el Müeyyed, Afrika *Sahra-yı Kebirinde Seyahat*, p.26

CONCLUSION

The Mahdi revolt was one of the important case studies to shed light on the Ottoman policy towards the Saharan Africa and on the views of the Sultan against the radical Islamist movements in the late nineteenth century. The first contact of the Ottoman Empire with African continent has occurred in sixteenth century. The conquest of Egypt started the Ottoman dominance in the North Africa and in the following four hundred years the Ottoman sphere of suzerainty continued to spread into the inside of the continent. In 1555, Habeş province was established with the order of Sultan Süleyman and as the symbol of the state authority, the *sikkes* were coined and the *hutbes* were read on behalf of the Ottoman Sultan. Besides, important port cities in the Red Sea shore like Massawa, Sewakin and Zeila had also been conquered by the Ottoman navy during this time.

Muhammad Ali who was the Ottoman viceroy of Egypt in 1820 undertook the conquest of the northern Sudan for the sake of gold and slaves. Thereby the first Turkiyya period has been started in Sudan. There is no evidence that the viceroy had obtained permission from the Sublime Port for conquering the Sudan. The *firman* of 13 February 1841, which conferred this position on the viceroy, also recognized him as the governor of the provinces of Nubia, Darfur, Kordofan, Sinnar and all their dependencies outside the boundaries of Egypt, but without the right of succession. The prerogatives of the Egyptian province have been gradually enlarged with the other *firmans* and as a result of the amendments, Egypt has legally adhered to Ottoman Empire, politically it gained semi-autonomous status.

In 1882, British forces invaded Egypt with the pretext of Urabi Pasha revolt. Meanwhile Muhammad Ahmed had already proclaimed himself as the expected Mahdi in the Sudan. The Mahdi has widened his sphere of influence in a short time and when the Egyptian authorities who were preoccupied with the Urabi uprising, noticed the

seriousness of the incident, Muhammad Ahmed had already won his first victories. It was neither a seeking for nationalist state nor for a struggle of independence. It was prominently a religious movement. The Mahdi was a revivalist leader who wished to return to the conditions to the prophet Muhammad had lived in first Islamic state. For these reason, he declared the holy war against the “Turks” who were particularly corrupted Egyptian rulers and Christian British administrators. His mahdship has gained acceptance and spread to other communities via his devoted followers and disciples. Although the movement had lost its strength after the death of the Mahdi in 1885, British and Egyptian expeditionary forces have been already heavily defeated by the *Ansar* a number of times and Britain had lost two important generals, Hicks and Gordon Pasha, during the war against the Mahdist dervishes.

On the other hand, the argument, Mahdi had taken stance against the Ottoman authority in the Sudan is also debatable. Because, when the Mahdi revolt occurred in 1881, Egypt was not invaded by Britain and the uprising was against the Egyptian administration that ruled the country for sixty years. Furthermore, the Mahdi had declared holy war against the infidels who were the British officers governing the country. Throughout the uprising, *Ansar* forces had merely confronted with Egyptian and British army. From this point of view, there is no clear opposition against the Ottoman state. However, when the Mahdi proclaimed himself as the caliph of the world and declared holy war, he had indeed challenged the authority of the Ottoman Sultan who was the widely accepted caliph of the Muslim population. On the other hand, the real enemy of the Mahdi was the “Turks” as it is understood from the letters of Mahdi and his successor *Abdullah el-Teaşi*. The actual meaning of the “Turks” is controversial in the Sudanese history. The term was generally used to refer to all foreign authorities who administrates the country. Hence, Anglo-Egyptian period in the Sudan historiography was also named as the “second Turkiyya” period. So, it could be deduced that the Mahdi movement firstly opposed to the actual rulers of the country, Egyptian administration and then British government whose officers were charged with the administration of the country by the permission of the Khedive. He was a religious leader and British colonialism and his subcontractors were in the target of Muhammad Ahmad. In the eyes of Ottoman authorities, he was perceived as a *shaqi* who was rebellious and a bandit against the rule of the Sultan and as threat to the territorial integrity of the Empire.

According to Yasamee, there were three peculiar features of Abdülhamid's response to the Mahdi revolt: fear of revolution, non-intervention, and legalism. Due to the fact that strategic position of Egypt located across the Holy Cities was increasing the contingency of the spreading of revolt to the Holy places. Consequently, Ottoman government's first concern was to prevent the insurrection from spreading into neighboring regions. Secondly, Sultan Abdülhamid behaved timidly to the Khedive's proposal to support the Egyptian army with Ottoman soldiers. Because sending troops means joint operation with the British forces against the Islamic population. Furthermore, he believed that the Mahdi revolt was a British-inspired plot and Sudanese question could not be separately solved from the Egyptian question. There was also possibility of Ottoman soldiers' joining the followers of the Urabi Pasha in the Sudan. Hence, the Sultan limited himself to watch the marches of events without taking an active role in the region. Lastly, legalism as the most comfortable option has been used effectively by the Ottoman Sultan. British decision to separate the Sudan from Egypt was a breach of the Sultan's *firman*s which guaranteed the integrity of the Khedive's territories.

Ahmed Muhtar Pasha served in Egypt for twenty-three years and has been appointed as high commissioner to monitor the current situation and to write reports about the reforms in the Egyptian administration and army as well as the ongoing negotiations with Mahdist supporters. Despite his counterpart Drummond Wolff has been recalled two years later, he remained in Egypt as the representative of the Sultan. His status was no longer legitimate since his counterpart left the Egypt. However, his existence bothered Khedive and British Consular, Baring by narrowing their sphere of influence. On contrary, he created reliance among Egyptian people. Although his power of sanction was very limited even symbolic, he solely aimed to protect the rights of Ottoman state over Egypt. At this point, there is an important thing that deserves to be taken into consideration. This symbolic power also denotes the inability of Ottoman Empire to colonize the continent at least in the Sudan. There is no actual Ottoman army or Ottoman governor to manage the country like the conditions of India, the great colony of the Britain in the nineteenth century. Ottoman penetration to the region has been restricted with the cultural ties and has not gone beyond the religious motives.

Furthermore, the idea of Pan-Islamism (*Ittihad-ı Islam*) has been produced as a remedy against the rapid colonization movement of the Muslim territories. Since the

empire had lost the hegemonic power in the continent, Pan-Islamism as a cultural unit has been utilized to increase solidarity, brotherhood and unity feelings among the Muslims. Berlin-Bagdad railway project was the most remarkable steps towards this goal. Besides, the letters, presents and embassies have been dispatched to the important centers of the Muslim world in order to strength the unity against the colonialist powers.

Regarding the Ottoman orientalism/colonialism debate, it is hard to say that if we keep Egypt outside Ottoman Empire colonized the Sudanese territory and performed western type of colonial policies. Moreover, the superior gaze toward the region or the movement was very straightforward. Because; in the nineteenth century Egypt de facto declared its independence from the Ottoman Empire. So; thinking of Egyptians and Ottomans policies separately could make the incidents more understandable. On the other hand, I thought that Egyptian orientalist/colonialist perspective cannot generalize for all Ottoman governors or Sultan's himself. For the case of Sudanese Mahdi, archival documents did not give us any impression that Ottoman central elites saw the Sudanese people or Mahdi himself as savage or backward. It is possible that the diplomatic and official language of the documents hinders to get such an idea or examined documents are inadequate to claim such argument.

Consequently, there is a recent increase of studies concerning the Ottoman-African relations in the historiography. Most of them tend to exaggerate the Ottoman strength in the continent. However, this study came to the conclusion that in the last quarter of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire has lost its military and economic strength to deal with the great powers for particularly remote regions. The best solution was to benefit from the conflicts among Europeans and to highlight its sovereignty rights on the certain territories without intervening there. Sudan was one of the lands which was distant and gained through Egyptian invasion. From these studies point of view, Sultan Abdülhamid was not seeing this part of the country as an integral or essential part of the Empire. When colonialist powers has been seen in Africa, a map showing the accurate borders of the Egypt had been immediately demanded from Ahmed Muhtar Pasha that it shows even the Sultan was unaware of the exact borders of his Empire. Besides, Ottoman soldiers have been never sacrificed for the Sudan territory and at that time when Egypt was under the occupation of British army, fighting for Sudan was trivial. On the other hand, the Mahdi revolt was to some extent echoed within the empire. At the beginning it was neglected by the authorities due to the fact that there were always

Mahdis throughout the history of Islam and even concurrent Mahdis had arisen in different corners of the Empire. For the case of the Sudanese Mahdi, the Ottoman Sultan thought that it was a British sham to postpone the date of evacuation from the Egypt. His only concern was spreading of the movement across the neighboring places, thus Hejaz garrisons had been immediately reinforced and religious men and *risales* had been sent to the region in order to break Mahdi's influence. Indeed, those acts were done for the sake of keeping the holy cities and remove the Sudan pretext of Britain to fix the evacuation date of Egypt. In discourse, Abdülhamid has staked out a claim on the Sudanese territory and highlights the Ottoman rights of sovereignty in the region; he did not take *de facto* role in the course of events.

APPENDIX

سواد نه ظواهریه شقی به دانش نجبه فخر میرد حبایه ایرنه مذاکراتی متضمنه تنظیم و تقدیم فلحنه اولیه مضطرب منظر علی
 بر لری مضطرب مذکور نک خاتم سنده بونک بر کرده وها مذکره سید نجبه مذاکرات نک نکرا عریضی لری دیانه
 اولینه د[سرهای ۹۹ تا پنجم مورخ ادویه دولتی کوه بوطرفه واصل ادویه و بر جوی نفا موجب ایستادن
 اساده قلمه تفرا فامده مرتوب شقی دار مجاز دایمکنده و بریدیه معلومات و خصوصیه انکسار نک بونک
 صریه کینک عدیده سواکنه کلیدی و بر مقدار عکرا بدویری حامله دیگر بر انکسار سفینه شک دخی کلک از
 بولنیک مودی اولدینی متضمنه بولانه فقره ایلم متمرکز متولونه طرولیه سواکنه سلاطین محله احوال و فواید
 نقلیه باب عالی به نظر باقیمه و نکب قشبه بولید جفته دار معلومات و بریوایر مجاز ج دخی اکا توفیق
 ایلمس موجب استفاده و کسالت اولدینی متضمنه اولدین استار ابوجه جالب نظر دقت را خفا کونک منی بونک
 توصیفه علاوه مذاکرات اولدین لایحه مرده اولید بنا علی استو تفرا فام مندرجه انکسار مذکره و بریدیه
 تمارک دیو بایره لایحه لایحه اولدین تدابیر مکنک سربا عرصه دایماری دشتی مرقوم حقنه مندی
 تعبیر نک استقامی قطعا موافقه حکمت و مصلحت اولدینی ذکر دانسته و بطرفه مروری بولانه دذات فام
 ندر لایحه دخی تصدیقه اولدینی جفته عادات اظلام تقادیم بودیم بر صوره فساد لرون حدوده باعث اولدین جفته
 مستحق اولدینی شقی نامید یاد ایلدی اقتضا ایدیه جفته بونک بونک بونک بونک بونک بونک بونک بونک
 ترکی و عربی و فرانسجه غرضه لرون جفته سنده مرقوم شقی نامید یاد اولدینی حقنه اجاب ایدینه غرضه
 اکیده قطعه ایلدی مقتضای اردو زمانه حضرت باور هیله اولدین باور اردو زمانه حضرت باور اردو زمانه

محمد زکریا
 ۱۶ مه ۱۳۰۱

BOA, I. MTZ. (05), 23/1115

BOA, I. MTZ.(05), 23/1115, no: 2, 27 Muharrem 1301 (28 November 1883)

“Sudanda zuhur eden şakiye dair encümen-i hususide cereyan eden müzakerat-ı mutazammın tanzim ve takdim kılınmış olan mazbata-i manzur-ı ali buyruldu. Mazbata-i mezkurenin hatimesinde bunun bir kere daha müzakeresiyle netice-i muzakeratın tekrar arz -ı luzumu dermeyan olunmasına ve fi 5 teşrin-i sani 99 tarihiyle müverreh olup dünkü gün bu tarafa vasıl olan ve bir sureti leffen savb-ı sami-i sadaretpenahilerine irsal kılınan telgrafnamede merhum şakiye dair hicaz valiliğinden verilen malumat ve hususuyla ingilterenin bir büyük harp gemisinin Aden’den Sevakine geldiğini ve bir miktar asker ile topları hamilen diğer bir ingiliz sefinesi dahi gelmek üzere bulunduğunu mervi olduğunu mutazammın bulunan fıkra ile mütemehdi ihtilalinden dolayı Sevakın misüllü mahaller ahvalince vuku bulacak tekallübata bab-ı alice ne nazarla bakılacağına ve ne gibi teşebbüste bulunulacağına dair malumat verilir ise hicazca dahi ona tevfik-i meslek olunması mucib-i istifade muhsenat olacağını mutazammın olan işar bi’l vucuh caleb-i nazar-ı dikkat ve itina görünmesine mebni bunlar dahi komisyonca ilave-i müzakerat olunmak lazımeden olmasıyla binaenaleyh işbu telgrafname mündericatında tezekkürüyle verilecek kararın ve bu babda lazım’ül ittihaz olan tedabir-i mükemmelenin serian arz ve izbarı ve şaki-i merhum hakkında mütemehdi tabirinin istiğmali kat’an muvafık-ı hikmet ve maslahat olmayacağı zıkr olunan mazbatada mühürleri bulunan zevat-ı fahham nezdlerinde dahi tasdik olunacağı cihetle adeta izhar-ı şekavetle böyle birçok fesadların hudüsüne bais olan bir habisin müstehak olduğu şaki namıyla yad edilmesi iktiza edeceğinden bundan böyle gerek her türlü muhariratta ve gerek Türkçe ve Arapça ve Fransızca gazetelerin cümlesinde merhumun şaki namıyla yad olunması zımmında icab edenlere tenbihat-ı ekide-i katiyye icrası mukteza-i emr-i ferman hazret-i padişahiden olmağla ol babda emr-ı ferman hazret-i veliyu’l emrundur.”

BOA, İ. MTZ.(05), 23/1115, no: 2, 27 Muharrem 1301 (28 November 1883).

قرای حساب شهریار به حال توبسی به اذن حقیر

حاکم
 انصاف
 ۱۹ سره اولیای
 تا یقین جویا حکیم غفر انما جلیده عهد و پیمان ایستیم یاکونک تریک بنو و مورچه نسخ مطهر عربی نه به زلفه قلیو
 بویله اوزره لغا عهد و تقسیم ایدم بویلا مطهر و لایحه قضای طبع ایدرله وینقص صورتده ادرجه نتر ایدرله اوزره بولنده یاکونک قوتونه
 ترتیب درجه طبعی دره کولمچین حصار کیمسه اطفند ایدم حکمی ادعا اولمرازم قوم عربک ایکنه درو ترجمه اولما مزاج و نظایر نظایر
 بولنده بریده تا یقین نافع حصولی شهریز کور بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده
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 اوزرین و لایحه کولمچین قلیو ایدم ههکله اوزرین حقت مملکته ایدرله بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده
 و لایحه قلیو



BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 6/27, 11 Muharrem 1301 (12 November 1883).

“Kurna-i cenab-ı şehriyariden saadetlu Besim Efendi hazretlerine
Saadetlu efendim hazretleri 19 teşrin-i evvel 99 tarihliyle cevaben çektiğim
telgrafname-i çakeride arz ve beyan ettiğim risalelerin Türkçe bir nüsha-i
muharreresiyle nusuh-ı matbua-i arabiyesinden bir kıtasını manzur-ı ali buyrulmak
üzere leffen arz ve takdim eylerim bu risale matbaa-i vilayette harfiyyen tab ettirilmiş
ve yine de hafî surette olarak neşr edilmek üzere bulunmuştur risale-i merkumenin tertib
ve tercümesiyle tabı dört gün içinde husule getirilmiş olmakla öyle mükemmeliyeti
iddia olunamaz ise de kavm-i arabın iki seneden beri tecrübe olunan mizaç-ı efkarına
nazaran Bu kadarca bir şeyden tesirat-ı külliye-i nafia husulü şüphesiz görüldüğünden
bundan gayet mahrem vesaitle Mısır ve Şam ve Yemen ve Irak ve Sudan taraflarına
nusuh-ı kafiye irsal ve neşri teşebbüsünde bulunuyorum risalenin mündericâtı
mütemehdinin neşriyat vakasının mahv-ı tesirâtı yolunda icab-ı hal ve maslahata tevfiğ
edilmek istenilmiş ve istitla olunan ahvale tevfiğ edildiği zannında bulunulmuş olduğu
cihetle bunu kablel istizan tertib ve tab’a vaki olan cüret-i bendeganemden dolayı affımı
istit’a ve isaf-ı istida-yı kemteranem emrinde delalet-i aliye kerimanelerini temenna
eylerim her halde emr ferman hazreti men lehulemrundur 11 muharrem sene 1301 ve
20 teşrini evvel 99. Vali ve Kumandan-ı Hicaz”

BOA, Y.PRK.UM. 6/27, 11 Muharrem 1301 (12 November 1883).

“Hartum’da bulunan mütemehdi Abdullah’ın “sultan-us Sudan” unvanıyla bi-t’telkib ilan-ı keyfiyet olunması sevahil-i hicaziyenin nezaketini taz’if eyleyeceğinden sevahil-i mezkurenin muhafazası içün irsali Hicaz vilayetinden arz ve inhâ olunan üç-dört küçük vapurun serian tehiyyesiyle gönderilmek üzere atebe-i ulyaya arz-ı keyfiyet olunması vilayet-i müşarünileyhadan bu kere dahi telgrafla vaki olan isti’cal üzerine te’kiden emr ü ferman buyurulduğu şeref-vürud eden tezkire-i aliyye-i asafanelerinde işar buyurulmuştur. Basra içün tertib ve techiz olunmuş olan iki kıt’a vapur Basra sevahilince derkar olan ehemmiyet ve elzemiyet ve ol babda canib-i bab-ı âliden vuku’ bulan işarâta mebni ledel-arz şeref sunuh buyurulan emr ü ferman-ı keramet-i unvan hazret-i şehinşahi mantuk-ı âlisi vechile oraya gönderilmek üzere bulunmuş ve hal-i hazırda elde techiz edilmiş başka vapur kalmamıştır. Mamafih zaten Cidde’de beş kıt’a süfün-i hümayun bulunduğu gibi orası içün müretteb olub ba-irade-i seniyye-i hazret-i hilafet-penahi muhtacin-i hüccacı almak üzere gönderilen Paris vapuru da ba’del-avde yine oraya gönderileceğinden şu halde Cidde’deki vapurun miktarı altı kıtaya baliğ olacağına bi’l-arz mütemehdinin hareketından sevahil-i Hicaziye içün endişe edilecek bir cihet-i melhuz olsa bile sefâin-i mezkure icab eden nukat-ı mühimmeye taksim ve tayin olunduğu halde emr-i muhafazaya kifayet edebileceğine nazaran sevahil-i mezkure için yeniden vapur tertip ve irsaline pek de lüzum görülmemekte ise de mamafih oraya sefine irsali sureti emr-ü ferman buyurulduğu takdirde ahşap Ertuğrul Firkateyn-i hümayun mücehhez ve müheyya bulunduğundan onun Girid’e ve Girid’de bulunan Fırat ganbot-ı hümayununa dahi Cidde’ye irsali münasib olacağının ve bu babda emr-ü irade-i kerâmet-i âliye-i hazret-i şehinşahi her ne suretle şerefrîz-sünuh ve sudur buyurulur ise mantuk-ı âlisi infaz kılınacağına arz ve ifadesine ibtidar kılındı. Ol babda emr-ü ferman Hazret-i menlehül-emrindir. Fi 8 Muharrem sene 1306 (1888). Nazır-ı bahriye.”

BOA, Y.. PRK.ASK, 50/47, 8 Muharrem 1306 (14 September 1888).

“Sudan’a sevk olunmak üzere hıdiv-i Mısırın bazı memuriyeti hafıyye vesatet ve marifetleri ile Anadolu tarafına asakir-i muvazzafa tahrir ve celb etmek teşebbüs altında bulunduğu vasıl-ı semi-i ali olduğu gibi yine Sudana gönderilecek süvarilerin (?) tahsis olunmak üzere Suriye cihetinden dahi hayvan ıstırasına teşebbüs olunmuş olmasına mebni bu suretle başıbozuk askeri tahrire katan müsaade olunmaması ve hafıyyen yazılacak olur ise gönderilmemesi ve bu babda müsamaha olduğu halde şediden mesul olacakları bilinip ona göre hareket olunması hakkında iktiza eden vilayata ve geçen gün maruz-ı huzur-ı ali kılınan tezkere-i samiye-i fehmaneleri üzerine teftiş-i askeri komisyonunda bu hususa dair bir karar verilinceye kadar Suriyeden vesair vilayetlerde bu suretle olunması esb ıstırasına müsaade olunmaması vesayasını havi Suriye vilayetine ve iktiza edenlere ba telgraf tebligat-ı ekide-i müessere ifası hususunun dahiliye nezaret-i celilesine havalesi ve bu babda tahkikat-ı mahsusa icra buyurulacağının daha yazılacak telgraflara ilaveten tefhim ve ibnası muktezay-ı emr-i ferman hazret-i padişahiden bulunmuş olmağla ol babda emr-i ferman hazret-i veliyulemrundur. Fi 24 Cemaziyelevvel 1300 ve fi 21 Mart 1299”


BOA, İ.MTZ(05) 23/1096, 24 Cemaziyelevvel 1300 (2 April 1883).

مضمون نامه قیصریه در دوازده شماره با تفاوت در مضمون

نور و قورقون بکره کوه خرم و صابیه و قشایر و در دی بجهت ان مهم نفع از زبده و عسل و نور شویکم بدین
 یاد یانه بکنی بعضا قریب و بعضا دور و در دوازده شماره و در دوازده شماره و در دوازده شماره و در دوازده شماره
 حال که این نامه ده در این شماره و در این شماره و در این شماره و در این شماره و در این شماره و در این شماره
 حال که در سر ده ان بکره بجهت قورقون و در دوازده شماره و در دوازده شماره و در دوازده شماره و در دوازده شماره
 با حرف او و بکره کوه و در دوازده شماره و در دوازده شماره و در دوازده شماره و در دوازده شماره
 محمد رضا

“Mısır fevkalade komiserliğinde varid olan şifreli telgrafname suretidir. Lord Cromeri’in geçen gün Hartum’da meşayih-i urbâna şayana dikkat bir nutk verdi içinde en mühim noktalar zirde arz: olunur şu iki bayrağın yan yana bulunması badema kraliçe ile hidiv tarafından müştereken hükm ve idare olunacağınıza alemetdir. Serdar ikisinden de iktidar-ı kamileyi haiz olduğundan hakimeniz işte yanınızdadır. Andan başkasına müracaat olunmayacak ve her işiniz onun tarafından tesviye olunacaktır. Kraliçe her hükümdardan ziyade Müslüman teb‘aya malikdir. Sizler de onlar gibi bahtiyar kalursunuz. Artık eski zulmetlerden kurtuldunuz. Din ve ...dan kat‘an bahs etmemiştir. Nutk aynen bi’t-telgraf Avrupa’ya gitti. Ol babda... Fi 28 kanun-i Evvel 1314 Ahmed Muhtar”

BOA, A. MTZ. (05) 14B/ 85 28 Kanun-i sani 1314 (10 December 1898).



BOA. Y.MTV. 36/88 23 Rebiyulahir 1306 (27 December 1888)

“Devletlü efendim hazretleri

Mütemehdi namına sim mecidiyeyi takliden yapılmış ve Hicazda ele geçirilerek bu kere nezarete götürölmüş olan bir parça gümüş aynen ve leffen arz ve takdim kılındı. Ol babda emr-u ferman hazret-i veliyu’l emrundur. Fi 26 rebiyü’l ahir sene 1306 ve fi 15 kanun-ı evvel sene 1304.Telgraf ve Posta Nazırı”

BOA. Y.MTV. 36/88 23 Rebiyulahir 1306 (27 December 1888)

ماش کائنات داری

سید کاظم علی

“Kongo hükümetinin Sudana doğru ilerlemek istediği noktaları mısır taalluku olup olmadığının işarı Muhtar paşa hazretlerine yazılması üzerine evvel emirde sudanın bir kıta haritası bab-ı alice hidiviyet-i Mısıriyeden talep edilerek suretinin kendisine irsali münasib olacağı ifadesini şamil cevaben gelen tahriratın takdimine ve böyle bir haritanın gönderilmesi hidiviyet-i müşarünileyhaya tebliğ edildiğine dair enmile piray-ı tazim olan fi 8 ramazan 1311 tarihli tezkere-i hususiye-i sedaratpenahileri melfufuyla lede’l takdim meşmul-u negah-i ali olmuş ve sudan kıtası sahipsiz ve hal-i araziden madud olmayıp firdevsi aşıyan sultan Abdülaziz han hazretlerinin devr-i saltanatlarında büyük pederi ismail paşa hazretlerinin hidiviyeti hengamında zikr olunan Sudan kıtasında Darfur ve hartum vesair mevaki ba idare-i seniye sevk edilen asakir-i Mısıriye-yi şahane marifetiyle feth ve zabt ile taht-ı tasarruf-u idareye idhal edilerek oralarda mehakim tesis olunmuş ve ahalisine vergi tarh edilerek kendilerinden asker alınmış velhasıl oraları mısır ilhak ve ilave olunarak keyfiyet-i ilhak hidiviyet-i mısıriye ısdar ve ihsan olunan feramin-i alide tasrih ve beyan edilmiş olduğu malum bulunduğu halde kıta-i mezkureye arasına bazı taraflardan ve Kongo cihetinden tecavüz edilmek istenilmekde olduğundan büyükpeder ve pederi zamanlarında bu suretle tasarruf ve idare altına alınmış olan mahal-i mezkureye vuku bulan tecavüzata meydan verilmeyerek mısır idaresine alınan ve fermanlarda musarraha olan mahal ve arazinin velhasıl hudud-ı mısıriyenin muhafazasına itina ve dikkat edilmesi luzumunun ve lede’l hace buraca dahi düvel-i ecnebiye nezdinde teşebbüsât-ı mukteziyede bulunulacağının hidiv mısır paşa hazretlerine ba tahrirat tebliğ ve işar ve buralarının beyan ve tebliğiyle komiserlik vezaifi bu nokta-i nazardan ifa etmesi hususunun dahi Muhtar paşa hazretlerine izbar olunması mukteza-i irade-i seniye-i hazret-i hilafetpenahiden bulunmuş olmağla ol babda emr-u ferman hazreti veliyul emrundur. Fi 10 ramazan sene 1311 ve fi 5 mart sene 1310 Serkatibi hazret-i şehriyari Süreyyadır.”

BOA, İ.MTZ(05) 29/1584, 10 Ramazan 1311 (17 March 1894)



THE MAHDI.

James Dermesteter, *The Mahdi: Past and Present*, p.60.



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Father Joseph Ohrwalder, *Ten Years Captivity in the Mahdi's Camp: 1882-1892*, by Major F. R. Wingate, London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company, 1893. p.107.



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
No. 2249.—VOL. LXXX.

SATURDAY, JUNE 10, 1882.

WITH SIXPENCE.
TWO SUPPLEMENTS. 3d. Part. 4th.




ARABI PASHA, THE WOULD-BE DICTATOR OF EGYPT.—SEE PAGE 102.



1. Remains of a Village, destroyed by an Inundation of the Nile. 2. View of the Arabian Mountain Range.

PIRE SKETCHES, BY OUR SPECIAL ARTIST.—SEE PAGE 102.


London News, 10 June 1882



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وسمک اوزوندہ کوریلن پریس حضرتلریک ۱۹۱۰ سنه سنه دفعه ثانیه سودانه سیاحتلرندہ بلجیقا
(وحیدالقرن) : تک پوزولی ، یاخود (العزقہامالقرن) دیغلین کرکدن
مستعمراتندن (لادو) ده صید ایندیکی کرکدن



برئیس طرقتدن نو طوطوغرافیه ورسولری التان شلک اهلایسی

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